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II 
Efficiency, Survival, and Non-Performing Loans in Islamic and Conventional Banking in the 
GCC 
by 
Maha Alandejani 
Abstract 
The success of Islamic banks is determined by several factors, among which are their 
performance, efficiency, stability and ability to grow in conjunction with the economic and 
financial growth of the GCC’s national economy. Due to the successes resulting from these 
factors, which are located within the inherent value system of Islamic finance, the GCC’s Islamic 
banks were praised for their resilience during the recent financial crisis. This research thus aims to 
examine the efficiency, performance, survival-time analysis and issues related to non-performing 
loans (NPL) in the case of the Islamic banks within the GCC through four different yet 
interconnected empirical essays.  
The first essay aims to examine the technical efficiency of the Saudi Arabian Islamic banks in a 
comparative analysis with the Sharia-compliant windows of Saudi Arabian conventional banks by 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for the period from 2005 to 2010. In doing so, some 
selected variables related to the banks’ characteristics also are examined through second stage 
regression of the DEA model. Overall, the results indicate that the performance of Islamic banks 
decreased sharply until it reached its lowest level in 2008. In addition, as a result of the influence 
of environmental variables, it has been found that the efficiency of Islamic banks was affected 
negatively more than traditional banks during the period in question. 
The second essay aims to measure the efficiency and productivity growth of the banking sector in 
the GCC through DEA meta-frontier analysis for the period from 2005 to 2010. This essay offers a 
comparative study on two levels: between each country and between three types of bank, namely 
Islamic banks, conventional banks providing Islamic windows and conventional banks. The 
second stage of the analysis attempts to examine the influence of the banks’ characteristics, 
financial structures and rule-of-law variables on technical efficiency (TE) scores by applying a 
two-stage approach via panel random effect and bootstrap models. The findings reveal that Islamic 
banks have underperformed in comparison with Islamic window banks during the specified 
period. However, the catch-up value of the total factor productivity illustrates that Islamic banks 
appear to be the most productive group.  
The third essay aims to investigate the survival time of Islamic and conventional banks in the 
GCC countries, taking into account the impact of the global financial crisis by employing the 
discrete-time duration models for the period of 1995 to 2011. In addition, to examine the 
differences between banks, a range of explanatory variables from both the micro- and macro-
levels are included in several models. The results from hazard and survivor functions indicate that 
the Islamic and conventional banks form two distinct bank types, where Islamic banks potentially 
have a higher incidence of failure and therefore a shorter survival time. The discrete-time duration 
model findings for the all-banks-pooled model confirm that the hazard rate increases with Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, the analysis of each bank type reveals that the effect of covariates on survival 
time differs between Islamic and conventional banks. For instance, increasing the net interest 
margin ratio causes the hazard rate in Islamic banks to rise, whereas this rate is lowered in 
conventional banks. 
The fourth essay aims to identify the macro- and micro-level factors determining NPL in Islamic 
banking within the GCC via the panel data econometrics model for the period from 2005 to 2011. 
In addition, this paper examines the impact of the sectoral distribution of Islamic financing on the 
NPL in the GCC banking system as a whole by utilising dynamic panel data models. The findings 
indicate that the relationship between efficiency and NPL supports the “bad management” and 
“bad luck” hypotheses. Further, the sectoral distribution of Islamic financing extended by the GCC 
Islamic banks shows an adverse impact on NPL, thus demonstrating that Islamic bank financing, 
which is related to real estate and construction projects, increases the credit risk exposure. It is 
suggested that increasing financing by profit-and-loss-sharing instruments could enhance loan 
quality, thereby implying that the growth influence of fixed-income debt contracts could increase 
NPL more than profit-and-loss-sharing contracts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
Islamic banking and finance (IBF) is considered to be an innovative and novel method 
of financing that is based on Islamic principles, which have been developed over the 
years. During the early stages of Islamic history Muslims worked to create financial 
contracts with no interest for the purpose of mobilising capital to finance commercial 
needs. Given that the Islamic structure worked efficiently for centuries without 
institutionalisation, such a development within Islamic finance has only been made 
possible in the last quarter of the twentieth century (Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002). 
From the perspective of Islamic economists, Islamic banks (IB) are classified as 
financial institutions working via an essential principle of profit and loss sharing 
(PLS), which is derived from the Islamic moral economy. In other words, transactions 
in IB are different from those in conventional banks (CB) since they function with 
participating revenues acquired from the use and investment of funds, rather than by 
means of generating income through the use of interest rates (Ayub, 2007; Kettell, 
2008).  
IB offer a range of financial services and products; most of them are categorised into 
trade and investment, and they are based on equity participation and on profit-, loss- 
and risk-sharing between banks and investors. In addition, there are many types of 
contracts and financial instruments within the IBF universe. 
IBF contracts are grouped into two categories: contracts that are based on PLS, which 
involve mudarabah and musharakah, and contracts that are based on cost-plus-sale, 
deferred sale contracts or fixed income, which create types of debt including 
murabahah, salam, ijarah, istisna. In addition, Dar (2003) categorises four kinds of 
financial instruments that are used as alternative options to interest: investment-based, 
sale-based, rent-based and service-based. Crucially, PLS instruments are preferred by 
2 
Islamic economists, yet murabahah or cost-plus-sale contracts are the most popular 
instrument as PLS instruments are more at risk than cost-plus-sale contracts. For this 
reason, most IB use murabahah as a substitute for credit in CB (Ayub, 2007).   
Another important principle of IBF is that Islamic transactions must be backed by real 
assets (Eedle, 2009). To illustrate this notion, CB lend money for any financial 
requirements so as to be paid interest on the money lent; that money could be 
provided for financing the purchase of assets. However, whether or not it is provided, 
CB do not own the assets, they are only concerned with interest and the return of their 
principal amount of money. On the other hand, the principles of IBF institutions do 
not allow them to finance any requirement without the transfer of the ownership of the 
asset (Usmani, 2009).                   
Based on these fundamental principles, the IBF industry, which emerged in the 1970s 
as a modern institution of the religious-historical knowledge, has shown tremendous 
growth over the last thirty years. This growth can be attributed to a number of factors: 
increased Islamic awareness in the Muslim world in the sense of a search for Islamic 
identity, the increased wealth mainly in the GCC region due to petro-dollars, and the 
recognition by the global financial system of IBF. Millions of Muslims around the 
world need banking services for many purposes, such as financing a new business, 
buying a house or a car, facilitating capital investment, undertaking trading activities, 
and as a safe place for savings.  
The period from the mid-1970s to the 1990s was vital in the history of the growth of 
IBF for four reasons. Several Islamic financial institutions were established in many 
Muslim countries around the world, and the corresponding Islamic finance products 
were adopted and offered by a number of multinational CB. Further, the development 
of Islamic finance witnessed the advance of financial modes, transactions and 
products. Importantly, in the third stage of development, the applications of such 
Islamic finance functions and modes were acknowledged by two international 
institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This 
acknowledgement has been evident in their publications since the early 1990s. 
Finally, three countries in the Muslim world, namely Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, 
replaced interest in their banking systems with Islamic finance models (Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005). Likewise, until the present day, the number of commercial and 
3 
investment IB around the world has increased so that they now exist in more than 
seventy-five countries (The Banker, 2013).  
To identify the developments that have taken place in the IBF industry, the number of 
banks reporting sharia-compliant assets can be used as evidence, which has increased 
to 185 in 2013 (The Banker, 2013) from scratch in the last forty years. The assets base 
of IBF institutions has grown rapidly over the years; for instance, according to The 
Banker (2013), the assets of Islamic financial institutions over the world increased 
from USD 1166 billion in 2012 to USD 1267 billion in 2013, thus recording 8.67% 
annual growth. In addition, the compound annual growth rate of the IBF industry from 
2007 to 2013 has also been remarkable, as it has demonstrated healthy progress at 
16.02% (The Banker, 2013).   
As for the tipping points, IBF practices are intensively applied in the Middle East area 
and within the GCC region in particular, which represents the largest number of IB 
and the largest percentage of assets. Such a growth trajectory can be attributed to the 
increase of oil revenues that generate a large amount of liquidity in the GCC 
countries, which has notably had the result of increasing the number of IB 
significantly since the 1970s. For instance, in 2013 the percentage of the global total 
assets of IB accounted for by the GCC region was 39.2%, compared to 38.6% in non-
GCC Middle East countries, 19.6% in Asia, 1.7% in Australia, Europe, and America 
and up to 0.82% in Sub-Saharan Africa (The Banker, 2013, November). In the course 
of such developments, many large IB have been launched since the first Islamic bank 
(namely the Dubai Islamic Bank), including the Al-Baraka Group and the Al-Rajhi 
Bank. Importantly, Saudi Arabia represents one of the biggest parts of the market in 
Islamic finance and investment, for in 2013 it was estimated at USD 227.2 billion 
(The Banker, 2013).  
It should be noted that IBF institutions, as part of the banking sector, have a 
significant impact on the economic and financial sectors in the Gulf countries. Despite 
having faced fierce competition from CB and adverse political attitudes from the 
establishment, IB have  remained an important growth area.  
Due to the dramatic rise in oil income throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the banking 
sector in the GCC countries grew considerably. Jbili et al. (1997) point out that until 
4 
the 1990s most dealings in the GCC banking sector were generally associated with 
short-term lending to finance the trade and building sectors (Hussein and Omran, 
2005: 2). During the 1990s, after the adverse effect of the First Gulf War, the capital 
and base deposits of the GCC’s IB were increased; their productivity was also 
advanced by employing new technology (Hussein and Omran, 2005).  
Over the last decades a number of IB have been established with various asset sizes. 
According to The Banker (2013), the Al-Rajhi Bank has the largest amount of assets 
within the GCC’s IBF industry at USD 71 billion; it is followed by the Kuwait 
Finance House, which accounts for USD 52 billion. The National Commercial Bank 
(NCB), which as a conventional bank, provides a sharia-compliant window, and the 
Dubai Islamic Bank, have USD 27.8 billion and USD 25.9 billion respectively, and 
are also among the top IB in the world. It is important to state that IBF has also made 
important inroads in other parts of the world; the most remarkable development has 
been witnessed in Malaysia, but some of the European countries have opted to 
facilitate IBF in their countries in a bid to attract GCC financing. 
Despite such developments, there still exist certain challenges. For instance, IBF 
institutions suffer from inappropriate regulatory regimes, and the shortcomings in 
invention and product development remain important and challenging for IBF 
(Hancock, 2009). In addition, Hussein and Omran (2005) state that GCC IB need to 
expand their size and evolve operations for improving performance in order to face 
competitors.  
It should be noted that the success of IB depends on several factors, among which are 
their performance, efficiency, stability and ability to grow. These factors are coupled 
with the economic and financial growth of the national economy by taking into 
account the impact of any factor related to the financial surroundings, such as the 
global financial crisis. Hence, this study is extensively focused on GCC Islamic 
banking and aspects of its performance. 
When providing the specific context of the topics in this study, an increasing amount 
of empirical research conducted on the dynamics of IBF and on the factors 
contributing to its success has been published, with particular emphasis following the 
middle of the last decade. Significantly, this research has been primarily concerned 
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with the performance and efficiency of IBF institutions by using their efficiency as a 
measurement, whether through financial indicators or methods that are utilised to 
compute their efficiency scores, to evaluate both their individual and general 
performance in the banking industry (Mokhtar et al., 2007). Equally, stability-related 
studies emerged in response to the global financial crisis, such as Hasan and Dridi 
(2010) and Parashar (2010).  
In the existing body of knowledge related to efficiency analysis, two types of 
approaches are utilised to measure efficiency: non-parametric and parametric. For 
example, the non-parametric approach involves Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and the parametric approach includes the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). 
Further, some studies have measured efficiency and productivity growth, to specify 
the differences in production technologies of groups of firms or countries in a 
particular industry by employing the meta-frontier approach (such as O'Donnell et al, 
2008; Chen and Yang, 2011).  
A few studies on IB have investigated efficiency and performance in particular 
through the application of the meta-frontier approach in the Gulf region, yet the 
limitations of the data have obstructed any inclusive analysis in the last three decades 
(Sufian, 2006). In addition, the collection of data from across several countries with 
very different economies is a challenging matter when studying efficiency and 
performance issues in IBF institutions (Johnes et al, 2009). It is important to note that 
most of the available studies in the subject literature have been conducted within 
Malaysia. Only a small number of studies have, however, been conducted to 
investigate performance-related issues for IB in the GCC region (e.g. Johnes et al., 
2009; Srairi, 2010; Srairi, 2011; and Ben Naceur et al., 2011).  
With regard to issues of survival analysis and stability, exploring the survival-time 
analysis and the risk of bank failure, studies are generally based on probability and 
likelihood forms. Such topics are investigated through duration-time methods, of 
which there are two main types: continuous-time models and discrete-time models. 
Most studies have, however, focused on applying continuous-time models to 
investigating the risk of bank failure (for example, Lana et al., 1986; Leung et al., 
2003; and Evrensel, 2008). Significantly, this topic is quite recent and infrequently 
investigated within Islamic banking. For instance, Pappas et al. (2012) provided a 
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comparative analysis between IB and CB that were at risk of failure by utilising a sort 
of continuous-time model, namely the Cox PH model.  
In the face of global financial crisis IBF was praised for its resilience by various 
sources, yet the deviation from its ethical foundation is somewhat concerning in terms 
of IB developing practices similar to those seen in CB. It is therefore important to 
investigate the stability of IBF so as to identify whether there has been any deviation 
from its trend-based growth. It is only through stability that greater efficiency and 
high growth can be attained. A crucial part of these concepts of sustainable growth 
and efficiency (and by extension stability) is considered to be that of ‘non-performing 
loans’ (NPL). This study also then aimed to explore the NPL in the case of the GCC’s 
IB with the intention of identifying the determinants which should be considered as 
expanding the narrative initiated within this study. Indeed, beyond political economy 
reasons, the macroeconomics-oriented business cycles have an impact on the creation 
of NPL, which should be considered alongside the financing types and trends of IB, to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of the determinants of NPL in the GCC 
region. Thus, the economic reasons for NPL are considered to be an important aspect 
of the research in this study when continuing with the efficiency narrative, as 
indicated at the beginning of the study. 
The other aspect of sustaining the efficiency, growth and stability of IB is that of the 
NPL or the problem loans issue, which is deemed to be a key factor among the causes 
that lead to bank failure (for example, Demirguc-Kunt, 1989 and Whalen, 1991). 
Investigating such matters, several studies have taken different approaches; thus, 
Berger and De Young (1997) examined the link between cost efficiency and NPL via 
the Granger causality method to explore the intertemporal relationship directions 
between them. Several studies investigated the determinants of NPL in developed and 
developing countries by applying the dynamic panel data through generalised method 
of moments (GMM) methods (see, for example: Salas and Saurina, 2002; Espinoza 
and Prasad, 2010; and Louzis et al., 2012). Nonetheless, in relation to studies of IB, 
issues of bank financing and NPL are explored infrequently.  
1.2	AIMS AND OBJECTIVES		
The main aim of this research is to explore and analyse efficiency, performance, 
survivability and NPL in the case of the GCC’s Islamic banking with the objective of 
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providing a comparative analysis between IB and CB in the region. This analysis is 
provided via four different topics and via empirical modelling in the form of four 
studies.  
The following objectives are developed to fulfil the research aims for each individual 
essay, as is shown below:      
(i) The first essay aims to investigate and analyse empirically the efficiency of IB 
and CB in Saudi Arabia. For this aim, the following objectives are developed:  
a) To provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of the technical 
efficiency level of the IB and traditional banks that provide Islamic 
windows. 
b) To examine the impact of some internal financial indicators on the Saudi 
banks’ efficiency, which are related to the quality of loans, liquidity, and 
bank type.  
(ii) The second essay aims to measure and investigate the efficiency of IB and CB in 
the GCC countries through meta-frontier analysis. In fulfilling this aim the 
following objectives will be developed:  
a) To measure the technical efficiency levels of the GCC’s banking sector.  
b) To evaluate the gaps and achieve comparable efficiency scores through a 
comparative study on two levels, as all banks in these countries operate 
under different technologies and different bank groups; between each 
country in an individual frontier, then between three bank groups, namely 
IB, IW, and CB. 
c) To measure the total factor productivity growth via the MPI in order to 
investigate the catch-up term, which locates how a country’s or group’s 
frontiers perform in terms of production points and productivity growth 
towards the meta-frontier from period t to period t+1.  
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d) To examine the high potential influence of banks’ characteristics, 
financial structures and rule-of-law variables on the efficiency scores that 
are obtained by the DEA meta-frontier method.  
(iii) The third essay aims to investigate the survival analysis and risk of bank failure 
through time-duration models for IB and CB of the GCC countries. In pursuing 
this aim the following particular objectives will be developed: 
a) To measure the survival-time of IB and CB by taking into account the 
impact of the global financial crisis and other circumstances by employing 
the discrete-time duration models.  
b)  A range of explanatory variables from both the micro-level and the 
macro-level are included in several models to explore the risk of bank 
failure and the hazard rate. 
c) To examine whether IB or CB are more susceptible to the risk of failure. 
 
(iv) The fourth essay aims to investigate the macro-level and micro-level factors 
determining NPL in the GCC banks. When completing this aim the following 
objectives will be developed: 
a) To explore the impact of some selected sectors of Islamic financing and 
Islamic finance contracts on the NPL of both the Islamic banking and 
commercial banking systems of the GCC countries as a whole.  
b) To identify the macro-level and bank-level factors that contribute to NPL 
in the GCC Islamic banking system through the panel data econometrics 
model. 
c) To examine the dynamic impact of these factors that determine the NPL 
of the GCC banking sector by utilising dynamic panel data (GMM) 
models.  
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the identified research aims and objectives, the following research questions 
are developed in each essay: 
(i) For the first essay, the research question is: do IB perform better than CB in 
Saudi Arabia? And if so, how far can these banks influence the efficiency level 
of the commercial banking sector as a whole? Further, what factors determine 
the efficiency of Saudi banks? 
(ii) For the second essay, the research questions to be explored are as follows: 
Among the GCC countries, which country’s IB and CB are more efficient, 
productive and perform closest to the meta-frontier? With regard to the bank 
type, which bank group has an outstanding performance and has been more 
productive over the years? With regard to all of the utilised variables, which 
variable has a significant impact on a bank’s efficiency? Do government and 
foreign ownerships play an important role in determining a bank’s efficiency? 
Does the rule of law have an effect on a bank’s efficiency?  
(iii) For the third essay, the research questions are as follows: Are IB or CB more at 
risk of failure? Do the micro-level and macro-level variables contribute enough 
to compute the hazard rate of the GCC banking sector?  
(iv) For the fourth essay, the research questions to be discussed are as follows: Do 
the Islamic sectoral financing and Islamic finance contracts contribute when 
determining the NPL of Islamic banking and of the whole commercial banking 
sector of the GCC countries? If Islamic contracts contribute when determining 
the NPL, which sort of contract has a potential significant impact on NPL, 
fixed-income contracts, or PLS contracts? Do the macro-level and bank-level 
variables determine the NPL? Do these variables have a significant and dynamic 
impact on the NPL of the GCC banking sector?  
1.4 THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
As identified, this research is constructed through four empirical papers. In the first 
paper, as mentioned, the efficiency of the Saudi Arabian IB and IW are examined. As 
being the largest GCC economy, Saudi Arabia houses a number of fully fledged IB 
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have been operating, and most importantly all CB in the country offer Islamic banking 
services through Islamic window (IW). Thus, it is substantially significant to the 
present study to start by examining the efficiency of the Kingdom’s IB by comparing 
their performance with the other traditional banks provide Islamic window, through 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DAE) method by taking into account the effects of some 
environmental variables related to bank’s characteristics. Therefore, to investigate the 
influence of such variables on the Saudi banks’ efficiency, the second stage regression 
of DEA method is applied. Moreover, Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is utilised 
to examine the robustness of the estimated model of DEA second stage regression.  
In the second paper, this study utilises the meta-frontier approach to measure the 
technical efficiency and to obtain an accurate comparison between the GCC countries 
and the three bank types as this approach takes into account the technology 
differences across the countries and firms. In addition, the meta-frontier approach is 
employed with the DEA method, which helps to measure the efficiency between 
different countries (Ben Naceur et al., 2011). Further, it utilises the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI) to evaluate productivity change over time and to obtain the 
catch-up rate (Chen and Yang, 2011). Moreover, to determine the variation in 
efficiency scores, which are produced from the meta-frontier approach, several 
environmental variables related to the banks’ characteristics, financial structures, and 
regulations are employed with different models, including bootstrap procedure, as are 
derived from Simar and Wilson (2007).   
The third empirical essay and modelling aims to provide a survival-time analysis and 
risk of bank failure related issue for the GCC countries, in which the continuous-time 
and discrete-time models are applied to investigate whether IB or CB are more 
susceptible to the risk of failure. It commences with the life-table method, which is a 
non-parametric technique and unconditional analysis that depends on the observation 
of failure events (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002); this is followed by the conditional 
analysis, which is based on the availability of data and covariates at a micro-level and 
macro-level (Evrensel, 2008). Furthermore and most importantly, the third study 
pivots on the application of ‘complementary log-log’ (cloglog) to estimate the banks’ 
failure; a comparative analysis will then be conducted between IB and CB.   
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The last essay provided in this study is based on studies related to NPL, which 
examine the macro-level and micro-level factors in determining the NPL of IB and 
IW, in the GCC countries via means of the panel data econometrics model. In 
addition, it examines the factors contributing to NPL in the GCC commercial banking 
sector as a whole by utilising more sophisticated econometric tools to observe the 
time-condition impacts on the NPL through dynamic panel data (GMM) models. 
Crucially, among those examined factors, the present study investigates the impact of 
Islamic financing and Islamic finance contracts on the NPL, which enables the 
identification of Islamic finance in the NPL of the Islamic banking sector and in the 
NPL of the GCC commercial banking system as a whole. 
1.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
Despite the attention shown by many researchers to the performance, growth and 
stability of IBF institutions, the prior literature on such issues is limited in the case of 
GCC member countries. It is important to state that many of the existing studies suffer 
from certain shortcomings, such as that suggested by Bashir (2000), who pointed out 
in his paper that ‘several Islamic banks are not included and several interesting 
questions are not answered’ (Bashir, 2000: 25). In relation to measuring the efficiency 
of the Saudi banking sector, and according to the existing studies, only one study has 
investigated the performance of Saudi banks, namely that by Akhtar (2010). However, 
his study examines efficiency and productivity without presenting a comparative 
analysis between IB and CB. This study therefore presents an accurate comparison 
between IB and CB with Islamic windows of technical and scale efficiencies by taking 
into account the impact of some selected variables that relate to the banks’ 
characteristics, which are bank type, ratios of loan quality and liquidity.  
It should be indicated that there are not enough empirical studies which shed light on 
measuring the efficiency and productivity change of the IB and CB of GCC countries 
via the meta-frontier approach by endogenising the impact of environmental variables, 
and in particular those that are related to financial structures and the rule of law on 
technical efficiency. Given that the meta-frontier method evaluates the gap between 
the meta-frontier and the group frontiers of each country or bank group, this helps the 
research to provide a precise comparative description between each country and 
between the IB and IW and the CB that do not offer such windows (O’Donnell et al., 
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2008). The findings of both empirical essays that analyse the efficiency of IB in Saudi 
Arabia and then in other GCC countries are therefore expected to identify the most 
efficient institution, country and bank group so that they can be used as benchmarks to 
improve the performance of other IB in the region.  
With regard to survival analysis conducted using the GCC’s IB in this study, there is 
only one recognised study, by Pappas et al. (2012), that examines the failure risk of IB 
in a number of countries and which covers several regions of developing countries, 
thereby indicating the dissimilarities in the framework between them; this in turn 
could cause misleading comparative findings. In addition, their study does not present 
a comprehensive finding that focuses solely on the GCC’s IB. Thus, such a gap in 
these studies on IB has inspired this study to focus on the risk of failure in the GCC 
region by taking into account the impact of real economy growth on these banks. The 
findings are expected to contribute substantially to the understanding of the 
mechanism of failure risk in IB; it will then enable appropriate suggestions to be 
highlighted for policy makers to enhance the stability growth of the GCC’s banking 
sector in general and of IB in particular.   
In relation to NPL in Islamic banking within this essay, and according to prior 
literature, there is no study examining the impact of Islamic financing and, most 
importantly, Islamic finance contracts on the NPL of Islamic banking in the whole 
banking sector of the GCC countries. The findings of this study may therefore lead 
bank managers to restructure the diversification of investment portfolios according to 
those contracts. Finally, these findings could pave the way for future research.  
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The identified research aims, objectives and research questions indicate that the 
empirical essays in this research apply a quantitative research methodology by 
utilising secondary data. The secondary data source mainly consists of annual balance 
sheets and financial statements from the GCC’s banking sector, with the exception of 
Oman due to the absence of Islamic bank applications in the country during this 
research period, which were drawn from Bank-scope. Nonetheless, each essay in this 
study differs in terms of utilising the theoretical frameworks, econometric methods, 
timelines and study samples, which are described in each chapter and are briefly 
explained as follows. 
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The first essay utilises the cross-sectional data of Saudi banks over the period from 
2005 to 2010 by applying a non-parametric DEA model to compute efficiency scores 
and scale efficiency; following that, the second stage regression of efficiency scores, 
which were obtained from the DEA model, is conducted to estimate the coefficients 
of environmental variables from pooled data by utilising ordinary least squares (OLS), 
generalised difference (feasible GLS), and Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates. 
Moreover, the SFA production function is utilised to examine further the validity of 
second stage regression. The programme employed to obtain the estimate of 
efficiency and coefficients is LIMDEP.    
The second essay uses the panel data set of GCC banks from 2005 to 2010. Efficiency 
scores and the MPI of DEA meta-frontier models are estimated as the first stage of the 
analysis. After that, the second stage regression is employed to estimate the 
coefficients of bank characteristics, financial structures and the rule of law through the 
following models: panel data with random effect and bootstrap procedures, which 
were proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). The program used to estimate the 
efficiency and productivity is LIMDEP, whereas the STATA programme is employed 
to estimate the coefficients of second stage regression.    
The third essay employs unbalanced panel data from the IB and CB of the GCC 
countries, covering the period from 1995 to 2011. The life-table method is applied to 
obtain the survival-time data as unconditional results; continuous-time and discrete-
time methods are then conducted to estimate the coefficients of micro-level and 
macro-level variables in order to evaluate the hazard rates. Here again the programme 
used to estimate survival analysis and those coefficients is STATA.   
The last essay covers the period from 2005 to 2011, and it applies panel data random 
effect and fixed effect models to estimate the coefficients of bank-level and macro-
level variables that determine the NPL of Islamic banking. This step will be followed 
by the use of dynamic panel data GMM models, including GMM-difference and 
GMM-system, to estimate the coefficients of the bank-level and macro-level 
variables, which determine the NPL of the GCC’s commercial banking sector. The 
programme employed to estimate these coefficients is STATA.             
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1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH     
The research presented in this thesis covers six chapters, including this introductory 
chapter that briefly presents the background, aims and objectives, questions, 
methodology and significance of the research. 
Chapter Two presents the empirical study by analysing the efficiency of IB and CB in 
Saudi Arabia. The essay begins by describing the environment of the Saudi economy 
and banking sectors, illuminating recent developments in this area and the financial 
surroundings, as well as analysing the banks’ performances through several financial 
indicators and surveying banking efficiency literature. This is followed by illustrating 
the applied approaches and models, which include the distance function concept, the 
non-parametric DEA approach with bootstrap techniques, scale efficiency and the 
second stage model of DEA. In ensuring the direction of these variables, the SFA 
model is employed with Cobb-Douglas function forms. The econometric specification 
and the empirical application are presented to describe the data and identify the 
variables included in the model. The paper in the last section collates all the findings 
of the selected models by displaying the efficiency scores for each Saudi bank through 
the DEA application model, representing the results of the environmental variables in 
order to evaluate the adjusted efficiency scores with the DEA application so that they 
can be compared with the initial scores. To conclude the essay, there will be a 
discussion of the models and their implications. 
Chapter Three presents the second empirical paper on determining the efficiency of 
the Islamic and conventional commercial banking sectors of the GCC through meta-
frontier analysis. This essay begins by describing the environment of the financial and 
banking sectors, thereby shedding light on recent developments in these sectors in 
each country and group. This is followed by a review of the literature on efficiency in 
the case of banks and financial institutions. The methodology is described in terms of 
output distance function, meta-frontier, technical efficiency and meta-technology 
ratios, DEA method, MPI with meta-frontier and the second stage regression. It will 
be followed by an empirical modelling and application, including statistical 
description and variable definition. The following sections present the findings based 
on the DEA meta-frontier results, MPI results of meta- and group frontiers and the 
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second stage regression results. Finally, there will be a discussion and conclusion of 
the study. 
Chapter Four, which presents the third empirical essay, is developed within survival 
analysis of the GCC’s IB and CB by focusing on discrete-time duration models. The 
essay begins by discussing some of the relevant literature on the subject before 
describing the methods that are employed to investigate survival time and failure 
within the banking sector in the GCC. These steps are followed by a preliminary 
survey of both the data and the definition of the covariates. The study then proceeds to 
interpret the findings of the empirical application by presenting the unconditional and 
conditional findings. 
Chapter Five is the last empirical paper, and it is based on the examination of the NPL 
in GCC Islamic banking; it focuses on the impact of Islamic financing types on the 
NPL in the GCC banking system as a whole. The essay begins by presenting an 
overview of NPL in banking surface studies; it then describes the determining factors 
of NPL, including macroeconomic, structural, organisational, bank-level and product 
development factors. The research methodology presentation is then conducted via 
panel data, dynamic panel data (GMM) models and econometric specification; this 
presentation is followed by the empirical findings for each of the stated methods.    
Chapter Six provides the conclusion of this research by summarising its findings and 
presenting the implications of the research via a deliberation that contextualises the 
results in the case of GCC Islamic banking. Finally, it presents a discussion of the 
observed limitations of the study and offers a case for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXAMINING THE EFFICIENCY OF ISLAMIC BANKS AND 
CONVENTIONAL BANKS IN SAUDI ARABIA: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION   
In response to the global developments and trends in the Islamic finance industry, the 
Saudi Arabian financial sector has shown positive advances and demonstrated 
successful expansion and development strategies. Being the largest economy within 
the GCC and the Arab world, the Saudi economy offers great potential for the 
development of the financial sector. When expanding the sector and contributing to its 
development, fully-fledged IB have been established along with a number of IW to 
offer Islamic financial services on different levels. This study thus aims to investigate 
the efficiency of Saudi Arabia’s IB in  comparison with the IW for the period from 
2005 to 2010. The study will be part of a number of essays on Islamic banking within 
the GCC that use DEA and second stage regression, to investigate the effects of some 
selected environmental variables, which are related to banks’ characteristics. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 describes the Saudi economy and the 
environment of the banking sector, as well as analysing the banks’ performance 
through several financial indicators. Section 2.3 discusses banking efficiency 
literature in an attempt to shed light on the empirical evidence. Section 2.4 illustrates 
the research methods and modelling framework, including the distance function 
concept, the non-parametric DEA model with bootstrap techniques, scale efficiency, 
the second stage model of DEA and the SFA model employed with Cobb-Douglas 
(CD) function form. Section 2.5 describes the empirical process and Section 2.6 
presents all of the findings for the selected models. Finally, section 2.7 contains the 
conclusion and discussion.                     
2.2 THE BANKING SECTOR ENVIRONMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA  
When presenting the banking sector environment in Saudi Arabia, this section initially 
describes the Saudi economic conditions and the commercial banking environment in 
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general. Further, the second section discusses the recent developments in the Saudi 
banking sector and its financial situation. By contextualising the study, the last section 
describes the performance of IB and CB with IW through some selected financial 
ratios.  
2.2.1 Overview of the Saudi Economy and the Environment of the Banking 
Sector    
The Saudi economy is controlled by oil prices and petrochemical production, which 
have recorded high profits over the past few years. Table 2.1 illustrates that the real 
gross domestic product (GDP) decreased by 4.1% in 2009 due to a decline in the 
growth rate of the oil sector. Consequently, this decline directly affected the 
government revenues.  
 
Table 2.1- Selected Indicators of the Saudi Economy and Banking Sector (2005 
to 2010) 
Economic Indicators (% of GDP) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP Real Growth    5.6 3.1 2.0 4.2 0.1 3.8 
GDP Growth (oil sector) 45.8 16.6 9.5 37.1 -38.8 25.0 
GDP Growth (non-oil sector) 9.5 9.0 6.3 7.5 7.4 9.1 
Central Government Budget Revenue 47.7 50.4 44.6 61.6 36.5 45.4 
Central Government Budget 
Expenditure 
29.3 29.4 32.3 29.1 42.7 38.4 
Banking Sector Indicators (AV; %)       
Capital Ratio: Equity to Assets  15.5 15.6 13.9 13.2 13.7 14.1 
Liquidity Ratio: Liquid Assets to 
Deposits  
17.7 23.4 20.8 18.5 22.6 21.5 
Net Loans to Total Assets  60.6 58.5 58.1 58.2 57.8 57.8 
Operations Ratio: Return on Average 
Assets (ROAA) 
3.5 4.9 2.9 2.03 1.4 1.63 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 29.9 32.8 20.6 16.4 11.2 11.9 
Data Sources: The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 47th Annual Report, EIU Country Report 
(March 2010, May 2011), and Bankscope. 
Note: All numbers are reported at the nominal prices except the real GDP growth.    
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1 and despite the global financial crisis in 2009, the real 
GDP growth of Saudi Arabia was affected negatively as a sustained increase in oil 
prices until 2008 allowed the government to make a significant reserve (The PRS 
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Group Saudi Arabia Country Forecast, May 2010). Although the government has 
made substantial efforts to support local and foreign investments, such as power and 
water projects, to enhance the GDP growth rate of the non-oil sector, the oil sector 
itself remains an essential part of the Saudi economy (EIU Country Report, May 
2007).  Due to such a direct link between the oil prices and the performance of the 
Saudi Arabian economy, any change in the price and production of oil by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) plays an important role in the 
macroeconomic environment and the performance of the financial sector in Saudi 
Arabia.   
Since the oil boom phase of 1973, which resulted in the government revenues 
reaching their peak, the Saudi banking sector has witnessed increases in liquidity and 
deposits; several Saudi banks were also established, such as the Bank Al-Jazira (1975) 
and the Saudi Investment Bank (1976). As a result of liquidity and deposits increasing 
(particularly during recent years due to the increased oil prices and revenues), Saudi 
banks had to enlarge their amount of investment and consumer lending. Moreover, 
according to a Jadwa Investment report in 2010, seven top banks in the Kingdom have 
managed to cover loan-loss by more than 100%; the provision of bad loans is also 
covered by 109% due to credit losses (taken from EIU Country Report, May 2011: 
14). In 2011 the SAMA therefore stated that Saudi banks had ultimately attained a 
satisfactory level with provisioning, which stimulated Saudi banks to expand their 
lending significantly (EIU Country Report, May 2011).  
2.2.2 Recent Developments in the Saudi Banking Sector and its Financial 
Environment  
Saudi Arabia has twelve banks for commercial and trade services; five of them are 
entirely Saudi-owned, the rest are owned jointly by Saudi and foreign owners (Ariss 
et al., 2007: 467). It should be noted that in recent years and as a result of joining the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), Saudi Arabia has had to liberate its banking sector 
by allowing international banks to enter the Saudi Arabian market. The SAMA, acting 
as a central bank, was therefore given permission by the Cabinet to licence several 
branches of foreign banks to operate in the Saudi financial market, including BNP 
Paribas (a completely European-owned bank) and the State Bank of India (EIU 
Country Report, February 2006).           
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In terms of bank types, there are four fully-fledged IB; the rest are CB that provide 
Islamic products through IW. Table 2.2 shows a detailed list of banks operating in the 
Saudi Arabian market that also offer IW with the ratio of the sharia-compliant assets 
of their IW to the total assets of their parent banks; in addition, it shows the bank’s 
ranking according to the amount of sharia-compliant asset holdings.   
 
Table 2.2- IB and IW Operating in the Saudi Arabian Market (2010) 
Bank Name  Bank 
Type  
  
Sharia-
Compliant 
Assets (mSR) 
Total Assets 
(mSR) 
 % Sharia-
Compliant / 
total Assets  
Started Year 
Service   
Al Rajhi Bank  IB 170,747.84  170,747.84 100 1987 
National Commercial 
Bank (NCB)  
IW 64,178.72 257,479.59 24.93 1991 
Riyad Bank  IW 44,676.64 176,418.07 25.32 2001 
Saudi British bank 
(SABB) 
IW 41,995.63 120,319.56 34.90 1978 
Arab National bank  IW 31,903.52 110,308.99 28.92 1980 
Banque Saudi Fransi  IW 30,471.25 120,585.49 25.27 2005 
Bank AlJazira  IB 29,979.95 29,979.95 100 1975 
Alinma Bank  IB 24,948.96 24,948.96 100 2008 
Samba Financial 
Group  
IW 23,070.35 185,537.60 12.43 1980 
Bank Albilad  IB 17,413.10 17,413.10 100 2004 
Saudi Hollandi Bank  IW 11,447.35 59,116.06 19.36 1926 
Saudi Investment 
Bank  
IW 9,452.13 50,153.35 18.85 1976 
Note: In the column for bank type, IB denotes Islamic banks and IW indicates Islamic windows. 
Data Source: The Banker (November, 2010).  
 
From a sharia-compliant perspective, the Al-Rajhi bank is considered to be the largest 
Saudi Islamic bank, and it is listed as the second largest banking institution in the 
GCC (EIU Country Report, May 2011). It is followed by the Bank Al-Jazira, the 
Alinma Bank and the Bank Albilad as IB. For CB with IW, the NCB represents the 
second largest bank that offers sharia-compliant assets. The maximum percentage of 
sharia-compliant assets to total assets is with the SABB, which is approximately 
35%; in contrast, the minimum share appears to be with the Samba Financial Group at 
12.40%.  
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Figure 2.1 illustrates that the total sharia-compliant assets of CB outweigh the total 
assets of IB by 2%, owing to the number of CB with IW being more than IB. In 
addition, the amount of total assets in some of the IW is larger than the holdings of IB, 
such as the NCB and the Riyad Bank. It should also be noted that although the NCB 
has the largest total asset holdings, a significant share of its holdings are owned by the 
Public Investment Fund (EIU Country Report, November 2006).        
 
Figure 2.1- A Comparison of Sharia-Compliant Assets Held by IB and IW 
 
Data Source: The Banker (November, 2010). 
 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 depict the assets growth in both types of Saudi banks. It can be 
noted that in 2007 the total assets rose by more than 10% when compared with 2006, 
a result which could be due to the liquidity boom experienced in the Saudi stock 
market as its index, the Tadawul All-Share Index (TASI), doubled in 2005 and 
reached its peak in February 2006. These changes in the Saudi financial market 
illustrate that the main reasons for the observed increases in assets during 2006 to 
2007 were loans and investments, which represent a high level of liquidity (EIU 
Country Report, February 2006 and May 2007). In 2009 the growth of total assets in 
Saudi Arabian banks declined sharply by more than 15% when compared with 2008 
as a result of the global financial crisis at the end of 2008. Despite the substantial 
decreases and low performance in the Saudi Arabian banking sector in 2009, IB 
managed to recover their assets growth significantly in comparison to IW.  
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Figure 2.2- Assets Growth Rate in Saudi Arabian Banks 
 
Data Source: Bankscope. 
Figure 2.3- Total Assets in Saudi Banks (M SR) 
 
Data Source: Bankscope. 
 
The Saudi Capital Market Company was launched in 2007 by transforming the Saudi 
stock exchange, Tadawul, into a shared-stock company that would be fully owned by 
the Public Investment Fund (EIU Country Report, May 2007). In addition, Tadawul is 
controlled by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in terms of regulations. It should 
be noted that Tadawul had a substantial impact on the performance of the Saudi 
banking sector, particularly during 2005 and 2006. 
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As part of the financial development, since 2007 foreign investors from five other 
GCC countries have been allowed to invest in Saudi Arabian bank shares and several 
financial companies in the Saudi Arabian market. The Saudi Arabian capital market 
does, however, need further liberalisation in order to substantiate its position. For 
instance, foreign institutions from other members of the GCC cannot be listed on the 
Tadawul (EIU Country Report, November 2007). As part of the on-going reform, all 
of the Saudi banks had to set up new procedures in banking investment practices 
during 2007 to be consistent with CMA regulations (EIU Country Report, May 2007).  
2.2.3 Comparing the Financial Indicators of IB with IW   
In order to develop an understanding of the performance of Saudi Arabian IB and IW, 
this section reflects on their performance through some financial measures.  
With regard to Return on Average Assets (ROAA) and Return on Average Equity 
(ROAE), and as can be seen in figures 2.4 and 2.5, the returns on average assets and 
equity were influenced significantly by the TASI movement in 2005 and 2006; the 
value of these ratios therefore reached the highest level in 2006, especially the ratios 
for the IB, when TASI recorded the maximum index number. During 2007 those 
ratios dropped sharply, which can be explained by the decrease in investment banking 
activities, such as the decrease in brokerage revenue and asset-management fees (EIU 
Country Report, May 2007). In 2009 Saudi Arabian bank returns declined to reach the 
minimum level, especially in terms of the returns for IB; this decline was mainly as a 
result of the global financial crisis in 2008, but they have recovered gradually during 
2010.  
As part of the performance measurement, the ratio of equity to total assets in Figure 
2.6 indicates that during the period of 2005 to 2006, IB had a high level of equity in 
comparison with CB that offered IW; such a finding can be attributed to the liquidity 
boom and stock market activities as described in the previous section. Generally 
however, the average ratio of equity in all Saudi banks seems to have remained steady 
at around 15% during the period in question.    
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Figure 2.4- Percentage of ROAA for Saudi Banks  
 
Figure 2.5- Percentage of ROAE for Saudi Banks  
 
   
Figure 2.6- Average Ratio of Equity to Total Assets 
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Figure 2.7- Non-Performing Loans (NPL) to Total Loans 
 
Data Source: Bankscope. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.7, the ratio for NPL in all of the banks remained fairly 
steady during the period from 2005 to 2007; nevertheless, it has increased gradually 
since 2008 by approximately 1.5%. Such an increase can be explained by the financial 
crisis, for as can be seen from the trend, the ratio jumped in IB more than IW. In 
addition, consumer lending went up rapidly in 2005; consequently, because of 
concerns over the risk of problem loans, SAMA took some action in authorising 
consumer loans by Saudi banks (EIU Country report, February 2006).  
Overall, the Saudi banking sector is influenced by internal factors and most 
importantly by developments in the macroeconomic and financial environments. Thus 
the global financial crisis and the developments in the Saudi capital market have had a 
great impact on bank performance. As can be seen from the financial indicators, the 
performance of IB is, however, affected by such factors more than the performance 
for CB. This result can be explained by the size of the Islamic banking assets and their 
smaller significance in the economy.     
2.3 BANK EFFICIENCY: A LITERATURE SURVEY OF DETERMINING 
FACTORS  
Studies on banking efficiency have systematically revealed that two methods are 
employed to compute efficiency: the non-parametric, mathematical-based “Data 
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Envelopment Analysis” (DEA) and the parametric statistics-based SFA. Many studies 
examining efficiency in the banking sector imply that the advantages of parametric 
techniques outweigh the advantages of non-parametric techniques. Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) indicated, however, that there is no consensus as to which of the 
two main approaches gives the best measure of efficiency because the factual stage of 
efficiency is unknown. Other studies, besides examining the efficiency, therefore 
investigate the effect of environmental variables, either those related to internal 
factors (bank characteristics) or to external factors (financial structures and economic 
conditions). In addition, the published material on bank efficiency used a specific 
country or a group of countries as case studies. This section, however, reviews the 
available material on a single country, given that the main objective of this present 
study is to measure the efficiency of the Saudi banking sector.         
Initially, studies on developed countries, as individual case studies, which focus on 
bank efficiency are reviewed. For example, Drake and Hall (2003) investigated 
efficiency in the Japanese banking sector by employing DEA to explore the technical 
and scale efficiencies through the use of a cross-section sample for 149 banks. They 
also categorised according to the sample by bank size and type. Another study of 
Japanese banking by Loukoianova (2008) also used DEA with MPI for the period 
from 2000 to 2006. The results for both studies indicated that large banks have a 
significant impact on efficiency; the latter study generally showed that the 
performance of Japanese banks has gradually improved since 2001.  
In terms of European countries, Fiorentino et al. (2006) examined the cost efficiency 
of banking  in Germany by applying SFA and DEA; they also compared the results of 
both methods, according to several standards, over the period from 1993 to 2004. The 
findings emphasise that the use of SFA to benchmark the efficiency of the banking 
system seems to provide clearer information on efficiency due to random error effects.  
In the case of another country, Altunbas et al. (2008) investigated the performance of 
nineteen medium and large commercial Turkish banks over the period from 1992 to 
2006 by using DEA and MPI. In addition, they examined the effect of some 
environmental variables, including the domestic economic crises of 1994, 2000 and 
2001, foreign ownership and the IMF reorganising programme in 1999. The results 
suggested that Turkish banks have generally witnessed a growth in productivity, yet 
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productivity was shown to have decreased over the periods 1996 to 1998, 2000 to 
2001 and 2005 to 2006, which could be explained by the economic and financial 
conditions that the country experienced.  
The performance of IBF is a very recent topical issue, and the increased attention 
during this decade is mainly due to the increased numbers of IB and IW as well as the 
importance of IBF around the world, including its important presence in Malaysia and 
the GCC countries, especially in Saudi Arabia. Empirical studies devoted to IB have 
therefore followed available literature in employing econometric and statistical 
models to measure their efficiency. The existing body of knowledge shows that some 
of the available studies have compared efficiency between bank types (Mokhtar et al., 
2007; Hussein, 2004), whereas other studies have differentiated between the bank 
types by employing environmental variables (Al-Jarrah, 2002; Abdul- Majid, 2008).  
Given that Malaysia has become an important hub for Islamic banking, a large 
number of studies have emerged on Malaysian IB. For example, Sufian (2006) and 
Kamaruddin et al. (2008) explored the efficiency of IB and banks with IW by utilising 
DEA, whereas Mokhtar et al. (2007) evaluated the technical and cost efficiency of IB, 
IW and conventional Malaysian banks by employing DEA. The results in both studies 
show that the efficiency of the Islamic banking industry has improved over the period 
chosen by the study, and it was also found that IB were more efficient than IW. IB in 
general are, however, found to be less efficient than CB.  
In another study on Malaysian Islamic banking, Hadi and Saad (2010) investigated the 
technical efficiency and productivity change of domestic and foreign banks by 
applying DEA and MPI. Their findings indicate that the performance of local IB is 
noticeably better than that of foreign banks, which could be attributed to the number 
of domestic IB outweighing their foreign counterparts. In addition, they found that 
large banks operate more efficiently, implying that increasing a bank’s size is a 
significant element in determining its efficiency. Accordingly, it is suggested that IB 
need to expand their size and further advance their technology and client services to 
be more viable when attempting to compete with CB. 
Another study in a single country is that by Hassan and Hussein (2003), which 
measured the efficiency and productivity of Sudanese banks by utilising SFA and 
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DEA on seventeen banks for the period from 1992 to 2000. The results revealed that 
the productivity had mainly decreased due to the lack of technology and the political 
surroundings in the Sudanese banking sector. Hassan and Hussein do, however, state 
that IB need to be more efficient in terms of their operating and management so as to 
advance in the international market.       
In terms of case studies specifically located within GCC countries, Hussein (2004) 
compares the profit efficiency of the Islamic and conventional banking industries in 
Bahrain as an important financial centre within the GCC by applying SFA to his 
sample of eight IB and eight CB, regardless of whether they were commercial or 
investment banks, over the period from 1985 to 2001. Overall, the findings showed 
that although several IB were small and offer venture capital, they did not differ much 
from conventional investment banks in terms of profit efficiency. Another study on 
Bahrain by Hassan et al. (2004) aimed to investigate the cost efficiency of thirty-one 
banks for the years 1998 and 2000 by using DEA and MPI.  In addition, they 
examined the effects of several selected variables on efficiency, which were related to 
profitability, bank size, the assets of shareholders and market power. The findings 
indicated that ultimately the efficiency of all the banks had notably increased. The 
efficient banks were Bahrain’s IB as well as another two foreign banks, and the main 
cause of inefficiency scores in Bahrain’s banking was found to be technical, that is 
pure technical inefficiency. Moreover, the determining variables showed that large 
banks have a substantial propensity to increase their efficiency; further, efficient 
banks tend to have more loans to total assets. It can, however, be noticed that the 
study was limited in its coverage to only two years, which is considered to be too 
short a time in which to obtain accurate results.   
A study of the Saudi banking sector by Akhtar (2010) measured the efficiency and 
productivity growth of nine banks (including IB) over the period from 2000 to 2006 
by applying DEA and MPI. The findings indicated that Saudi banks tended to catch 
up in some periods with the best available technology; efficiency also increased in 
some years. They did, however, see their efficiency level decline in other years, which 
could be attributed to changes in oil prices. Furthermore, for future studies, Akhtar 
(2010) recommended that to obtain more accurate results the banks should be grouped 
according to their size and type; for instance, IB and CB. In addition, Akhtar 
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suggested that as the Saudi economy has been heavily reliant on the oil sector, the 
impact of oil prices on the banks’ performance should also be investigated.  
From the preceding survey of the empirical papers on bank efficiency, it can be 
observed that several of these studies have indicated the significance of environmental 
factors, which could have an impact on bank efficiency. Therefore, this study 
distinguishes itself from the existing studies on Saudi banking efficiency on two 
points. Initially, it utilises the DEA approach to obtain an accurate comparison 
between three IB and eight CB that provide IW in order to compute the technical and 
scale efficiencies. Further, it applies second stage regression to investigate the effects 
of some selected environmental variables related to the banks’ characteristics, such as 
bank type, ratios of NPL, and liquidity with the objective of locating the impact of 
these variables on the efficiency of Saudi banks. In addition, bootstrap procedure (as 
derived from Simar and Wilson (2000)) is applied to determine the location of the 
obtained efficiency scores between the upper and lower confidence limits. Moreover, 
when examining the robustness of the estimated model of DEA second stage 
regression, the SFA model is also applied by including the selected variables directly 
in one model to ensure the direction of those variables on efficiency. This, in line with 
the surveyed empirical papers above, provides a theoretical justification for the 
research in general and the empirical analysis conducted in this thesis. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL MODELING AND MODEL SELECTION  
This section delineates the methods and models that were employed in measuring the 
performance within Saudi banks by comparing the efficiency levels of IB relative to 
IW through the application of an output distance function, or the DEA model with a 
constant return to scale (CRS) assumption, which helps to obtain efficiency scores 
with bootstrap techniques and measuring the scale efficiency through variable returns 
to scale (VRS) and non-increasing returns to scale (NRS).  
To assess the variation in efficiency scores, some environmental variables related to 
banks’ characteristics are investigated through the second stage model of DEA. 
Furthermore, to re-examine the direction of those variables, the SFA model was 
employed. This section is therefore divided into four parts to describe and discuss the 
applied function and models. Initially, the concept of output distance measure, 
followed by the mathematical form of the DEA model, is defined in the second part, 
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including the calculation of scale efficacy, bootstrap technique and the second stage 
regression of the DEA model. SFA is then examined through the CD function forms, 
which is followed by the econometric specification of the empirical model tested in 
this study.    
2.4.1 Output Distance Function  
The concept of efficiency measurements relies on production, profit or cost functions, 
as well as distance function, which will be discussed in detail later. Koopmans (1951), 
who defined the basis of technical efficiency, along with Debreu (1951) and Farrell 
(1957), who presented a standard measure of technical efficiency. In addition, 
Shephard (1953 and 1970) provided the framework for distance function, whereas 
Coelli et al. (2005) specified that the mechanism for distance function permits the 
demonstration of a multi-input or multi-output production technology, and it does not 
require a precise objective, such as to minimise cost or maximise profit, in a 
behavioural model of a firm. An input distance function takes into account a 
minimum point of input with a given output in production technology. In contrast, the 
output distance function takes into account a maximum level of output that can be 
produced with a given input. 
The basic framework of the output distance function is illustrated by Lovell (1993: 
10). Accordingly, it can be assumed that x and y are input and output vectors of 
elements N and M. To describe the production technology function according to 
Lovell (1993), input vector x can be defined via the output set as: 
 ܲሺݔሻ ൌ 	 ሼݕ:	ሺݔ, ݕሻ݅ݏ	݂݁ܽݏܾ݈݅݁ሽ     (2.1) 
Thus, these input and output mixtures are comprised in the technology set to be 
efficient as: 
 ܧܨܲሺݔሻ 	ൌ 	 ሼݕ:	ݕ	 ∈ 	ܲሺݔሻ, ݕ’	 ∉ 	ܲሺݔሻ, ݕ’	 ൒ 	ݕሽ	   (2.2) 
According to Shephard (1970), an output distance function model can therefore be 
defined on the output set P(x) as: 
 ܦ௢ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ 	݉݅݊	ሼߜ ൐ 0 ∶ ሺݕ/ߜሻ ∈ 	ܲሺݔሻሽ    (2.3) 
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Färe and Primont (1995) listed properties on the technology set of Do(x,y) as truisms 
that include: non-decreasing in y and non-increasing in x; linearly homogeneous in a 
positive way in y; is quasi-convex in x and convex in y, when y includes the possible 
production set of x (y∈p(x)) and Do(x,y)≤1; when y is located on the “frontier” of the 
production set that means distance of y is equal to one (taken from Coelli et al., 2005: 
47-48). 
The concept of output distance function is described by Figure 2.8 through the use of 
a given input vector	ሺݔሻ to produce two outputs, y1 and y2.  
 
Figure 2.8- Output Distance Function  
 
   
          
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coelli et al. (2005). 
 
The production possibility set	ሺݔሻ, represented by the production possibility boundary 
PPB-	ܲሺݔሻ, with observing producing points B and C on the PPB frontier, which 
indicate that the values of the distance function are equal to one and that the points are 
technically efficient. When the firm utilises level ݔ to produce outputs at point H, the 
distance function ratio appears as	ܦ௢ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ 	ߜ ൌ 	 ଴ு଴஻ 	൏ 1, which indicates that to be 
technically inefficient.  
As well as describing the concept of distance function, Figure 2.8 describes the output 
distance function technology with a given input of a firm that produces a maximum 
amount of output. 
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2.4.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  
DEA is conducted through mathematical and linear programme methods, which 
envelops the data set as closely as possible, but it does not make accommodation for 
random errors; it therefore does not envelop a data set in the manner of most 
econometric models (Lovell, 1993: 26). The DEA model estimates efficiency for each 
level of a firm (bank) and involves two different methods: input-orientated, where 
outputs are held constant to reach the maximum reduction proportional in input levels 
through the technology set, and output-orientated, where inputs are controlled 
constantly to obtain the maximum proportional increase in output levels. The two 
DEA methods can be calculated when the technology set is under two assumptions:  
(i) CRS, which is represented by Charnes et al. (1978) on the assumption that all firms 
practice on an optimal scale, yet in real market conditions all firms cannot operate on 
the optimal scale. Thus, in amending that assumption, Banker et al. (1984) proposed 
the second option, which is as follows: 
(ii) VRS as a modification for the CRS model, which covers the data more cohesively 
than CRS (Lovell, 1993: 30).  
Both methods, input-orientated and output-orientated, when they are estimated under 
the former assumption give the same technical efficiency results, although they differ 
when they are measured under the latter assumption. 
This study thus adopts an output orientation of the DEA form, which can be estimated 
at t period; ݕ௜௧ is M × 1 vector of output quantities for i firms (banks), t period of time, 
and Y is the M × ܮ௞ܶ matrix of output quantities for all of the ܮ௞ firms. According to 
Coelli et al. (2005), the CRS equation can therefore be written as: 
݉ܽݔ∅	௜,௧,ఒ	௜,௧	∅௜,௧ 
ݏݐ. െ∅௜,௧ݕ௜,௧ ൅ 	ܻߣ௜,௧ ൒ 0, 
						െ ௜ܺ,௧ߣ௜,௧ ൅ 	ݔ௜,௧ ൒ 0, 
							ߣ௜,௧ 	൒ 0.          (2.4) 
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∅௜௧ is a scalar, which solves the linear programing (LP) problems, and ߣ௜௧ is a vector 
of I×1 of constants. In addition,	1 ൑ ∅௜௧ ൏ ∞ and ∅௜௧ െ 1 accounts for an unused 
growing rate of outputs, which would be obtained by i bank with the same level of 
inputs; technical efficiency (TE) scores for the output orientation model can be given 
for each bank by	1/∅௜௧. In relation to the CRS model, it would be easy to insert the 
constraint element ሺ݈1ᇱߣ௜௧ ൌ 1ሻ	in order to amend equation (2.4) so as to represent the 
VRS equation as: 
݉ܽݔ∅	௜,௧,ఒ	௜,௧	∅௜,௧ 
ݏݐ. െ∅௜,௧ݕ௜,௧ ൅ 	ܻߣ௜,௧ ൒ 0, 
						െ ௜ܺ,௧ߣ௜,௧ ൅ 	ݔ௜,௧ ൒ 0, 
							݈1ᇱߣ௜,௧ ൌ 1				ܽ݊݀	 
							ߣ௜,௧ 	൒ 0          (2.5) 
The estimated efficiency levels with the input-orientated method do not differ other 
than in terms of output orientated function under the CRS assumption. Moreover, the 
CRS assumption has been disputed, because it is assuming that all firms are practicing 
at the optimal level. In the case of this study, however, this assumption can be relied 
on, because all banks operate in only one country; hence, in the same economic, 
market, and financial conditions. In addition, VRS will be obtained indirectly to 
examine the scale efficacy for each bank and to investigate the issue of scale 
efficiency. Further, the VRS and NRS models are estimated to ensure specifying the 
scale efficiency measurement, as described by Lovell (1993), if the restricted element 
ሺ݈1ᇱߣ௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ in equation (2.5) is replaced by ሺ݈1ᇱߣ௜,௧ ൑ 1ሻ, then the NRS model can 
be acquired.   
2.4.2.1 Scale Efficiencies   
From the TE scores that were obtained from the CRS and VRS models scale 
efficiencies (SE) can be calculated by the proportion of the CRS score divided by the 
VRS score for each firm (bank), where the TE of the CRS can be decomposed into SE 
and “pure” TE or the TE score of VRS. This description of SE is illustrated by Coelli 
et al. (2005) as: 
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ܵܧ௜,௧ ൌ 	 ்ா಴ೃೄ	೔,೟்ாೇೃೄ	೔,೟	           (2.6) 
ܶܧ஼ோௌ	௜,௧ ൌ 	ܶܧ௏ோௌ	௜,௧ 	ൈ ܵܧ௜,௧       (2.7) 
The calculation of SE provides in which term of scale efficiency the firm is operating; 
for example, in decreasing or increasing returns to scale, or even in CRS. It is 
important to note that Coelli et al. (2005) have also indicated that most DEA studies 
have stated that TE scores for CRS measure the total improvement or change in the 
productivity of a firm, which makes this assumption more convenient in the long 
term. On the other hand, the TE scores of VRS denote what the firm is able to obtain 
in the short term, as the operation scales cannot ordinarily be changed in the short 
term.  
 
Figure 2.9- The Nature of Scale Measurement in DEA  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Lovell (1993); Coelli et al. (2005). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.9, the scale efficiency for each firm according to the TE 
scores of VRS and NRS can be estimated. For instance, at the point of firm A, the TE 
of VRS>NRS implies that in this case increasing returns to scale are applied in the 
firm. When VRS is, however, equal to NRS (as at point C), decreasing returns to scale 
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appear. In addition, when VRS is equal to the CRS assumption, constant return to 
scale applies in this case.            
2.4.2.2 Bootstrap Technique  
As can be observed from the DEA model, the bootstrap technique is not based on 
statistical procedure as a result of not considering the random error in estimating the 
efficiency, for which this method is criticised by most efficiency examiners. To avoid 
such a problem in the DEA method, Simar and Wilson (1998 and 2000) provided a 
possible statistical solution by using the bootstrap approach in the DEA frontier to 
estimate the variation of efficiency scores in the sample.  
The bootstrap method can be described as a statistical technique to simulate or mimic 
the distribution of the sample in order to acquire the confidence limits of the TE 
scores obtained by scaling the data randomly through generated scale factors. This 
adjusted data is then recalculated n times to estimate the confidence limits or 
intervals. 
In the case of this study, the main reason for bootstrapping the sample is that the 
initial TE scores could not be correct; thus, the bootstrap process is applied to 
investigate and assess the location of the efficiency scores between the confidence 
limits. In relation to this case, Simar and Wilson (2000: 62) stated that the DEA 
studies applying bootstrap technique concentrate more on ‘the efficiency scores of the 
observed units themselves’; besides, the corrected scores, could yield extra noise. In 
addition and most importantly, Simar and Wilson (2000: 63) emphasise that ‘that the 
bootstrap is an asymptotic procedure’, which is applied to investigate the location of 
efficacy scores.                
2.4.2.3 Second Stage Regression of the DEA Model 
In this particular study, the efficient level of output is evaluated through an output-
oriented DEA model with the CRS model. There are, however, other factors that may 
have an impact on efficacy measures. Thus, it is crucial to take into account the 
influence of environmental factors, such as bank characteristics, on efficiency scores. 
In addition, to examine these influences there is a two-stage DEA model. In the first 
stage, the basic inputs and output elements are conducted to solve the DEA problem 
in order to obtain the TE scores. The second stage is used to regress those scores on 
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the environmental variables, enabling the trends of their effects to be captured (Coelli 
et al., 2005: 194).  
Crucially, the two stages method has been criticised by researchers in terms of 
correlation, variance, or any other statistical problems in the estimated function (Assaf 
and Josiassen, 2011). In addition, Coelli et al. (2005) stated that a drawback of this 
method could appear in a high correlation level between the utilised variable in the 
first and second stages. To overcome this problem several statistical tests are therefore 
applied in this study so as to examine the validity of the estimated model and thus 
ensure that the results are without bias.   
2.4.3 The SFA Model  
As well as the DEA model, the current study adopts the SFA model with CD 
production function to examine the robustness of the employed environmental 
variables’ direction on banks’ efficiency in the DEA model, by using three inputs and 
only one output, as will be discussed further in section 4.4. A great variety of 
literature on efficiency prefers to adopt the translog function as it is more flexible 
than the CD form.  
The SFA model is mainly proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977). The SFA CD production function of 
output-oriented can be obtained by maximum likelihood estimation and given by 
taking the logarithms of output and input variables on both sides of this function, as is 
shown in equation 2.8.  
 ݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	∑ 	ߚ௡݈݊ ݔ௡,௜,௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅ ݒ௜,௧ െ ݑ௜,௧                        (2.8) 
Here,	ߚ0	 and 	ߚ݊ are unknown parameters to be estimated; ݒ݅,ݐ indicates noise impacts, 
which are assumed to be distributed separately than every ݑ݅,ݐ, with zero mean and 
variance ሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ, and ݑ݅,ݐ	> 0 linked with inefficiency measures, it is assumed to be 
distributed with one side of ݑ݅. Thus, to estimate efficiency through the SFA model, a 
number of assumptions are taken, such as half-normal, truncated, and gamma models 
(Coelli et al., 2005: 252). This process is commenced by the half-normal specification 
to estimate the inefficiency from noise impacts, which is proposed by Aigner et al. 
(1977) in the following equation: 
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ݑ௜,௧~	ܰ	ሺ0, ߪ௨ଶሻ																																																																																									  (2.9) 
                     
Therefore, by assuming that there are no inefficiency measures, the optimal SFA 
function is: 
݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	∑ 	ߚ௡ln ݔ௡,௜,௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅	ݒ௜,௧																						    (2.10) 
In relation to functions 2.8 and 2.10, the technical efficiency of every individual firm 
(or bank) can be acquired by dividing the observation of the SFA function (2.8) with 
the optimal stochastic function (2.10): 
ܶܧ௜,௧ ൌ ୪୬௒ை௣௧௜௠௔௟ ୪୬௒೔,೟ ൌ ܧݔ݌	൫െݑ௜,௧൯																		       (2.11) 
 
2.4.4 Econometric Specification    
In this particular study, the efficient level of output is evaluated through output-
oriented DEA with the CRS model, which is applied to compute the TE scores and the 
SE for each bank in the sample. The second stage regression of the DEA model is 
then used to examine the influence of environmental variables; the SFA production 
function is also used to investigate further and to ensure the effect of those variables. 
In addition, the investigation of these influences through the selected methods 
requires different processes, whether in the DEA or SFA estimations. This estimation 
process is described below.  
Initially, with regard to the second stage estimation in the DEA model, the 
environmental variables are regressed on the obtained efficiency scores by applying 
ordinary least squares (OLS). In addition, to check the validity of the estimated model 
in terms of correlation between the used variables (multicollinearity) and constant 
variance (heteroscedasticity), two methods are applied to correct such a problem. 
These methods are generalised difference (feasible GLS) estimate (utilised by 
applying the Prais-Winsten model) and the ML estimate, which was produced by 
Beach and Mackinnon (1978). Therefore, the function of second stage regression can 
be estimated from this equation as:  
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ܶܧ஼ோௌ	௜,௧	 ൌ 	ߙ ൅ 	ߚ	ܼ௜௧ ൅	ߝ௜,௧        (2.12)           
             
Here, the dependent variables are the TE scores for the CRS models, and on the right 
hand side of the equation are the parameters of α (constant), and β parameter of the 
independent variables Zit, which include the variables for the banks’ characteristics.     
Further, to investigate the direction of the environmental variables and their impact on 
bank performance in the SFA model, in contrast to the DEA method, all those 
variables are comprised directly in the CD equation that is estimated in only one step, 
which can be represented as:  
݈݊ ௜ܻ,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	∑ 	ߚ௡ln ݔ௡,௜,௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅	∑ 	ߛ௡ ݖ௡,௜,௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅	ݒ௜,௧ െ 	ݑ௜,௧														  (2.13) 
ܻ݅,ݐ is the output variable,	ݔ݊,݅,ݐ, are the input variables, ݖ݊,݅,ݐ is an exogenous element of 
the environmental variables, which are illustrated in detail in section 4.4, and 	ߛ݊ is the 
parameter of the variables that measure the direction and the influence on efficiency 
scores for each variable. The estimations of ݒ݅,ݐ and 	ݑ௜,௧ are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the independent variables. In addition, the SFA with CD model is 
re-examined by substituting for the half-normal specification, as described above in 
equation 2.9, the truncated normal assumption, which can be written according to 
Coelli et al. (2005) as: 
ݑ௜,௧~	ܰା	ሺߤ, ߪ௨ଶሻ         (2.14) 
Here the truncated specification is presented by Stevenson (1980), which differs from 
the half-normal specification in terms of flexibility. As pointed out by Greene (1993), 
in cross-sectional applications the half-normal model has, however, been considered 
to be the most convenient form. Therefore, to examine whether the estimated half-
normal model or the truncated model is adequate, Coelli et al. (2005) indicate that 
likelihood ratio (LR), as a statistical test, is used: 
ܮܴ ൌ 	െ2	ሾln	ܮ௔ െ ݈݊	ܮ௕ሿ	~ݔଶሺܬሻ        (2.15) 
                
La is the log-likelihood value of the half-normal model; Lb is the log-likelihood of the 
truncated model; and J in this case is equal to one. The calculated LR value is 
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compared with the critical value of x2 at 95% significant level. Accordingly, the null 
hypotheses are H0: µ = 0, which specifies that the half-normal model is not adequate, 
and H1: µ ≠ 0, which illustrates that the simple half-normal model is adequate.               
In most DEA research the two-step approach is preferred in order to address the 
influence of the environmental variables (Coelli et al., 2005; Ben Naceur et al., 2011). 
For SFA studies, these variables are, however, usually involved directly in the 
estimated equation to control the variances (Abdul-Majid, 2008). The obtained TE, 
after including environmental variables with the traditional input and output variables, 
could be more precise (Coelli et al., 1999: 254).  
2.5 THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH, DATA AND THE VARIABLES 
2.5.1 Empirical Approach 
This section describes the applied variables to estimate the TE scores. As identified by 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), most literature on the efficiency of banks, except bank 
branch studies, has applied an intermediation approach. In addition and as stated by 
Abdul-Majid (2008), this approach is considered to be a more accurate means of 
addressing IBF structures. Therefore, this study uses the intermediation approach in 
the selection of input and output variables. 
 2.5.2 Data  
The inclusive set of cross-sectional data used in this study is sourced from the 
Bankscope database, which contains balance sheet and income statements for each 
bank. The bank sampling, as well as the data sampling, is based on the availability of 
the data. For instance, Alinma Bank is omitted from the sample because it began to 
operate in 2008. In addition, other foreign banks are also excluded from the sample as 
they operate on a branch level in Saudi Arabia. 
The empirical sample consists of three fully-fledged IB, including the Al-Rajhi Bank, 
Bank Al-Jazira, Bank Albilad, and eight CB with IW; these include the NCB, the 
Riyad Bank, the Saudi British Bank (SABB), the Arab National Bank (ANB), the 
Banque Saudi Fransi, the Samba Financial Group, the Saudi Hollandi Bank and the 
Saudi Investment Bank. The annual reports of these banks covered the period from 
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2005 to 2010. Thus, the number of observations used in the DEA model and second 
stage regressions is 66.  
2.5.3 Variable Definition  
The specified variables in the sample of this study are adopted according to the 
existing body of knowledge in studies on bank efficiency (see: Yudistira 2004; 
Bouchaddakh and Salah, 2005; EI-Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005; Sufian, 2006; Bader et 
al. 2008; El Moussawi and Obied, 2010).  
This study employs the intermediation approach, which considers the bank as an 
intermediary between savers and borrowers, wherein it transforms the monetary 
sources to loans. Consequently, it is assumed that each bank in the operating system is 
producing net loans (or financing in the case of IB), which are designated as Y. 
Following El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005), this assumption exists because only one 
output is produced by employing three inputs: total deposits and short term funding 
(X1), capital represented in the value of fixed assets (X2) and labour, which is 
expressed in personal expenses, general and administration expenses (X3). In addition, 
due to the small sample size of the current study, which covers 66 observations, it is 
more appropriate to use one output for some technical and statistical reasons 
associated with applying DEA and the econometrics models. 
The second estimated function of second stage regression is comprised of the 
environmental variables. Initially, the dummy variable of IB (Z1) is expressed by one 
and zero for CB (Abdul-Majid 2008; Al-Jarrah 2002). It is crucial to investigate the 
influence of bank-specific characteristics, which requires the identification of the type 
of bank, such as IB or IW, to determine which type is affecting the production of the 
output.  
Recalling section 2.2.3, in terms of financial indicators, IB have performed slightly 
better than CB. For instance, when compared to CB, it is noticeable from the assets 
growth rate of IB that they have managed to recover their assets growth significantly 
from the effect of the global financial crisis in 2009. In addition, the ROAA ratio and 
the average ratio of equity to total assets were also higher at several points. On the 
other hand, this could be due to the number of IB being lower when compared to 
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banks providing Islamic products. Therefore, the impact of variables for IB on bank 
efficiency cannot be estimated.   
The second variable is that of the ratio of NPL to total loans (Z2) (see: Abdul-Majid 
2008). Berger and Mester (2000) state that problem loans can be caused by external 
and internal factors, such as a financial crisis or by central bank regulations and bad 
management. It is important for this study to take into account the impact of NPL in 
order to compute efficiency, because the net loans variable is used as an output 
element. In addition, for the current study this variable seems to be influenced by both 
internal and external factors. Indeed, it would be external factors due to the financial 
circumstances in 2006; so as to reduce the potential credit risk caused by increasing 
consumer loans, SAMA introduced some procedures in authorising those loans. 
Further, this variable could have been affected by the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Consequently, the prior expected sign for this coefficient is negative with efficiency.  
The last environmental variable is the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits and 
short-term funding (Z3), which reflects the ability of the bank to face any risk posed 
by large unanticipated withdrawals or loan requirements. This variable is included in 
accordance with Ben Naceur et al. (2011), who pointed out that if there is a significant 
shortage in liquidity, it could oblige banks to be funded with very high costs. As noted 
in section 2.2.2, in this case study, the liquidity in the Saudi banking sector was 
affected by the liquidity boom in the period from 2005 to 2006, which led to increased 
consumer lending for real estate and stock market investment. In addition, the global 
financial crisis in 2008 could be the cause of the reduced liquidity ratio. Therefore, the 
expected impact of this coefficient is negative on the banks’ efficiency.  
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Table 2.3- Statistical Summary for the Saudi Bank Sample 
Variable  Symbol Mean  SD Min. Max. 
DEA       
Net Loans (Million SAR) Y 54146.2 34602.2  4221.40 125597 
Total Deposits (Million SAR)  X1 77495.8     53734.6  3171.56  243492 
Capital (Million SAR) X2 932.213     741.523  165.726 3394.90 
Labour (Million SAR) X3 786.193     520.937  84.7260 2336.30 
SFA        
(log) Net Loans Ln Y 10.6441     0.858991 8.34792  11.7878 
(log) Total Deposits   Ln X1 10.9469     0.903782     8.06198  12.4028 
(log) Capital  Ln X2 6.58626     0.690563 5.11034  8.13003 
(log) Labour  Ln X3 6.44486     0.701394 4.43942   7.75632     
Environmental Variables      
IB (Dummy ) Z1 0.27273 0.448775 0.00 1.00 
NPL/Total Loans (%)  Z2 2.91776     1.38439       0.00 5.99617 
Liquid Assets/Customer Deposits 
and Short-Term Funding (%) 
Z3 19.6685     10.8132 5.7753      65.5663 
   
Table 2.3 depicts the statistical summary of the variables for both of the applied 
methods (DEA and SFA). It should be noted that all of the annual variables employed 
in this study are presented in Saudi Riyal, and they are converted to suitable real 
prices according to the GDP deflator in 2010. This deflator can be acquired from the 
World Databank through the website of the World Bank Organization.    
2.6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section displays the results generated by the application of the DEA model to 
measure the TE of the IB and CB; it then presents the results of the environmental 
variables in the second stage regression. In addition, the findings generated by the 
SFA CD model are displayed in order to examine the robustness of the direction of 
these variables. Finally, the adjusted efficiency scores with the DEA application are 
compared with the initial scores.                     
2.6.1 Findings Generated by the DEA 
The DEA results are depicted in Appendix to Chapter 2: Table 1, which is comprised 
of the TE evaluation with the CRS assumption for each bank. In addition, VRS is 
applied to estimate scale efficiency (SE) and the nature of SE. Furthermore, the table 
includes the confidence intervals, or the lower and upper limits, for the estimated TE 
scores from 1,000 bootstrap replications.  
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The averages of the TE estimates in all of the Saudi banks have generally fluctuated 
between approximately 80% and 76% during the period of the sample. To provide 
further details in relation to bank types, in 2005 the average of the TE scores in IB 
outweighed their counterparts with IW; similarly, in the years 2006 to 2007 the TE of 
IB was slightly higher than that of other banks by more than 1%. Conversely, there is 
a large gap between IW and IB in 2008, whereas the average for the TE of CB is 15% 
higher, which can be explained by the low performance of the Albilad and AlJazira 
banks, as their TE accounted for 58% and 64% when compared to the efficiency level 
of the AlRajhi bank, which was at 86%. Consequently, the observed difference in the 
average for the TE between these two bank types was sustained until 2010, which 
means that the performance of IB reached its peak in 2005. On the other hand, they 
dropped sharply until they reached the lowest level in 2008, which can be attributed to 
the trading activities in the Saudi capital market in 2006, as its index collapsed from 
20,000 points to 8,000 points at the end of that year (EIU Country Report, May 2007). 
The effect can be observed in the case of the Al-Jazira Bank, as it appears to be the 
most inefficient bank from among all of the Saudi banks. Meanwhile, it can be 
observed that the performance of IB was influenced negatively by the effect of the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Interestingly, these findings are in line with the 
financial indicators analysis in section 2.2.3.       
Bootstrapping results of the estimated TE scores specify that most efficiency scores 
are simulating around the lower confidence limit. It should be noted that the bias 
correction is not important in this result because it could involve a huge variance 
when compared with the original estimation of TE, as indicated by Simar and Wilson 
(2000). The main aim of the bootstrap process is to determine the location of the 
obtained efficiency scores with regard to the bounds of the lower and upper levels.  
In terms of the SE results, most of the banks were performing under increasing and 
constant return to scale in 2005 and 2006, except Al-Rajhi (in 2006); the Riyad and 
NCB banks were operating under decreasing return to scale and they remained below 
the optimum level of scale until the end of the period. This could be explained by bad 
management. Surprisingly, small banks and the majority of banks with foreign 
partners, such as Al-Jazira, Saudi Investment, Saudi Hollandi, Saudi Fransi and 
SABB, seem to operate under increasing returns to scale during the period in question.     
43 
2.6.2 The Findings from the Second Stage Estimation of DEA 
To assess the differences in the TE, specifically between the two types of bank, three 
variables were employed to investigate those variations by OLS regression. Initially, it 
is important to clarify the validity of the estimated models, which were examined in 
terms of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. As can be seen from Table 2.4, the 
multicollinearity or autocorrelation problem does appear in OLS estimation; the GLS 
and ML methods are therefore considered to be feasible for application. All of the 
parameters are significant in both estimators of GLS and ML. ML estimation is, 
however, preferred because of the value of log-likelihood1.  
The displayed results of the effects of the environmental variables reveal the 
coefficients with the expected signs. The first variable (Z1) shows the influence of 
Islamic banking on bank efficiency to be positive, which signifies that IB are 
potentially more efficient at producing loans or financing (as output) than CB by 
10.5%.  
 
Table 2.4- Second Stage Regression of TE   
 OLS Feasible GLS ML 
Variable Estimated 
Value 
Std. 
Error 
Estimated 
Value 
Std. 
Error 
Estimated 
Value 
Std. 
Error 
Constant 0.9772***  0.0359 0.9422***  0.0452 0.9422***  0.0456 
Z1 0.07164* 0.0429 0.1045* 0.0603 0.1052* 0.0606 
Z2 -0.0417*** 0.01024 -0.0353*** 0.0074   -0.0353*** 0.0074   
Z3 -0.00498***  0.00187 -0.0039*** 0.0011 -0.0039***  0.0011 
F-statistic 12.18***      
Adjusted R2    0.34                   
Log-
Likelihood 
56.34 80.739 80.741 
Notes: (***), (**), (*) are significant at a 99%, 95% and  90% confidence level. 
 
The results in Table 2.4 also show that the estimated coefficients of NPL (Z2) are 
negative, proving the expectations of the study, which in turn reflects that an increase 
in the NPL to total loan ratio leads to a decrease in the bank’s efficiency by 3.5%. 
                                                            
1 Gujarati (1988) and Greene (2007) stated that in a large sample (above sixty or seventy observations), 
the results of GLS or ML estimators are somewhat similar.  
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This result is in accordance with Abdul-Majid (2008), who suggested that robust 
measures are needed to control the default loans.  
Finally, the estimate of liquid assets to customer deposits and short-term funding (Z3) 
indicates the negative impact of this ratio on the output TE by approximately 0.4%. 
This relationship implies that less liquidity in banks is more associated with funding 
high-risk loans, which can perhaps lead to an increase in NPL.  
2.6.3 The Findings from the SFA Application 
This section presents the findings for the utilised environmental variables on the 
banks’ efficiency by SFA with CD production specification. Table 2.5 presents the 
SFA estimation with half-normal and normal truncated models, where it was found 
that all of the employed variables (Z1, Z2, Z3) are significant and determine the 
directional effects on Saudi banking efficiency. This result is consistent with the DEA 
application in the second stage estimation. It should be noted that the environmental 
variables are employed in SFA with CD model, as ratios, and not logarithms, in 
accordance with the study made by Good et al. (1995). Further, as indicated by Coelli 
et al. (1999) the environmental variables in this case are assumed to have a direct 
impact on the production technology and not the technical efficiency of a bank. 
       
Table 2.5- Estimated SFA with CD Production Function   
 Half-Normal Normal Truncated 
Variable Estimated Value Std. Error Estimated Value Std. Error 
Constant -0.265 0.269 0.03981 0.3817 
Ln X1 1.094 ***    0.059 1.06903 *** 0.08933 
Ln X2 0.0791**     0.0395 0.07979 ** 0.03678 
Ln X3 -0.2009*** 0.0661 -0.18985 ** 0.09317 
Z1 0.3659*** 0.0671 0.32305 ***       0.1129   
Z2 -0.0531*** 0.0103 -0.05224 *** 0.0115  
Z3 -0.00878 ***  0.0019 -0.00845 ** 0.00382 
Lambda  1.3077*** 0.4191 132.668      5750.885 
Sigma      0.14141      0.00162 0.1266        0.02118 
Mu  - 0.1778 0.1073 
Log-Likelihood 52.68994  55.34414 
LR ratio 5.3084 
Note: (***) and (**) are significant at a 99% and 95% confidence level. 
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The LR test is used to examine which of these models, whether half-normal or 
truncated, is more accurate to estimate efficiency when comparing the calculated LR 
value to the critical value of x2 at a 95% significance level, which is equivalent to 
3.84. In accordance with the results in Table 2.5, the null hypothesis H0 is rejected, 
which means that the simple half-normal model is adequate. Nevertheless, the SFA 
model cannot be relied on entirely to evaluate the efficiency scores for each bank of 
the sample, given that the inefficiencies are involved with the random error in this 
model, which could lead to misleading results in a small sample. Thus, to avoid this 
problem, the SFA model requires a larger sample than the DEA model (Assaf and 
Josiassen, 2011). It is important to clarify that the SFA equation is only estimated to 
ensure the direction of the environmental variables.       
2.6.4 The Rank of Saudi Banks 
Table 2.6 shows the ranking of the Saudi Arabian IB and CB according to the TE 
average during the period in question, both before (Rank A), and after (Rank B), 
including the environmental variables with the DEA applications.   
 
Table 2.6- The Rank of the Sampled Banks  
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Rank A 3 11 4 10 9 8 2 1 5 6 7
Rank B 6 11 1 8 4 9 3 2 5 7 10
Note: Rank A provides the bank’s order according to the average for the TE (DEA) without 
the influence of the environmental variables; Rank B presents the bank’s ranking after 
adjusting the DEA TE scores.         
 
By looking at the results in Table 2.6 and from the ranking for the IB, it seems that the 
efficiency level of these banks is affected negatively by the independent variables 
(loan quality and liquidity ratio) more than IW. This finding can be observed from the 
ranking level of Al-Rajhi bank, as it has changed from three to six. The Albilad Bank 
appears to be the most efficient bank in Rank B; indeed, it is considered to be a new 
bank as it started to operate in 2005. Therefore, in this bank the NPL accounted for 
zero, and then took the lowest level of that ratio among other banks in the period from 
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2006 to 2007. Accordingly, the most efficient banks are the Saudi Fransi Bank and the 
SABB. This implies that CB with IW and foreign partnerships have a higher 
efficiency level than other banks. The differences in the efficiency scores can be 
explained in some cases by the bank management being better than Saudi banks with 
full ownership, such as is the case with the Al-Rajhi Bank and the NCB.   
2.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This study has examined performance in the form of the efficiency of IB and IW 
operated by all CB in Saudi Arabia over the period of 2005 to 2010 through the use of 
some financial indicators. In endeavouring to locate the performance of the sampled 
banks, the DEA model, the SE and the bootstrap approach were employed. In 
addition, a number of environmental factors were included to capture their impact on 
the performance and efficiency of the sampled banks. The internal variables were 
used to explore their influence on the banks’ efficiency in the second stage regression 
of DEA; these are the banks’ characteristics or type, for which a dummy variable is 
used to signify fully-fledged IB, loan quality and liquidity ratio. Furthermore, banks 
are ranked according to the average of TE during the period, both before and after 
including the environmental variables with the DEA model. 
The analysis of financial ratios suggests that the Saudi Arabian banking sector is 
influenced by several environmental variables, such as the economic and financial 
conditions. In general, the development stages in the Saudi Arabian capital market 
have had a great impact on the banks’ performance, as well as the global financial 
crisis. Furthermore, the performance of IB is affected by such factors more than that 
of CB. This can be explained by the limited number of IB and also by the amount of 
their total assets, both of which are less than IW.   
With regard to the results, the TE obtained from the DEA estimations are in 
accordance with the financial indicators analysed in the earlier part of this study, 
which indicates that the performance of IB reached its peak in 2005. They did, 
however, decrease sharply until they reached the lowest level in 2008, which can be 
attributed to the trading activities in the Saudi capital market during 2006. The 
findings also show that the performance of IB was influenced adversely by the effect 
of the global financial crisis in 2008. In terms of the nature of the SE findings, the 
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majority of banks with foreign partners seemed to operate under increasing returns to 
scale during the period. 
The findings of environmental variables reveal that IB are positively associated with 
the banks’ efficiency. The estimated coefficient of NPL has a negative impact on the 
banks’ efficiency, which indicates that further controls should be introduced to 
monitor borrowers with regard to developing management portfolios. Finally, the 
estimate coefficient of the liquidity ratio indicates a negative relationship with bank 
efficiency, as less liquidity in banks is more associated with funding high-risk loans.  
The ranking of Saudi Arabian banks, after adjusting the DEA efficiency scores, shows 
that the efficiency of IB is adversely affected by the environmental variables more 
than the IW. In addition, the findings suggest that the performance of IW with foreign 
partnerships is better than that of IB, where the efficiency scores of these banks were 
almost not influenced by the independent variables.     
Lastly, it should be noted that in terms of this study’s limitations, it is only comprised 
of one output variable. Therefore, it is suggested that for future studies more input-
output variables should be included, such as other earning assets as an output variable. 
In addition, the application of different methods should be considered, such as SFA 
with Gamma model, to advance the assessments of efficiency levels and obtain better 
results. Such methods do, however, require more observation. It is also recommended 
that future research expands the sample size and utilises panel data. Furthermore, to 
examine the variation in bank efficiency in greater detail, more environmental 
variables, which are related to bank-level and macro-level factors, need to be 
investigated; for example, banks with foreign ownership and the financial 
development factors, including market capitalisation and concentration.        
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CHAPTER 3 
DETERMINING THE EFFICIENCY OF ISLAMIC AND 
CONVENTIONAL BANKS IN THE GCC: META-FRONTIER 
ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The economic conditions of the GCC countries are very similar due to their 
dependency on oil exports, which provide a high level of earnings and a large 
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Four of these countries, namely 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait, play a crucial role as members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Bahrain should be 
considered separately as the country’s economy and finances rely heavily on sectors 
other than oil, and its oil exports are not sufficient to consider it a member of the 
OPEC (EIU Country Report, March 2012). Although oil wealth helped these countries 
to develop, vicissitudes in oil prices have an influence on government budgets and 
financial sectors. Nevertheless, the authorities in the GCC countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE have made substantial efforts to support local and foreign 
investments and to enhance the GDP growth rate of non-oil sectors, but the oil sector 
still remains essential to these economies (EIU Country Report, May 2007; EIU 
Country Report, May 2005). 
The banking sector, as an intermediary among other sectors, has a significant impact 
on the financial systems and economies of the GCC countries, and the GCC countries’ 
financial sectors have responded positively to global developments and trends in the 
financial sectors, especially the developments related to the Islamic finance industry. 
As large economies within the Arab world, the GCC economies offer great potential 
for the development of the financial sector in general and for the Islamic finance 
industry in particular, due to the large capital accumulated with the ever-increasing oil 
prices. A number of fully-fledged IB have emerged over the years and started to 
operate in these countries even though the first commercial Islamic bank was 
established in the UAE in 1975. In response to the developments in Islamic finance, a 
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substantial number of CB in the GCC countries have also opened IW to offer different 
levels of Islamic financial services.  
This paper thus aims to investigate the efficiency and technology gap ratio (TGR) of 
the banking sector in the GCC countries on an empirical level. Given that all of the 
banks in these countries operate under different technologies and different bank 
groups, this research aims to compare these banks on two levels: between each 
country on an individual frontier (except Oman) and between three bank groups, 
which are IB, IW, and CB. These comparisons will be made using DEA, under the 
“variable returns to scale” (VRS) assumption in combination with the meta-frontier 
approach. In addition, this study also measures the total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth through the use of the Malmquist productivity index (MPI) in order to 
investigate the catch-up term, which measures how the frontiers of a country or bank 
group perform in terms of production points and productivity growth towards the 
meta-frontier from period t to period t+1. In the second stage, this study attempts to 
investigate the high potential influence of banks’ characteristics, financial structures 
and rule-of-law variables on the technical efficiency (TE) scores that were obtained 
from the DEA meta-frontier method. This stage is applied through a two-stage 
approach in different models of the panel data set, which are panel random effect, 
with generalized least squares (GLS) and bootstrap estimators.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 3.2 describes the environment of 
the financial and banking sectors in the GCC region by focusing on recent 
developments in these sectors for each country and each bank group. Section 3.3 
reviews and discusses the “bank efficiency” literature; section 3.4 describes the 
methodology employed in the study, which includes an output distance function, the 
meta-frontier approach, the meta-technology ratios of the DEA method, and the MPI 
with meta-frontier and second-stage regression. Section 3.5 presents an empirical 
modelling and process; section 3.6 illustrates the findings of the study. Finally, 
section 3.7 offers a discussion and conclusion.  
3.2 FINANCIAL AND BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE GCC 
COUNTRIES  
The oil boom in the GCC countries has had a substantial effect on the establishment 
and development of the financial sector, as well as on the launch and increased 
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importance of IBF in the region. Although development trajectories have taken 
several stages, this section only intends to analyse recent developments in these 
sectors within the GCC countries.  
In an attempt to understand the role of the banking sector in the GCC region, Figure 
3.1 depicts the total assets ratio of the banking sector to GDP. Bahrain, where the total 
assets of the banking sector accounted for 224% of the GDP by the end of 2010, has 
clearly taken first place among the other countries, and the numbers here emphasise 
Bahrain’s heavy dependency on its financial sector. For Kuwait, during 2010, its 
banking assets represented 131% of the GDP; the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
exhibited commercial banking assets of approximately 122%, 94% and 80% of the 
GDP.  
 
Figure 3.1- Total Assets of the Banking Sector to GDP in 2010 (%) 
 
Data Source: Bankscope and the EIU. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the size of the share of assets in each country relative to the total 
assets of all countries during 2010, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE representing the 
largest percentage at 34%; Bahrain correspondingly represents the smallest percentage 
at 5%. In addition, the asset sizes of Kuwait and Qatar are 15% and 12%. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the share for each bank category in terms of their assets in the 
GCC countries, namely fully-fledged IB, IW, and CB. The assets of IB account for 
19%, with sixteen IB; the assets of IW represent the largest portion of assets at around 
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56% in eighteen banks; and the assets for CB represent 25% of the total in twenty 
banks within the GCC region.  
 
Figure 3.2- Total Assets of Banking Sector in the GCC countries (2010) 
 
Data Source: Bankscope. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, the largest banks in the Gulf region are CB offering 
Islamic products, such as the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia, the 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi and the Qatar National Bank. Moreover and without 
exception, all of the CB in Saudi Arabia provide IW, which strengthens the assets of 
this bank group. In addition and according to Al-Hassan et al. (2010), the position of 
IB is significantly dominant with about 24% of the banking assets in the GCC region.  
 
Figure 3.3- Total Assets of the GCC’s Bank Groups (2010) 
 
Data Source: Bankscope. 
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3.2.1 Financial Sector Indicators  
Table 3.1 displays two indicators in order to describe the financial sector development 
of the five GCC countries included in this study over the period from 2005 to 2010. 
These indicators are market capitalisation ratio (to GDP) or MC/GDP, which 
demonstrates the development stage of the stock market, and private sector credit 
indicator, which can be described as the banks’ claims on the private sector over 
GDP, or BCPS/GDP. Two factors influence the market capitalisation indicator: the 
income level of the country (Ben Naceur et al., 2011) and the stock prices of listed 
companies (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2009).  
 
Table 3.1- Financial Growth Indicators in the GCC Countries 
 Saudi Arabia The UAE Bahrain Qatar Kuwait 
Year MC/
GDP 
BCPS/
GDP 
MC/ 
GDP 
BCPS/
GDP 
MC/
GDP 
BCPS/
GDP 
MC/
GDP 
BCPS/
GDP 
MC/ 
GDP 
BCPS/
GDP 
2005 206 35.6 124.9 42.7 129 49.6 202.9 44.1 161 62 
2006 93.5 35.3 62.4 49 133.2 47 101.8 42 126.9 62.4 
2007 134.8 38.6 87 60.1 152.3 56.5 118.2 50.1 163.9 68.8 
2008 51.8 39.9 31.1 73.2 96.7 67.3 68.9 53.7 72 64.7 
2009 85.5 50.7 40.5 97.5 82.2 79.3 89.4 75.7 87.5 84 
2010 81.3 45.6 35.2 92.3 93.2 79.2 95.4 40.4 96.2 80.4 
Data Source: Standard and Poor's (S & P) Global Stock Markets Factbook data and country 
authorities. 
Note: MC/GDP presents the ratio of market capitalisation over GDP, and BCPS/GDP shows 
the ratio of the banks’ claims on the private sector over GDP. 
 
Trends in the market capitalisation ratio emphasise that it reached its highest level in 
2005 for most of the GCC countries, especially in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. 
Such a result can be attributed to the effect of the development stage of those markets, 
combined with the influence of stock prices. In 2008, however, it dropped sharply to 
31% in the UAE and to 51.8% in Saudi Arabia, owing to the effect of the global 
financial crisis in 2008.  
As for the second indicator, namely private sector credit, it depicts the development of 
the economic and financial sectors (Naceur et al., 2011). Accordingly, this indicator 
increased gradually during the specified period in Table 3.1, and it decreased slightly 
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during 2010 in all of the specified countries. This is especially noticeable in the case 
of Qatar, as the indicator declined by around 35% in 2010.  
3.2.2 Banking Sector Indicators 
The present study uses two financial indicators for financial sectors to assess the 
performance of the commercial banking sector in the GCC countries: the average of 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). The assessment is made by 
dividing these sectors into three groups. Figure 3.4, which presents the ROA ratios, 
demonstrates that the performance of the GCC’s banking sector generally decreased 
gradually from 2005 to 2010, reaching a minimum in 2009 and recovering in 2010. 
Furthermore and according to bank groups, IB reached their peak in 2006; this result 
can probably be attributed to the investment and capital market activities described in 
Table 3.1.      
 
Figure 3.4- ROA of the GCC Bank Groups 
 
 
Data Source: Bankscope. 
 
The ROE average movement in Figure 3.5 is similar to the trend observed for ROA in 
Figure 3.4; the performance of the IW group is, however, slightly above average, and 
this group has not fluctuated as much as the groups representing IB and CB for ROA. 
The strength of this group is due to the banks’ size in terms of ownership structure, as 
more than 70% of the actual banks are owned by the government in Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE (Al-Hassan et al., 2010). In addition, it is clear that the financial crisis at the 
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end of 2008 negatively influenced the financial system and the banks’ performance, 
especially that of the IB.  
 
Figure 3.5- ROE of the GCC Bank Groups 
 
Data Source: Bankscope. 
 
3.3 SURVEYING THE BANK EFFICIENCY LITERATURE  
A review of the literature has been conducted to compute banking efficiency by 
employing both non-parametric and parametric methods. In addition, other studies 
also examine the influence of environmental factors related to bank and financial 
structures and regulations or economic conditions.  
Among the available body of knowledge, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) explore 
the efficiency of the French and Spanish banking sectors, focusing on the effect of 
environmental variables on the cost efficiency. The results show that as these 
variables are involved in the estimated function, the efficiency scores are notably 
reduced. Another study employing environmental factors is that by Bonin et al. 
(2005), who investigate the influence of ownership structure on the bank efficiency of 
eleven transition countries. The empirical results indicate that foreign banks have a 
significant and positive position in illustrating the variation of efficiency scores in 
those countries. Finally, Delis and Papanikolaou (2009) examine the determinants of 
bank efficiency, which include bank size and the financial and ownership structures of 
ten European countries. The results of the study demonstrate that bank size has a 
positive influence on bank efficiency, although bank concentration has a negative 
impact on efficiency. 
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In terms of developing countries, Chen (2009) investigates the effect of 
macroeconomic factors and financial development on the levels of bank efficiency, in 
addition to examining the relationship between market structure, legal framework, 
political surroundings, government effectiveness and efficiency in ten sub-Saharan 
African middle-income countries. The findings provide evidence that suggests that 
foreign banks are more efficient than the local banks; in addition, a steady 
macroeconomic situation and a high level of financial structures would advance bank 
efficiency levels.  
With regard to developing economies, a study by Wezel (2010) analyses the bank 
efficiency of eighty-six domestic and foreign banks in six countries from the Central 
American region by measuring the productivity through the MPI. The results in this 
study demonstrate that efficiency in international banks is better than it is in domestic 
banks. On the other hand, in terms of productivity changes, the study found that local 
banks were better than foreign banks. A recent study using the same methodological 
framework was conducted by Ben Naceur et al. (2011) for some selected countries 
from the Middle East and North Africa in order to measure bank efficiency and 
investigate the impact of other factors related to policies, country development and 
financial and bank structures. They found that differences in efficiency levels are 
illustrated by the impact of those other factors. 
All of these studies, whether in developed or developing countries, indicate the 
importance of environmental factors that could have an impact on bank efficiency. 
The latter study did, however, use the meta-frontier approach in measuring bank 
efficiency to investigate differences in production technologies in terms of efficiency 
levels, especially across different markets and regulations among countries. This 
approach is proposed by Battese and Rao (2002), and it is further developed by 
Battese et al. (2004) and O’Donnell et al. (2008).         
With regard to the empirical studies related to IB, this study has followed the available 
literature in using econometric and statistical models to measure efficiency. Mokhtar 
et al. (2007) state that the IBF research has mostly concentrated on theoretical matters 
and that the analysis of empirical practices has primarily focused on descriptive 
statistics rather than statistical estimation.  
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In terms of comparing groups of countries by including GCC Islamic banking, 
Yudistira (2004) measured the efficiency of eighteen IB from the GCC, East Asia, the 
Middle East and African countries by applying DEA. The findings show that although 
IB were affected by the financial crisis of 1998 to 1999, they have recovered 
efficiently. In a further attempt at studying GCC banking, Al-Muharrami (2007) 
measured TE and productivity change in GCC banking by using DEA and the MPI. 
For statistical reasons, CB and IB are, however, used only on one frontier. Generally, 
the findings depict that there is a negative change in efficiency during the period and 
that the TE was reduced by 3%, along with a decrease in technology. It is indicated 
that the observed reduction could be due to provisional impact. Another study by 
Johnes et al. (2009) used DEA and the MPI to examine the efficiency of IB and CB in 
the GCC region from 2004 to 2007. The results suggest that the efficiency is notably 
higher among CB than IB. It also indicated that in producing the maximum outputs, IB 
are more efficient than CB, although they are not efficient at minimising the cost.  
Other studies used the parametric techniques method when measuring efficiency and 
performance, such as Srairi (2010). He investigated the cost and profit efficiency of 
CB and IB in the GCC region by employing SFA and some factors that related to 
macroeconomic and banking structure to explore the variation in efficiency for the 
period from 1999 to 2007. Srairi concluded that cost and profit efficiency increased 
during the period in question, yet the progress was not steady, and the GCC banks 
were not as efficient at managing cost as they are in making profit. In addition, he 
indicates that under the condition of rising prices, it is better for the GCC banks to 
manage expenses of labour rather than expenses of interest (cost of fund). His study 
shows that in terms of the geographic evaluation of cost efficiency, Oman was the 
most efficient, whereas Kuwait was the least efficient.  
According to bank types, Srairi (2010) found that IB are less efficient than CB, which 
could be due to many reasons, such as the assets size of IB being smaller than that of 
the CB; they have therefore not obtained the advantages of scale economies. Thus, he 
suggested that IB should improve their size by means of mergers to acquire economies 
of scale. In his more recent study, Srairi (2011) investigated the productivity change 
of both bank types in the GCC region by using the MPI, and his findings show that IB 
have underperformed in comparison to CB.  
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When reflecting on the empirical papers reviewed, this study distinguishes itself from 
the existing studies on banking efficiency in the Gulf region on two points. Initially, it 
uses the meta-frontier approach to obtain an accurate comparison between the GCC 
countries and between the three bank types, as this approach takes into account the 
technology differences across the group of countries and firms. In addition, the meta-
frontier is employed with the DEA method, which helps to measure efficiency 
between different countries (Ben Naceur et al., 2011). Further, it uses the MPI to 
evaluate productivity change over time and to obtain the catch-up rate (Chen and 
Yang, 2011). The second point is that to determine the variation in efficiency scores, 
which are produced from the meta-frontier, several environmental variables related to 
banks’ characteristics, financial structures and regulations are employed with different 
models, including bootstrap procedure as derived from Simar and Wilson (2007). The 
application of this methodology can be found in Delis and Papanikolaou (2009), and it 
is further explained in the following section.    
3.4 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY   
This section delineates the methods and models that are used in the application to 
measure the performance within the GCC’s banking sectors. Efficiency levels 
between each country and between the groups for IB relative to IW and CB are 
compared by applying the DEA meta-frontier method through an output distance 
function to obtain efficiency levels and TGR. In addition, to assess the variation in the 
TE, some environmental variables related to banks’ characteristics, financial 
structures and the rule of law are investigated through the second-stage model of 
DEA. Therefore, this section aims to discuss the methodological issues in detail. 
3.4.1 Distance Function and the Meta-Frontier Model   
The concept of distance function is described in Chapter Two. To compare the TE of 
a number of firms with different structures between different countries, Battese et al. 
(2004) and O’Donnell et al. (2008) defined the meta-frontier approach as a frontier 
that encloses or envelops a group of frontiers. Accordingly, efficiency levels are 
measured in relation to the meta-frontier concept in two steps. Firstly, to compute the 
TE of output and input combinations in the group frontiers, for each country and each 
bank group. After that, to calculate the gap between the meta-frontier and the group 
frontiers in the first step. The evaluated gap can be defined as the “meta-technology 
58 
ratio” or the TGR (O’Donnell et al., 2008: 232–33). The section below considers the 
framework for the output distance function and the meta-frontier.    
The current study aims to examine the efficiency of the GCC countries alongside bank 
groups using the meta-frontier model. Therefore, it is convenient to represent the 
group frontiers, output sets and output distance functions of a specific group A (>1), 
which can be characterised according to O’Donnell et al. (2008) as: 
ܲ஺ሺݔሻ ൌ 	 ሼݕ: ሺݔ, ݕሻ ∈ ܶ஺ሽ,									ܣ ൌ 1,2,… , ܣ; and     
 (3.1) 
ܦ஺	ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ 	݂݅݊ߜ	 ቄߜ ൐ 0 ∶ ቀ௬ఋቁ ∈ 	ܲ஺ሺݔሻቅ ,						ܣ ൌ 1,2, … , ܣ.      
 (3.2) 
Therefore, it is specified to group frontier by the boundaries of the specific group 
output sets.  
3.4.2 TE and Meta-Technology Ratios 
An observation ܦ	ሺݔ, ݕሻ is considered efficient when equal to “1”. In addition and as 
is consistent with O’Donnell et al. (2008), for one observation (or one firm) an 
output-oriented measure of TE with regard to meta-technology can be identified as: 
ܶܧ∗	ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ ܦ∗	ሺݔ, ݕሻ.           
 (3.3) 
For group A, the output-oriented measure of TE with regard to the technology of the 
group is defined as: 
ܶܧ஺	ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ 	ܦ஺	ሺݔ, ݕሻ.          
 (3.4) 
For group A, the output-orientated meta-technology ratio can be specified as: 
ܯܴܶ஺	ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ 	஽∗	ሺ௫,௬ሻ஽ಲሺ௫,௬ሻ ൌ 	
்ா∗	ሺ௫,௬ሻ
்ாಲሺ௫,௬ሻ       
 (3.5) 
Or as: 
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ܶܧ∗	ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ 	ܶܧ஺ሺݔ, ݕሻ ൈ	ܯܴܶ஺	ሺݔ, ݕሻ.      
 (3.6) 
ܯܴܶ஺	ሺݔ, ݕሻ measures the gap between the meta-frontier and the groups’ A frontiers, 
and it can also be named the TGR. 
 
Figure 3.6- Meta-Frontier Model and Meta-Technology Ratio  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 describes the meta-frontier function model and the meta-technology ratio, 
where the meta-frontier envelops the groups A 1, 2, 3 frontiers (or country frontiers), 
and the meta-technology ratio can be obtained by ଴ி/଴ா଴ி/଴஽, which is equal to  
்ா∗	ሺ௫,௬ሻ
்ாಲሺ௫,௬ሻ in 
equation (3.5).   
3.4.3 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
The definition and concept of the DEA approach are described in Chapter Two. This 
study adopts a multi-output orientation of the DEA form, which can be estimated as t 
period, ݕ௜௧ is the M × 1 vector of output quantities for i firms, and Y is the M × ܮ௞ܶ 
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matrix of output quantities for all ܮ௞ firms. The VRS equation is therefore written by 
Coelli et al. (2005) as: 
݉ܽݔ∅	௜,௧,ఒ	௜,௧	∅௜,௧	
ݏݐ. െ∅௜,௧ݕ௜,௧ ൅ 	ܻߣ௜,௧ ൒ 0,	
						െ ௜ܺ,௧ߣ௜,௧ ൅ 	ݔ௜,௧ ൒ 0,	
							݈1ᇱߣ௜,௧ ൌ 1				ܽ݊݀		
							ߣ௜,௧ 	൒ 0.         (3.7) 
Here, 	∅௜௧ is a scalar, which is described in Chapter Two.  
3.4.4 The MPI and Meta-Frontiers   
Initially, Malmquist (1953) suggested the structure of proportion calculation for 
distance functions by input indices; this technique was later developed and illustrated 
by Caves et al. (1982). The MPI is described by Coelli et al. (2005) as a component to 
calculate the total factor productivity variation between two time periods through the 
use of the output distance rate of every period and firm (bank) in relation to its 
technology. That component, which is also defined as a geometric mean of two ratios, 
is written by Coelli et al. (2005) as:   
݉൫ݔ௜,௧, ݕ௜,௧, ݔ௜,௧ାଵ	, ݕ௜,௧ାଵ൯ ൌ ൤ௗ
೔,೟൫௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯
ௗ೔,೟൫௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯ ൈ
ௗ೔,೟శభ൫௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯
ௗ೔,೟శభ൫௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯ ൨
ଵ/ଶ
  (3.8)          
When ݉	evaluation is greater or (less) than one this indicates an increase or (a 
decline) in MPI during the specified period (t) and firm (i). Furthermore, the above 
equation can be reorganised to comprise technical efficiency change (EC) and 
technical change (TC): 
݉൫ݔ௜,௧, ݕ௜,௧, ݔ௜,௧ାଵ	, ݕ௜,௧ାଵ൯ ൌ 	ௗ೔,೟శభ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯ௗ೔,೟൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯ ൤
	ௗ೔,೟൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯
ௗ೔,೟శభ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯ ൈ
	ௗ೔,೟൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
ௗ೔,೟శభ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯൨
ଵ/ଶ
   (3.9)         
The first part of the right-hand side of the equation evaluates the EC; the second part 
shows the TC, which measures the frontier shifting from period t to another period 
t+1.  
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It is worth noting that the aim of this study is to compute the MPI of each bank as a 
decision-making unit (DMU) through group and meta-frontiers in order to obtain the 
catch-up t, t+1 rate, which is described by Rao and Dolan (2007) and by Chen and 
Yang (2011). Mathematically, the concept of catch-up t, t+1 can be defined as the 
MPI of the frontiers for a group or country (A) (MPIG) divided by the MPI of the 
meta-frontier (MPIM); thus, the equation of MPIG can thus be written as:  
ܯܲܫܩ ൌ ݉௞൫ݔ௜,௧, ݕ௜,௧, ݔ௜,௧ାଵ	, ݕ௜,௧ାଵ൯ ൌ 	ௗ೔,೟శభ
ೖ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯
ௗ೔,೟ೖ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
൤ 	ௗ೔,೟ೖ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯ௗ೔,೟శభೖ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯ ൈ
	ௗ೔,೟ೖ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
ௗ೔,೟శభೖ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
൨
ଵ/ଶ
        (3.10) 
MPIG can simply be expressed as: 
ܯܲܫܩ ൌ ܧܥ௧,௧ାଵ௞ ൈ	ܶܥ௧,௧ାଵ௞        (3.11)   
The MPIM that is estimated through meta-frontier can be obtained from the equation 
below: 
ܯܲܫܯ ൌ	݉∗൫ݔ௜,௧, ݕ௜,௧, ݔ௜,௧ାଵ	, ݕ௜,௧ାଵ൯ ൌ 	ௗ೔,೟శభ
∗ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯
ௗ೔,೟∗ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
൤ 	ௗ೔,೟∗ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯ௗ೔,೟శభ∗ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯ ൈ
	ௗ೔,೟∗ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
ௗ೔,೟శభ∗ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
൨
ଵ/ଶ
        (3.12)     
In terms of EC and TC, this can also be rewritten as: 
ܯܲܫܯ ൌ ܧܥ௧,௧ାଵ∗ ൈ	ܶܥ௧,௧ାଵ∗        (3.13) 
         
Figure 3.7 illustrates the technical EC and the TGR for a firm during two time periods 
(t, t+1) by assuming that in the first period (t) the firm (i) is producing at point F*; the 
group frontier is located at point F, and the TEk would be measured by	଴ி∗଴ி  and the TE* 
of the meta-frontier is	଴ி∗଴ீ . In the second period (t+1), the TEk is presented by	
଴஽∗
଴஽ , 
where the TE* is	଴஽∗଴ா . Therefore, the TGR for period t is	
଴ி
଴ீ, and for period t+1 it is	
଴஽
଴ா.  
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Figure 3.7- The Meta-Frontier Concept over Two Periods 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
According to the meta-frontier form, MPIM, by enveloping the entire group or 
country frontiers with dissimilar technologies, provides an evaluation of the 
productivity growth through time trend. Equation 3.14 provides a mathematical 
illustration representing the measurement of the MPIG term besides TGR change for 
group A from period t to period t+1. This measurement is associated with the catch-up 
component, as described by Chen and Yang (2011): 
ܯܲܫܯ ൌ ܧܥ௧,௧ାଵ௞ ൈ	ܶܥ௧,௧ାଵ௞ ൈ	ൣܥܽݐ݄ܿ െ ݑ݌௧,௧ାଵ൧ିଵ   (3.14)   
The catch-up component in equation 3.14 is defined by Chen and Yang (2011) as: 
ൣܥܽݐ݄ܿ െ ݑ݌௧,௧ାଵ൧ିଵ ൌ 	 ൤	்ீோ೔,೟శభ
ೖ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯
்ீோ೔,೟ೖ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯
ൈ 	்ீோ೔,೟ೖ ൫	௫೔,೟శభ,௬೔,೟శభ൯்ீோ೔,೟శభೖ ൫	௫೔,೟,௬೔,೟൯ ൨
ଵ/ଶ
 (3.15)             
By replacing the two first elements of the right-hand side in equation 3.14 with 
equation (3.11) to acquire: 
ܯܲܫܯ ൌ 	ܯܲܫܩ ൈ	ൣܥܽݐ݄ܿ െ ݑ݌௧,௧ାଵ൧ିଵ      (3.16)   
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Here, catch-up terms can be measured as: 
ܿܽݐ݄ܿ െ ݑ݌௧,௧ାଵ ൌ 	 ெ௉ூீெ௉ூெ       (3.17)   
As indicated by both Fӓre et al. (1994) and Kumbhakar and Wang (2005), the catch-
up term evaluates how country or group frontiers perform in terms of production 
points and productivity growth towards the meta-frontier (Chen and Yang, 2011: 
198). Practically, this is depicted in equation 3.17, where the catch-up value would 
mainly be affected by the value of MPIG, which is comprised of the EC and TC of 
group K.   
3.4.5 Second-Stage Regression of the DEA Meta-Frontier Model 
In this study, the efficiency level is evaluated through the meta-frontier DEA model to 
achieve a comparable assessment among the GCC countries and bank type groups. 
Other factors are, however, able to have an impact on efficiency measures. It is 
therefore crucial to take into account the influence of environmental variables on 
efficiency scores. In addition, the second stage is applied by the form identified in 
equation 3.18 to examine these effects:  
ܶܧ	௜,௧	 ൌ 	ߙ ൅ 	ߚ	ܼ௜௧ ൅	ߝ௜,௧       (3.18)   
Here, the dependent variable is the TE scores for the meta-frontier; on the right-hand 
side of the equation are the parameters α (constant) and β (parameter of the 
explanatory or independent variables); Zit includes internal variables related to banks’ 
characteristics and external variables related to financial structure and the rule of law; 
the ߝ௜,௧ element presents the error term. 
Two models are applied in order to estimate the influence of environmental variables 
on banks’ efficiency: panel random effect and bootstrap procedures.2 The latter is 
derived from Simar and Wilson (2007), who observed that the two-stage or semi-
parametric approach estimation and inference potentially involve two complications. 
Initially, the estimated parameters could suffer from a serial correlation problem, and 
the dependent variable is measured from the first stage, which relies on input and 
                                                            
2 Panel random effect is preferred rather than fixed effect due to the explanatory variables in the 
estimated model that contain dummy variables, where the presence of such a variable is considered to 
be an obstacle to estimating the fixed effect model, as the latter is calculated by counting dummy 
variables of N groups in the model, which is indicated by Greene (2006).   
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output variables, and could lead to biased estimates. The second problem arises with 
the error element, which could be correlated with independent variables. Therefore, to 
overcome such problems and enhance the two-stage efficiency estimation and 
inference, Simar and Wilson (2007) proposed bootstrap procedure, which is 
conducted in the following steps:  
(i) After obtaining the TE scores in the first stage, the parameters in the second stage 
are estimated through ML combined with the truncated regression of the TEi on 
Zi in equation 3.18; this step presents consistent estimates of the parameters, 
although it is without the common convergence level. 
(ii) To acquire the bootstrap, the estimated model is replicated (2000 times) over 
three steps: 
(a) For each bank, calculate the standard error from the distribution with left-
truncation.  
(b) Recalculate the dependent variable (TE) for each bank.  
(c) Apply the maximum likelihood approach to estimate the yielded parameters 
through truncated regression. This step is defined as a non-linear regression 
model of parametric bootstrap with specified properties, which were 
explored by several studies (Bickel and Freedman, 1981).     
(iii) The bootstrap values are used and the former or basic estimates of each term to 
compute the confidence intervals. (For more details, see algorithm #1 Simar and 
Wilson, 2007: 41.) 
It should be noted that at this stage, the purpose of using bootstrap procedure is to 
examine the robustness of the estimated equation. Therefore, the findings of the two 
models, namely panel random effect and bootstrap, are compared.   
3.5 EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
This section determines the source of the applied data and defines it to assess the TE 
scores. To specify the input-output variables in the banks’ efficiency estimation, the 
“intermediation approach” is used, as is highlighted by Berger and Humphrey (1997). 
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The relevant body of literature on bank efficiency indicates that, with the exception of 
bank branch studies, the intermediation approach has remained the main approach.   
3.5.1 Data  
The inclusive set of cross-sectional panel data is drawn from Bankscope, where the 
selected banks and time period depend on the availability of this data for all of the 
GCC countries except Oman, which is omitted because of the absence of IB in the 
country until recently. It should be noted that foreign banks are also excluded from the 
sample, as they operate as branches in the GCC region, 
The empirical sample is limited to commercial banking, which consists of eleven 
banks in Saudi Arabia, eighteen banks in the UAE, nine banks in Bahrain, seven 
banks in Qatar and nine banks in Kuwait. In terms of bank type groups, the sample 
contains sixteen IB, eighteen IW and twenty CB. The study covered the period from 
2005 to 2010. Furthermore, all of the annual variables are used in US dollars and are 
then converted to suitable real prices according to the GDP deflator in 2007. These 
deflators can be acquired from the World Databank through the website of the World 
Bank Organization. The input-output variables of the DEA meta-frontier model and 
explanatory variables are statistically described in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2- Statistical Summary of Variables 
DEA Input and Output Variables Mean SD Min. Max. 
Saudi Arabia     
Loans 15557.7 9891.14 1196.78 36506.5 
Other Earning Assets 9033.91 7954.24 207.552 37173.3 
Deposits 21626.5 14921.9 899.130 67528.4 
Operating Expenses 398.418 293.180 60.1140 1650.89 
Equity 3533.58 2499.98 665.812 9112.27 
The UAE     
Loans 10273.2 13740.4 482.778 68253.3 
Other Earning Assets 3662.38 4271.09 97.1425 18273.1 
Deposits 11329.1 14382.7 453.120 68818.3 
Operating Expenses 188.169 212.865 11.1813 1109.90 
Equity 1913.19 2089.94 145.674 10292.6 
Bahrain     
Loans 2371.22 3640.90 119.970 15593.2 
Other Earning Assets 1788.20 2699.11 34.5950 10287.7 
Deposits 3318.49 5313.66 49.1040 21017.2 
Operating Expenses 61.7948 66.3891 3.82500 291.648 
Equity 566.805 675.786 52.2660 2697.16 
Qatar     
Loans 6406.31 7712.48 498.542 34781.6 
Other Earning Assets 3404.53 3553.25 506.072 14192.7 
Deposits 8116.33 10367.0 450.885 46929.7 
Operating Expenses 105.210 86.6732 8.01000 337.015 
Equity 1528.63 1438.77 194.154 6470.62 
Kuwait     
Loans 8584.98 7437.35 43.5616 28006.5 
Other Earning Assets 4200.19 3552.14 687.397 13072.6 
Deposits 11473.9 9930.36 546.301 37519.5 
Operating Expenses 188.463 206.943 11.5068 850.221 
Equity 1839.30 1833.06 133.569 7472.06 
IB Group     
Loans 5671.06 7811.00 43.5616 35510.6 
Other earning Assets 2607.12 3109.56 34.5950 13072.6 
Deposits 6829.77 9312.70 49.1040 41178.0 
Operating Expenses 168.360 213.548 3.82500 895.951 
Equity 1426.20 1807.62 52.2660 8578.11 
IW Group     
Loans 15336.2 13161.9 400.775 68253.3 
Other Earning Assets 8277.03 7051.03 148.297 37173.3 
Deposits 20378.5 16419.6 498.244 68818.3 
Operating Expenses 321.255 282.982 8.84000 1650.89 
Equity 3074.24 2396.42 54.4850 10292.6 
CB Group     
Loans 6635.68 8152.36 215.900 39361.8 
Other Earning Assets 2616.14 2859.36 90.0160 12306.6 
Deposits 7783.55 8817.43 203.490 37519.5 
Operating Expenses 114.104 123.199 7.65000 621.027 
Equity 1375.33 1615.28 113.490 7511.73 
Average of Countries and Groups     
Loans 9250.03 10888.0 43.5616 68253.3 
Other Earning Assets 4500.43 5429.48 34.5950 37173.3 
Deposits 11699.3 13468.3 49.1040 68818.3 
Operating Expenses 199.230 231.271 3.82500 1650.89 
Equity 1956.71 2109.86 52.2660 10292.6 
Explanatory Variables     
Net Loans/Deposits and Short-Term Funding 0.90520 0.79574 0.07422 7.43090 
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(NLD) 
IB (Dummy ) 0.29630 0.45733 0 1 
IW (Dummy) 0.33333 0.47212 0 1 
Bank Size (Size) (Dummy) 0.51852 0.50043 0 1 
Concentration (CON) 0.58277 0.13914 0.36406 0.856871 
Foreign Ownership (FO) (Dummy) 0.38890 0.48824 0 1 
Government Ownership (GOV) (Dummy) 0.42593 0.49525 0 1 
Rule of Law (RL1) (PRS) 0.77780 0.07870 0.66670 0.83333 
Rule of Law (RL2) (EIU) 0.60661 0.07032 0.52000 0.78000 
Note: All input and output variables are presented in real values of million US dollars. SD 
shows the standard deviation of the variables; PRS is the Political Risk Service indicator; EIU 
is the Economist Intelligence Unit indicator.  
 
3.5.2. Variable Definition  
The specified input and output variables in this study are adopted from the available 
literature on banking efficiency studies (Abdul-Majid, 2008; Johnes et al., 2009; Delis 
and Papanikolaou, 2009). The intermediation approach considers the bank as an 
intermediary between savers and borrowers that transforms monetary sources into 
output quantities. Consequently, the input variables used are total deposits, short-term 
funding, equity and operating expenses, which include non-interest and personal 
expenses; the output variables are total loans and other earning assets.     
3.5.2.1. Bank Characteristics  
The second-stage regression comprises the environmental variables. The variables for 
the banks’ characteristics are the ratio of net loans to deposits and short-term funding 
(NLD), the dummy variable of bank size (size) and the dummy variables of bank 
types; fully-fledged IB and IW.  
The internal factors are evaluated to explore the effect of the banks’ operation 
management on performance. The NLD ratio is selected to examine the banks’ ability 
to transform deposits into loans as an intermediate firm under specific and different 
regulations for each GCC country. A greater ability to produce loans from deposits 
leads to greater bank performance; thus, a positive relationship is expected between 
the intermediation ratio (NLD) and the banks’ efficiency, and this variable is adopted 
by the literature on banks’ efficiency (Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; Abdul-Majid, 
2008).  
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With regard to the size variable, the majority of studies have chosen to explore which 
bank sizes could boost efficiency. It should be identified that Delis and Papanikolaou 
(2009), among others, found that the growth of bank size led to increased efficiency. 
In order to capture the size effect, two types of variables were used in this study to 
investigate the impact of a firm’s size on efficiency: a non-linear variable, by applying 
the logarithm of total assets (Simar and Wilson, 2007), and a dummy variable, which 
symbolises large firms (Assaf and Josiassen, 2011). For some statistical reasons 
related to the validity of the data, the current study does, however, adopt the latter 
type of variable.                 
It is crucial for this study to investigate the impact of Islamic banking on the banks’ 
performance; from the previous sections it has been observed that most banks within 
the GCC deliver Islamic products, whether it is through fully-fledged IB or as IW in 
CB. Dummy variables for IB and IW are therefore employed (see:  Al-Jarrah 2002; 
Abdul-Majid 2008). By recalling section 3.2.1 and according to the financial ratio 
indicators, IW perform better than IB. Furthermore, most IB practice as venture capital 
providers and thus seem to be more at risk than traditional banks (Hussein, 2004). As 
a result, the estimated relationship between the banks’ efficiency and being an IW is 
positive, while it is negative with IB.  
3.5.2.2 Financial Structures and the Rule of Law 
The second group of explanatory variables are concentration (CON), ownership 
structure, including dummy variables of foreign ownership (FO) and government 
ownerships (GOV), and the rule of law (RL1 and RL2). Evidence from the literature 
indicates the importance of the CON variable on the banks’ efficiency, which reflects 
the power of the financial sector and competition (see: Delis and Papanikolaou, 2009; 
Ben Naceur et al., 2011). It is measured by the total assets of the three largest banks to 
the total assets of all banks, in this study sample, in each country. The assumption that 
CON has an effect on the banks’ efficiency cannot be expected to be held due to the 
mixed findings in the literature, where it is highlighted that more concentrated sectors 
lead to increased profitability, which in turn may raise the efficiency, but in contrast, 
increasing CON could adversely affect competition, which decreases the efficiency 
level.  
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With regard to ownership structure, the authorised legislation for FO in the GCC’s 
banking sectors is quite restricted. The percentage distribution of foreign banks within 
the GCC in 2007 was around 40%; 40% in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and 49% in 
Qatar and Kuwait, with the exception of Bahrain at more than 65%, where the foreign 
assets represent 57% of the total assets (Al-Hassan et al., 2010). In addition, GOV 
contributes a significant part of the total assets in the GCC countries; for instance, in 
the UAE by the end of 2007 the government’s share was around 41% of the total 
assets (Al-Hassan et al., 2010). Therefore, the importance of these variables, namely 
FO and GOV, does raise a question as to the direction in which the impact of those 
variables may drive the efficiency of the GCC banks. In accordance with the 
efficiency literature (for example, Bonin et al, 2005; Berger et al., 2008), the FO 
variable has been chosen, which results in a positive effect for foreign banks when 
compared with domestic banks. In this case study, the direction of the FO variable is, 
however, unclear, which is to be expected, and tends to have a negative coefficient. 
This outcome is probably due to the limited share of FO and the restricted regulations 
in most of the GCC countries. The GOV variable reflects liquidity pumping and 
represents the oil revenue, which is expected to have a positive impact on the GCC 
banks’ efficiency. 
In terms of the legal system, the rule of law is selected from the World Wide 
Governance Indicators for each GCC country to examine the impact of it on the 
banks’ efficiency. To this end, two variables are employed: RL1 and RL2, which are 
taken from the Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (PRS) and 
the EIU. In addition, these indicators evaluate the implemented rules of society, such 
as the quality of contract enforcement and courts. Ben Naceur et al. (2011) stated that 
efficient regulation improves the financial sector and is hence expected to have a 
positive influence, indicating a higher level of TE in the GCC’s banking sectors.   
3.6 EFFICIENCY MEASURES IN GCC BANKING: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS  
After identifying the detailed method and empirical procedure, this section aims to 
present the findings of the study. To this end, it is divided into three parts: the first 
part discusses the outcomes of the DEA meta-frontier results in the GCC countries 
and bank groups; the second section presents the MPI results of the meta-frontier and 
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group frontiers; and the third part deals with the estimated results of the 
environmental variables on the banks’ efficiency.       
3.6.1 DEA Meta-Frontier Findings   
The estimated efficiency scores are measured through DEA with VRS assumption and 
output distance function. Initially, it is worth noting that although the results are 
presented in the real values after using the GDP deflator, nominal values for the input-
output data are used in order to account for the homogeneity matter in the DEA 
estimation, particularly when evaluating productivity through time (t, t+1), and to 
ensure that the data is not heterogonous. Thus, it is found that the meta-frontier results 
for both sets of data are very similar.3  
For the estimation, the obtained results for the GCC countries of the panel data set are 
averaged for each year and presented within Table 3.3, in which the estimation of 
efficiency scores corresponds with the country frontier (CF), the meta-frontier (MF) 
and the technology gap ratio (TGR). 
On examining the estimates for the TE of the CF in Table 3.3, the performance of 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait has generally declined from 2005 to 
2010. In contrast, the TE scores for Qatari banks have shown an improvement during 
that period when compared to other countries. Thus, the average of the CF for all of 
the countries involved dropped from 95% to 91% in 2010.  
The following TGR, in Table 3.3, further illustrates production technology in relation 
to the CF. In 2005, the average of the estimated TE from the CF in commercial 
Bahraini banks was 92.5%, which represented the possible average output by using a 
given level of inputs. Correspondingly, the TGR is 0.927, signifying that those banks 
could perform at the level of best practice by producing output at 93% with the same 
level of inputs. Conversely, the efficiency scores of the CF of Saudi banks in 2010 
were about 96% when compared with the TGR at 0.847, revealing that the maximum 
output which can be produced by those banks with the same level of inputs in Saudi 
Arabia, and the technology provided by the GCC, is about 85% (O’Donnell et al., 
2008).                 
                                                            
3 See Table 1 in the appendices for the comparative statistical summary of the TE scores for the 
adjusted and nominal sets of data.        
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Table 3.3- TE and TGR of the DEA Meta-Frontier in the GCC Countries 
Country  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Estimated TE Relative to the CF  
Saudi 
Arabia  
0.997 
(0.008) 
0.983 
(0.023) 
0.971 
(0.035) 
0.978 
(0.046) 
0.977 
(0.025) 
0.966 
(0.034) 
0.95 
The UAE 0.956 
(0.076) 
0.935 
(0.082) 
0.882 
(0.102) 
0.911 
(0.077) 
0.892 
(0.073) 
0.887 
(0.084) 
0.91 
Bahrain  0.925 
(0.137) 
0.875 
(0.190) 
0.913 
(0.070) 
0.890 
(0.108) 
0.836 
(0.140) 
0.848 
(0.174) 
0.88 
Qatar   0.869 
(0.113) 
0.875 
(0.125) 
0.912 
(0.119) 
0.957 
(0.085) 
0.949 
(0.086) 
0.929 
(0.074) 
0.915 
Kuwait  0.984 
(0.032) 
0.955 
(0.051) 
0.938 
(0.101) 
0.942 
(0.057) 
0.962 
(0.057) 
0.940 
(0.070) 
0.95 
All 
Countries  
0.953 
(0.088) 
0.930 
(0.106) 
0.919 
(0.091) 
0.932 
(0.080) 
0.919 
(0.094) 
0.911 
(0.101) 
0.927 
Estimated TE Relative to the MF  
Saudi 
Arabia   
0.803 
(0.136) 
0.795 
(0.091) 
0.822 
(0.111) 
0.860 
(0.124) 
0.817 
(0.114) 
0.823 
(0.114) 
0.82 
The UAE 0.752 
(0.107) 
0.803 
(0.125) 
0.795 
(0.147) 
0.840 
(0.117) 
0.808 
(0.141) 
0.803 
(0.156) 
0.80 
Bahrain  0.862 
(0.157) 
0.795 
(0.10) 
0.755 
(0.173) 
0.735 
(0.148) 
0.695 
(0.142) 
0.727 
(0.184) 
0.762 
Qatar   0.741 
(0.131) 
0.762 
0.120) 
0.824 
(0.121) 
0.885 
(0.101) 
0.863 
(0.130) 
0.837 
(0.169) 
0.818 
Kuwait  0.832 
(0.113) 
0.810 
(0.073) 
0.801 
(0.131) 
0.790 
(0.123) 
0.806 
(0.105) 
0.766 
(0.101) 
0.801 
All 
Countries  
0.792 
(0.130) 
0.796 
(0.122) 
0.799 
(0.135) 
0.824 
(0.129) 
0.798 
(0.133) 
0.793 
(0.147) 
0.80 
TGR   
Saudi 
Arabia  
0.805 
(0.135) 
0.809 
(0.093) 
0.845 
(0.098) 
0.876 
(0.096) 
0.835 
(0.108) 
0.847 
(0.094) 
0.836 
The UAE 0.790 
(0.111) 
0.858 
(0.099) 
0.896 
(0.089) 
0.919 
(0.075) 
0.901 
(0.108) 
0.899 
(0.116) 
0.877 
Bahrain  0.927 
(0.060) 
0.902 
(0.064) 
0.822 
(0.142) 
0.823 
(0.105) 
0.832 
(0.103) 
0.858 
(0.102) 
0.861 
Qatar   0.851 
(0.078) 
0.875 
(0.098) 
0.904 
(0.072) 
0.926 
(0.060) 
0.908 
(0.091) 
0.896 
(0.122) 
0.893 
Kuwait  0.845 
(0.110) 
0.850 
(0.089) 
0.854 
(0.087) 
0.837 
(0.103) 
0.838 
(0.089) 
0.814 
(0.084) 
0.839 
All 
Countries 
0.832 
(0.114) 
0.856 
(0.093) 
0.866 
(0.1001) 
0.881 
(0.094) 
0.867 
(0.104) 
0.868 
(0.107) 
0.862 
Note: Standard deviation is shown in brackets. 
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Figure 3.8- Efficiency Scores for the DEA-MF in the GCC Countries 
 
  
Turning to the MF results, the TE scores for the CF are higher than the TE scores for 
the MF, where the MF envelops all of the countries’ frontiers. The averages of the MF 
in Saudi Arabia and Qatar are 82% and 81.8%, which are the highest for the GCC 
region for that specified period, whereas Bahraini banks underperformed with an 
average of the MF at 76%. The performance of banks from the UAE and Kuwait was 
found to be fluctuating around the average of the MF at 80%. The scores for Kuwaiti 
banks were, however, below average in 2008.  
In addition, Figure 3.8 displays the average trend of the MF as well as for each GCC 
country for the period from 2005 to 2010. It is observed that although Qatari banks 
were performing below the average of the MF,  they improved significantly until 2008 
and performed above the average. In contrast to the performance of the Qatari banks, 
Bahraini banks were found to be outperforming at the beginning of the period and 
then fell sharply until 2009, but they have recovered slightly during the period of the 
study.  
        
  
0.5
0.75
1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average all countries Saudi Arabia The UAE
Bahrian Qatar Kuwait
73 
Figure 3.9- Histogram and Kernel Density Estimate of the TGR in GCC 
Countries 
  
 
 
The TGR results for the period in question show that on average the maximum TGR 
appears in Qatar at 89%, followed by the UAE at 88%. This means that Qatari banks 
were operating on the best level of available production technology among the GCC 
countries during the period in question. On the other hand, the TGR for the Saudi and 
Kuwaiti banks represent the lower ratios, indicating the presence of larger technology 
gaps.  
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As evidenced by the histogram and Kernel density estimate of the TGR for the five 
GCC countries depicted in Figure 3.9, the TGR pattern of Bahraini banks is 
considerably in accordance with the MF trend, where these banks seemed to use the 
best available technology in the region, yet Bahraini banks were underperforming 
during the years from 2007 to 2009. 
At this stage an attempt has been made to examine the meta-frontier results according 
to bank groups that divided into three types, namely IB, IW, and CB. Table 3.4 
displays the estimate of the efficiency scores relative to the group-frontier (GF), the 
MF and the TGR.  
Starting with the analysis of the performance for the obtained TE scores through the 
GF and the MF, it is noted that the IW group has, on average for the selected period, 
shown the highest performance when compared to the other bank groups; it was 
followed by CB and then IB. This result is consistent with the trend of financial 
indicators (ROA and ROE) for each group of banks, as was described in section 3.2.2; 
it is also in line with Srairi’s (2010) findings. 
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Table 3.4- The TE and TGR of the DEA Meta-Frontier in the GCC Bank 
Groups      
Banks 
group 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Estimated TE Relative to the GF  
IB   0.835 
(0.183) 
0.818 
(0.179) 
0.808 
(0.171) 
0.824 
(0.167) 
0.833 
(0.144) 
0.849 
(0.176) 
0.827 
IW 0.944 
(0.053) 
0.935 
(0.046) 
0.942 
(0.055) 
0.963 
(0.030) 
0.950 
(0.054) 
0.927 
(0.076) 
0.943 
CB  0.946 
(0.062) 
0.923 
(0.079) 
0.874 
(0.115) 
0.899 
(0.078) 
0.883 
(0.085) 
0.863 
(0.100) 
0.90 
All Groups 0.913 
(0.120) 
0.897 
(0.121) 
0.877 
(0.129) 
0.898 
(0.115) 
0.891 
(0.108) 
0.881 
(0.124) 
0.89.3 
Estimated TE Relative to the MF  
IB   0.762 
(0.171) 
0.747 
(0.169) 
0.731 
(0.151) 
0.737 
(0.147) 
0.735 
(0.122) 
0.757 
(0.156) 
0.745  
IW 0.818 
(0.112) 
0.828 
(0.091) 
0.877 
(0.097) 
0.903 
(0.082) 
0.874 
(0.110) 
0.857 
(0.141) 
0.86 
CB  0.792 
(0.106) 
0.805 
(0.096) 
0.781 
(0.123) 
0.821 
(0.104) 
0.779 
(0.137) 
0.764 
(0.129) 
0.79 
All Groups  0.792 
(0.130) 
0.796 
(0.122) 
0.799 
(0.135) 
0.824 
(0.129) 
0.798 
(0.133) 
0.793 
(0.147) 
0.80 
TGR   
IB   0.917 
(0.072) 
0.915 
(0.065) 
0.908 
(0.061) 
0.898 
(0.062) 
0.887 
(0.068) 
0.894 
(0.066) 
0.903 
IW 0.865 
(0.094) 
0.885 
(0.081) 
0.930 
(0.062) 
0.939 
(0.076) 
0.918 
(0.090) 
0.919 
(0.095) 
0.908 
CB  0.837 
(0.085) 
0.870 
(0.070) 
0.894 
(0.074) 
0.914 
(0.078) 
0.883 
(0.124) 
0.886 
(0.114) 
0.881 
All Groups 0.881 
(0.174) 
0.910 
(0.240) 
0.932 
(0.224) 
0.936 
(0.213) 
0.907 
(0.178) 
0.915 
(0.206) 
0.913 
Note: Standard deviation is shown in brackets.  
 
The trends of the TE scores, which are derived from the DEA-MF estimate for all of 
the groups, are presented in Figure 3.10. The IW group has dominated and IB have 
unfortunately lagged behind the average, yet CB appear to operate with an average 
trend of MF. The average efficiency score of MF for all of the groups is 80%, 
meaning that the banking sector of the GCC region could increase its output by 20% 
with the same levels of input.  
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Figure 3.10- Efficiency Scores for the DEA-MF in the GCC Bank Groups 
  
The results for the TGR in Table 3.4 reveal that the average for the IB group is about 
90%, with an average of the GF at approximately 83%, indicating that the output level 
in the IB group is more restricted in terms of production technology than it is in other 
groups. Nonetheless, the average for the TGR proposes that IB could practice at the 
best level by producing at 90% while using the same levels of input and production 
technology provided by the GCC region. Consequently, it can be suggested that IB 
should expand their size in order to increase their performance and employ the best 
available technology. 
Table 3.4, moreover, shows that despite IB having the highest TGR, they operated 
close to the MF; this ratio has, however, declined steadily and they appeared to 
perform below the average for the TGR. The TGR for IW has shown the highest ratio 
from 2007 until the end of the period. As Figure 3.11, the histogram and Kernel 
Density estimate of TGR for the three groups, reveals, on average the group for IW 
presents the highest ratio, which is about 91%.   
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Figure 3.11- Histogram and Kernel Density Estimate of the TGR for Bank 
Groups 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2 MPI Results for the Meta- and Group Frontiers  
The preceding section presented the findings for the DEA meta-frontier analysis; this 
section focuses on presenting the results for the MPI of the meta- and group frontiers 
(MPIM and MPIG). Table 3.5 sums up the MPIG, MPIM and catch-up values as 
calculated for five periods.  
Ultimately, by observing the average of the productivity growth for the entire period 
(2005 to 2010), it can be seen that the MPIG value for Qatar indicates that it is the 
most productive country; it is followed by Kuwait and Bahrain. The scores for the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia appear to be less than “1”, which means that their 
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productivities declined during the period in question. Similarly and as the results 
show, in terms of the MPIM and the catch-up rate Qatar exhibits the highest 
productivity performance during most of the periods in question. Interestingly, these 
findings correspond with the average of TGR results. Qatar is then followed by 
Bahrain and Kuwait, which also managed to catch-up. It should be noted that the 
performance of the banks within the UAE and Saudi Arabia is at the lowest level.  
The catch-up movement for each country is displayed in Table 3.5. Here, Qatar 
initially seems to be the only country that experienced a catch-up in productivity 
among the sampled countries. Meanwhile, during 2009 to 2010 the only country that 
failed to catch-up was Saudi Arabia.  
 
Table 3.5- The Estimated MPIG, MPIM, and Catch-Up of Country Groups   
Country  2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
Average 
2005-2010 
Estimated MPIG  
Saudi Arabia  0.9702 1.0181 0.9880 0.9860 0.9765 0.9877 
The UAE 1.0278 0.9467 0.9784 0.9929 1.0147 0.9921 
Bahrain  1.0144 1.0891 0.9047 0.9497 1.0603 1.0037 
Qatar   1.2233 1.0833 1.0367 0.9986 0.9964 1.0677 
Kuwait  0.9547 0.9653 1.2644 0.9147 0.9732 1.0145 
All Countries  1.0270 1.0058 1.0233 0.9720 1.0052 1.0067 
Estimated MPIM  
Saudi Arabia  0.9837 1.040 0.9845 0.9761 0.9921 0.9953 
The UAE 1.0520 0.9688 1.0480 0.9550 0.9868 1.0021 
Bahrain  1.0466 0.9697 0.9330 0.9436 1.0399 0.9865 
Qatar   1.1370 1.0612 1.0204 1.0040 0.9949 1.0435 
Kuwait  0.9793 0.9742 1.2360 0.9628 0.9182 1.0141 
All Countries  1.0361 0.9964 1.0437 0.9650 0.9863 1.0055 
Catch-Up   
Saudi Arabia  0.9936 0.9793 1.0066 1.0162 0.9850 0.9961 
The UAE 0.9828 0.9794 0.9296 1.0402 1.0276 0.9918 
Bahrain  0.9671 1.1114 0.9772 1.0114 1.0148 1.0164 
Qatar   1.0765 1.0209 1.0192 0.9951 1.0005 1.0224 
Kuwait  0.9780 0.9913 1.0203 0.9665 1.0640 1.0040 
All Countries  0.9937 1.0087 0.9799 1.0124 1.0193 1.0028 
 
As the results in Table 3.5 show, countries with a higher TGR are generally more 
productive and have higher catch-up values, with the exception of the UAE. The UAE 
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illustrated progress in its TGR, yet it only managed to catch-up for the last two 
periods and generally experienced a declining trend in productivity growth. Figure 
3.12 depicts the relationship by means of a scatter plot, which shows that the TGR has 
a positive relationship with the lag/catch-up values, during the study period.    
 
Figure 3.12- The Relationship between the TGR for GCC Countries and Catch-
Up (2005 to 2010) 
 
                   
 
Table 3.6 depicts the performance of the MPIG, the MPIM and the catch-up values of 
each group. Although the TGR for IW represents the highest group, the recorded 
productivity growth of this group decreased during the period. Conversely, the TGR 
for IB appears to be lower than that for the IW, but the IB group emerges as the most 
productive group, as is shown in Table 3.6. Furthermore, the IB group has taken the 
highest value of MPIM; it is also the only group that has obtained the catch-up value 
for the whole period.   
As the results in Table 3.6 reveal, CB managed to increase their productivity growth 
in only one period, and the average value of catch-up is less than “1”. It should be 
noted that this result is consistent with the TGR for the CB group. Indeed, the TGR 
for the various groups has a negative relationship with the catch-up values. Moreover, 
such analysis of bank groups results can also be observed in a scatter plot in Figure 
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3.13, which shows that TGR has a negative relationship with the lag/catch-up values 
during the period in question. 
 
Table 3.6- The Estimated MPIG, MPIM, and Catch-Up for the Bank Groups   
Bank Group  2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
Average 
2005-2010 
Estimated MPIG  
IB  1.0530 0.9931 0.9710 1.0070 1.0650 1.0177 
IW   1.0220 1.0050 0.9914 0.9863 0.9505 0.9910 
CB  0.9931 0.9406 1.1445 0.9445 0.9772 1.0001 
All Groups   1.0270 1.0058 1.0233 0.9720 1.0052 1.0067 
Estimated MPIM  
IB  1.0596 0.9851 0.9586 1.0181 1.0398 1.0123 
IW   1.0445 1.0354 0.9910 0.9695 0.9598 1.0001 
CB  1.0095 0.9703 1.1590 0.9186 0.9675 1.0050 
All Groups   1.0361 0.9964 1.0437 0.9650 0.9863 1.0055 
Catch-Up   
IB  0.9975 1.0073 1.0107 0.9878 1.0217 1.0050 
IW   0.9802 0.9736 1.0062 1.0199 0.9910 0.9942 
CB  0.9873 0.9690 0.9786 1.0318 1.0108 0.9955 
All Groups   0.9937 1.0087 0.9799 1.0124 1.0193 1.0028 
 
Figure 3.13- The Relationship between TGR for Bank Groups and Catch-Up 
(2005 to 2010) 
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3.6.3 Second-Stage Regression Results for the Environmental Variables 
Different explanatory variables are applied through four equations in order to 
investigate the variation in the obtained efficiency scores of the meta-frontier, which 
are presented in Table 3.7.  
Initially, it is important to clarify that the validity of the estimated equations is 
examined in terms of multicollinearity (correlation between included independent 
variables), autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (non-constant variance), yet the 
heteroscedasticity problem relates to the size variable.4 Therefore, to avoid 
heteroscedasticity and to examine the robustness of the estimated equations, several 
models are applied, such as panel random effect, which includes GLS and bootstrap. 
These models are classified into two groups: in the first group size is included in the 
model, while in the second group it is excluded. This section thus provides the 
estimated results of four equations for the two specified types of environmental 
variables. 
Table 3.7 presents the findings for the estimated coefficients of the variables for bank 
characteristics, both with and without the size variable. As the results show, the 
intermediation ratio or NLD is significant and positive with bank efficiency in all 
models, which provides evidence for the study’s expectations and indicates that 
increasing NLD leads to a rise in the GCC banks’ efficiency of around 5%.  
 
  
                                                            
4 See Table 2 in the appendices, which presents the variance inflation factor (VIF) test.   
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Table 3.7- Second-Stage Estimates of DEA-MF    
Variables Panel RE GLS Robust SE 
Bootstrap 
 
Panel RE GLS 
Robust S.E 
Bootstrap 
 
With Size Variable  Model 1 Model 2 
NLD 0.0597*** 0.0601** 0.0562*** 0.0568* 
 (0.0104) (0.0294) (0.0111) (0.0297) 
IB -0.0522** -0.0523** -0.0522** -0.0524** 
 (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0227) 
IW 0.0297 0.0298 0.0280 0.0281 
 (0.0282) (0.0291) (0.0293) (0.0302) 
FO -0.0411* -0.0411* -0.0438* -0.0438* 
 (0.0229) (0.0233) (0.0225) (0.0230) 
Size 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0228) 
CON   0.123* 0.119 
   (0.0694) (0.0726) 
Constant 0.714*** 0.713*** 0.642*** 0.643*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0299) (0.0450) (0.0528) 
sigma_u  0.0572***  0.0575*** 
  (0.00829)  (0.00901) 
sigma_e  0.0859***  0.0851*** 
  (0.00686)  (0.00730) 
Wald chi2 68.52  70.53 55.78 
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood 
function 
 300.47676  302.83282 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
Number of Banks 54 54 54 54 
 Model 3 Model 4 
NLD 0.0624*** 0.0628** 0.0561*** 0.0567* 
 (0.0106) (0.0304) (0.00951) (0.0291) 
IB -0.0630*** -0.0632*** -0.0553*** -0.0555*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0204) (0.0197) (0.0209) 
GOV 0.0617*** 0.0618*** 0.0586*** 0.0585*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0191) (0.0169) (0.0173) 
Size 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0188) 
RL1 0.202 0.203   
 (0.126) (0.137)   
RL2   0.374*** 0.368*** 
   (0.132) (0.130) 
Constant 0.513*** 0.512*** 0.440*** 0.443*** 
 (0.105) (0.120) (0.0839) (0.0856) 
sigma_u  0.0539***  0.0543*** 
  (0.00838)  (0.00892) 
sigma_e  0.0859***  0.0845*** 
  (0.00687)  (0.00691) 
Wald chi2 83.98 63.58 88.43 69.17 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood 
function 
 302.67216  307.06796 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
Number of Banks 54 54 54 54 
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Variables Panel RE GLS Robust SE 
Bootstrap 
 
Panel RE GLS 
Robust S.E 
Bootstrap 
 
Without Size 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
NLD 0.0568*** 0.0570** 0.0539*** 0.0542* 
 (0.0104) (0.0284) (0.0111) (0.0293) 
IB -0.0635** -0.0636** -0.0644** -0.0644** 
 (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0279) (0.0281) 
IW 0.0886*** 0.0886*** 0.0916*** 0.0915*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0283) 
FO -0.0815*** -0.0816*** -0.0866*** -0.0864*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0228) 
CON   0.0944 0.0905 
   (0.0714) (0.0794) 
Constant 0.770*** 0.770*** 0.719*** 0.721*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0286) (0.0434) (0.0518) 
sigma_u  0.0694***  0.0710*** 
  (0.00782)  (0.00852) 
sigma_e  0.0859***  0.0852*** 
  (0.00687)  (0.00732) 
Wald chi2 43.95 32.39 45.20 33.33 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood 
function 
 292.56904  293.76451 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
Number of Banks 54 54 54 54 
 Model 3 Model 4 
NLD 0.0551*** 0.0553* 0.0483*** 0.0486 
 (0.0120) (0.0301) (0.0117) (0.0299) 
IB -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0305) 
GOV 0.0675** 0.0676** 0.0559** 0.0557** 
 (0.0305) (0.0314) (0.0261) (0.0263) 
RL1 0.275 0.275   
 (0.209) (0.219)   
RL2   0.300* 0.295* 
   (0.161) (0.167) 
Constant 0.540*** 0.540*** 0.582*** 0.585*** 
 (0.176) (0.188) (0.0988) (0.104) 
sigma_u  0.0801***  0.0850*** 
  (0.00735)  (0.00801) 
sigma_e  0.0859***  0.0846*** 
  (0.00688)  (0.00697) 
Wald chi2 26.91 16.63 28.27 18.63 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
Log likelihood 
function 
 286.26409  287.76391 
Observations 324 324 324 324 
Number of Banks 54 54 54 54 
Notes: (1) SE indicates standard errors, which are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05 and * p<0.1; (2) The bootstrap is estimated through ML, which combined the 
truncated regression of the TE scores as described in section 3.4.5.    
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As can be seen from the results, the impact of IB on efficiency is negative in that IB 
are approximately 6% to 10% less efficient at producing outputs than IW. The IW 
variable is positive and significant and it increases the banks’ efficiency by around 
8%. It is, however, significant only in the excluded size variable group, but 
insignificant with the size group, which reveals that this variable is highly correlated 
with IW, where most large banks are conventional with IW, and that in turn has an 
effect on the significance of this variable. Finally, the size coefficient positively 
improves the efficiency by more than 10% when it is included in the model, which 
indicates the important effect of size for growth through economies of scale on banks’ 
efficiency. In addition, the influence of IB, IW and size variables on banks’ efficiency 
meet the expectations of this study.  
Further, the estimated coefficients of the variables for financial structure and rule of 
law, as are shown in Table 3.7, reveal that the coefficient of CON appears significant 
with the size group, although it is statistically irrelevant with the second group. Again 
this illustrates that size is associated with CON, and that more importantly most large 
banks in the GCC countries are CB that provide IW.  
The other variables related to financial structure are foreign and government 
ownerships, which are significant in both groups; surprisingly, the FO coefficient 
produced a negative effect on the banks’ efficiency of around 4% to 8%, while as 
expected the GOV variable seems to confer a positive influence that improves the 
GCC banks’ efficiency by more than 5%.  
Finally, the outcomes of the variables for the rule of law, namely RL1 and RL2, 
confirm the expectations of this study, which are in accordance with the findings of 
Ben Naceur et al. (2011). The coefficient of RL2 provides evidence for it having a 
substantially positive influence on the TE in most estimated models, whereby it could 
be stated that efficient rule of law advances the efficiency of the GCC’s banking 
sector by around 30%.  
3.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This paper aims to investigate TE by using the TGR, MPIM and catch-up rate for the 
banking sector in the GCC countries, whereby special attention is paid to bank types. 
Via empirical analysis, the DEA meta-frontier and MPI models were used over the 
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period of 2005 to 2010. In addition, the study investigated the potential effect of 
specific factors related to three categories, which are bank characteristics, financial 
structure and rule of law, by applying two-stage semi-parametric models of the DEA 
meta-frontier.  
The analysis of financial indicators, such as ROA and ROE, indicates that despite the 
decreasing performance in all of the bank groups of the GCC countries, IW seemed to 
perform more steadily when compared with the other groups. The performance of 
fully-fledged IB did, however, seem to fluctuate more than that of other groups over 
the period covered, which implies that IB are more at risk than their counterparts.  
The results in terms of a country-level analysis show that in the case of the TGR, 
Bahraini banks used the best available technology in the region only during the 
beginning of the period; in the later years, namely 2007 to 2009, they were found to 
be underperforming. On average, the highest TGR score was found for Qatar followed 
by the UAE at approximately 89% and 88%. This result implies that Qatari banks 
operated at the best level of available production technology among the GCC 
countries over the period covered. As well as the TGR result, Qatar has reported the 
highest productivity performance in terms of MPIG and MPIM, wherein it has 
recorded the highest catch-up rate for the most periods of the study, while the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia have not managed to record any catch-up rate. Moreover, the 
findings show that the TGR for the country groups are positively associated with 
catch-up values.     
The results of the meta-frontier analysis for the bank groups show that IW have 
dominated all of the bank groups, as the TGR of these banks reached the highest ratio 
since 2007 over the period covered. In addition, it was found that the output level of 
IB is more restricted in terms of production technology than that of other groups. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the average TGR indicates that IB can operate at 
the best level by producing at 90%, using the same level of inputs and production 
technology which is produced by the GCC countries. Despite the TGR results for the 
IB group, it managed to catch-up and is the most productive group for the majority of 
the period covered. Furthermore, the results suggest that the TGR of the bank groups 
is correlated negatively with the catch-up values.       
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As for the meta-frontier-based findings, the TGR and catch-up results of the bank 
groups showed that even though IB scored the highest ratio in terms of productivity 
growth, their performance in terms of TE appeared to be lower than that of IW.  
It can therefore be recommended that IB should increase their size, either by mergers 
or by expanding their market share and clients, to take advantage of scale economies. 
Srairi (2010) also put forward such a recommendation as he located similar findings. 
In addition, policy makers should develop strategies and unite the regulation of IB 
within the GCC region in order to use the best available technology when 
strengthening their ability to compete with the other banks.    
The findings of second-stage regression analysis indicate that the variables for bank 
characteristics influenced bank efficiency, showing that the GCC banks, as 
representatives of an intermediation sector, have an effective ability to transform 
deposits into loans and financing. It should be noted that bank size is found to be an 
important determining factor in enhancing efficiency. From the perspective of the 
bank groups, IB are less efficient at producing outputs than IW. Similarly and apart 
from CON, the GCC banks’ efficiency is affected by other factors, such as financial 
structure and rule-of-law variables. In addition, the findings suggest that the GOV is 
essential to the performance of the GCC banks as it enhances liquidity.    
The meta-frontier and TGR approaches thus seem very significant in illustrating 
dissimilarities among the GCC countries and bank groups. To improve the  
performance of IB in the region, Islamic financial and banking products should be 
improved to reduce the risk faced by IB, while authorities in the GCC region, as an 
economic and political union, should take a proactive position in developing 
regulatory structures to enhance the efficiency of IB.  
In terms of methodological reflection, another version of the meta-frontier that is 
proposed by O’Donnell et al. (2008) is that of the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA), one of the parametric methods. This method should be considered for future 
research and applied with different environmental variables to investigate the 
variances in production or cost technology among the banks in the GCC. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A SURVIVAL ANALYSIS FOR ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL 
BANKS IN THE GCC: DISCRETE-TIME DURATION MODELS 
BASED EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the global financial crisis has caused a downturn in the economies of 
both developed and developing countries. Accordingly, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries, as the largest economies within the Arab world, were inevitably 
influenced by the effects of this crisis. Some financial system indicators of the 
banking sectors in those countries evidently witnessed a sharp decline during the 
crisis period. Indeed, the average of the market capitalisation to GDP ratio dropped 
significantly from 131% in 2007 to 64% in 2008.5 
An important development in the financial systems of the GCC countries is the 
emergence and consolation of IBF since the mid-1970s. The GCC financial sectors 
have responded positively to global developments and trends in the Islamic finance 
industry, where a number of fully fledged IB have been operating in these countries. 
A substantial number of CB have also opened Islamic windows so as to offer different 
levels of Islamic financial services to their customers. The performances of both bank 
types have, however, been affected by the global crisis; for example, from 2007 to 
2008 the average return on assets (ROA) in CB within the GCC, including Islamic 
windows, reached its minimum level, moving from 2.4% to 1.4%; in 2009 the average 
remained the same. Correspondingly, for the same period the ROA of IB experienced 
a more pronounced decline than CB (from 2.3% to 0.2%).6 
It is then clear from this indicator that the financial crisis negatively influenced the 
banks’ performance within the GCC region, especially with regard to the IB. This 
paper therefore aims to investigate empirically the survival time analysis of the 
commercial banking sector in the GCC countries, including continuous-time and 
                                                            
5 Source:  Standard and Poor's, Global Stock Markets Factbook, supplemental S&P data and author 
calculation. 
6 Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation. 
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discrete-time models, by examining whether IB or CB are more susceptible to failure 
through two factors. Initially, this entails non-parametric unconditional analysis, or 
the life-table method, which is based on the observation of failure events (Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice, 2002). A further factor is that of the conditional analysis, which depends 
on the availability of data at a micro- and macro-level. In addition, the present study 
pivots on the application of Complementary Log-Log (cloglog) with unobserved 
heterogeneity in order to estimate the banks’ failure; cloglog is again utilised to 
conduct a comparative analysis between IB and CB. 
This paper begins by discussing some of the relevant literature on the subject before 
describing the methods that are employed to investigate survival time and failure in 
the banking sector in the GCC. These steps are followed by a preliminary survey of 
both the data and the definition of the covariates. The paper then proceeds to interpret 
the findings of the empirical application; the final section is dedicated to the 
conclusion of this study.  
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section, firstly, presents a brief context in terms of literature on survival-time 
analysis, which is followed by a survey of the empirical studies related to survival-
time and bank failure issues.       
4.2.1 Concept and Method 
‘Survival analysis’ is a statistical term utilized to analyse the consequences of 
historical events for a particular group of people or firms, such as marriage, education, 
smoking, nations that have experienced war or revolution, firm mergers and 
bankruptcy (Alisson, 1982). In terms of methodology, initially, survival analysis was 
implemented, through the maximum-likelihood and partial likelihood methods and 
mostly under the continuous-times assumption, by biomedical researchers (e.g. Gross 
and Clark, 1975; Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980; Cox, 1972; Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice, 2002). However, later, the concept and procedure of discrete-time methods 
was proposed in arguing that, in certain situations, discrete-time methods could be 
more useful and adequate than continuous-times (Alisson, 1982:62). 
It should be noted that exploring bank failure, through survival analysis, in banking 
related studies aims to provide empirical evidence to aid in identifying the most 
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significant causes behind bank failure. These causes are classified into bank-level 
variables, which are attributed to factors related to mismanagement, and macro-level 
variables, which are caused by external risk factors.  These are discussed in detail in 
the following sections.              
4.2.2 Empirical Studies   
A number of empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the causes behind 
the probability of a bank’s failure. According to the existing body of literature on the 
topic, these causes can be categorised as follows: endogenous factors that are 
pertinent to bank-level or microeconomic variables such as inefficient management; 
and exogenous factors that are relevant to macroeconomic variables, such as financial 
structure, institutional development and the economic stability of the country.  
To explore the factors behind a bank’s failure requires a range of technical methods. 
Most of these methods are, however, based on probability and likelihood forms. For 
example, Lane et al. (1986) provide a comparative study between multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) and Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) models to estimate 
the probable survival time to failure of commercial banks in the USA from 1979 to 
1984 or through the failure date of June 1984. The findings showed that although the 
MDA model was capable of suggesting bankruptcies, it could not provide an accurate 
estimation of an actual failure date when compared with the Cox model. However, in 
responding to estimations and observations, Cole and Gunther (1995) argued that the 
typical survival-time models assume that all banks which have experienced a failure 
event will ultimately fail. Thus, to differentiate between failures and survivors, Cole 
and Gunther (1995) applied a split-population survival-time model of listed 
commercial banks in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Crucially, 
the results indicated that certain variables are required when estimating the failure, 
rather than the survival time, of banks. Evrensel (2008) further investigated the 
relationship between bank concentration and bank crisis in G-10 and non-G10 
countries over the period from 1980 to 1997 by using the ‘Weibull Model’ of 
duration-time analysis. This investigation concluded that a higher bank concentration 
and more restricted banking system are linked to the appearance of a higher hazard 
rate in developing countries.  
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In terms of the study of IB, investigating survival-time and bank failure issues is not a 
common subject. However, a recent study by Pappas et al. (2012) presented a 
comprehensive comparative analysis between IB and CB that were at risk of failure; 
the study focused on 421 banks from twenty countries between 1995 and 2010, 
employing the Cox PH model as its principal method. This study suggested that on 
the micro-level of variables, the probability of the risk of failure is higher for CB than 
it is for IB, whereas the hazard rate of IB is greatly influenced by inflation. Such 
findings also indicated that IB are more affected by the cycle of macroeconomic 
variables than CB (Hasan and Dridi, 2010).                  
Apart from survival models, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) examined the 
factors that could lead to banking crises in a selection of developed and developing 
countries from 1980 to 1994 by applying the multivariate logit model. Their results 
suggested that countries which suffer from poor microeconomic conditions, the low 
growth of real GDP and high inflation are more prone to such crises. Duttagupta and 
Cashin (2011) further explored the probability of banking crises in emerging markets 
and developing countries over the period from 1990 to 2005 by using the binary 
classification tree model (BCT), a non-parametric approach which is designed to 
estimate whether the crises have occurred. The findings revealed that a low level of 
bank liquidity, low profitability, high inflation and unstable macroeconomic 
conditions stimulate crises.  
Akin to non-survival models in the study of IB, Hasan and Dridi (2010) investigated 
the effect of the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 on the performance (which included 
profitability and credit and asset growth) of 120 CB and IB in the GCC, Jordan, 
Turkey and Malaysia via the application of ordinary least squares (OLS). Their results 
indicated that the profitability in large IB helped to minimise the negative influence of 
the crisis, whereas some IB that suffered from the mismanagement of risks displayed 
a significant reduction in profitability when compared with CB. The performance of 
IB in credit and asset growth during 2008 to 2009 was also better than that of their 
counterparts. Another study by Parashar and Venkatesh (2010) observed the 
performance indicators (which included capital adequacy, efficiency, profitability, 
liquidity and leverage) of six IB and six CB in GCC countries before and during the 
financial crisis over the period from 2006 to 2009. The results of this study 
91 
highlighted that the ROA and liquidity ratios in CB during the financial crisis had been 
adversely influenced more than those in IB, yet the ROE and leverage ratios in IB 
were more severely affected than those in CB.     
Relevant bank failure studies have emphasised the importance of macro-level factors 
in evaluating the causes of this failure. With regard to micro-level variables, several 
studies, such as those by Cole and Gunther (1995) and Pappas et al. (2012), adopted 
CAMEL model variables, which identify key financial indicators for capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity management. However, 
Rojas-Suárez (2001) claimed that the application of CAMEL indicators could not be 
accurate in a large observation of panel data that consisted of a wide range of 
developing countries because of the dissimilarities in framework supervision between 
those countries, which could result in misleading comparative findings.   
4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Duration, or survival, analysis can be defined as the process of failure time in firms 
(or banks in this particular study) that starts or occurs at any specific point. All those 
banks in the GCC countries, similar to any other bank in any other part of the world, 
are at risk, which means that each bank is likely to fail when a country experiences a 
bank crisis. Consequently, some banks survive and remain healthy after the crisis, but 
others might fail, which infers that some observations are censored in the sense of 
failures (Alison, 1982: 62-63).     
This section commences by describing the survival data and using the continuous-
time model; the discrete-time duration model is then utilised as long as the discrete-
time model in grouped data is derived from the continuous-time process; survival 
times are identified in bands. The aim behind the adoption of this technique is to 
examine the validity of the research model, given that the discrete-time model may be 
flawed and lead to an inefficient estimation of the coefficients, especially when the 
time duration of the observation is of considerable size. Singer and Spilerman (1976) 
further demonstrated that an arbitrary selection of interval length could affect the 
parameters’ inference; the discrete-time model that is derivative from the continuous-
time model does not face such a dilemma. Furthermore, Allison (1982) noted that the 
estimated outcomes of both the discrete and continuous models should be very 
similar.  
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To examine the model’s validity, unobserved heterogeneity in conjunction with a 
discrete-time model is employed. To discuss duration models, this section is therefore 
divided into four parts: 
(i) Survival-time data presentation life-table method;   
(ii) Continuous time model; 
(iii)Discrete-time model; 
(iv) Unobserved heterogeneity. 
To begin analysing survival data for the discrete-time model, it would be of value to 
estimate hazard and survival functions by using the life-table method, which is an old, 
non-parametric technique of duration modelling (as demonstrated by Cutler and 
Ederer, 1958; Gehan, 1969). This technique presents life-tables for bank groups 
alongside the likelihood-ratio and log-rank tests for group homogeneity in survivor 
functions. Moreover, it is the most applicable descriptive method to estimate the 
distribution of survival times from grouped data, such as the cloglog model (Jenkins, 
2008).  
The life-table is computed by three basic formulae: survivor function (Sj), cumulative 
failure time (Gj) and hazard rate (j). The mathematical form of this method takes the 
following steps, assuming that Ti represents censoring times or the duration variable 
to assess the time duration of bank failure; (tj) indicates the intervals of aggregated 
data, where	݆ ൌ 1,… , ݆, and ݐ௃ାଵ ൌ ∞ in every interval that includes quantities 
for	ݐ௝ ൑ ܶ ൏ ݐ௝ାଵ; ௝݀ and ௝݉ are the number of failures and censored observations in 
the interval; and ௝ܰ is the quantity of surviving banks at the beginning of the interval.7 
The modified number at risk at the beginning of the interval can be delineated as 
௝݊ ൌ 	 ௝ܰ െ ௝݉/2. According to Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), survivor function is 
estimated from the following equation: 
௝ܵ ൌ 	∏ ௡ೖିௗೖ௡ೖ
௝
௞ୀଵ          (4.1)    
                                                            
7 The duration variable of a bank is computed as the current year minus the established year; various 
banks have, however, started operating before the observation window begins, meaning that left 
censoring has to be controlled.     
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Thus, the cumulative failure time is described as one minus survivor function, where 
	 ௝ܵ		 can be graphed against	ݐ௝ାଵ. The maximum likelihood estimate of hazard rate is as 
follows:  
ߣ௝ ൌ 	 ௙೔൫ଵି௙ೕ ଶ⁄ ൯ሺ௧ೕశభି௧ೕሻ        (4.2)
8 
Here, ௜݂ represents the probability of the number of failures when an event occurrence 
is divided by the probability of a non-occurrence event, of all observations, at the start 
of the interval	ሺ ௜݂ ൌ 	 ௝݀ ௝݊ሻ⁄ 9. 
As stated earlier, the life-table also presents the group homogeneity test through the 
likelihood-ratio; this ratio is crucial for the observation of whether groups in the 
current study sample differ, especially in terms of bank groups. Lawless (2003) 
measures likelihood-ratio as the following:  
ࣲଶ ൌ 2 ൜ሺ∑݀௚ሻ log ൬∑ ೒்∑ௗ೒൰ െ ∑݀௚݈݋݃ ൬
೒்
ௗ೒൰ൠ      (4.3) 
where ݃ symbolizes the sum of groups number; ݀௚ denotes the total numbers of 
failures in ݃ group;	 ௚ܶ ൌ 	∑ ௜ܶ௜∈௚ , where ݅ is the censoring times or the index of 
failures. The second test for homogeneity is the log-rank test, which estimates the 
equality of survivor functions between groups (Schoenfeld, 1981). When applying 
these tests, the null hypothesis of a group’s equality will therefore be rejected if the 
value of chi-squared is significant according to the ߩ െ value. 
Both processes in duration models, whether continuous or discrete, rely on several 
basic functions: cumulative density function F(t), survivor functions S(t), probability 
density function f(t) and hazard functions h(t) or conditional probabilities. For all of 
these functions, t is the time duration variable that indicates the time elapsed since a 
bank was established to a particular year. In continuous-time models the spell length 
for units or banks is an implementing of a random variable T, where the cumulative 
density function can be represented by the following equation:  
                                                            
8 The likelihood form is designed to account for the right censoring assumption, as many banks have 
not yet failed by the period when the sample ends.         
9 To estimate the standard error and confidence intervals, see Cox and Oakes, 1984; Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice, 2002. 
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ܨሺݐሻ ൌ 	׬ ݂ሺݎሻ݀ݎ ൌ ܲሺܶ ൑ ݐሻ௧଴        (4.4) 
This describes the probability of survival time (T) as less than or equal to t. Thus, the 
survivor function can be given by: 
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ 1 െ ܨሺݐሻ ൌ ܲሺܶ ൐ ݐሻ        (4.5) 
The estimated value of ܵሺݐሻ lies between 0 and 1; this value is a decreasing function 
towards 0 when time (t) is increasing to infinity. Accordingly, the probability density 
function can be written as:    
݂ሺݐሻ ൌ 	 lim∆௧→଴ ௉ሺ௧ஸ்ஸ௧ା∆௧ሻ∆௧ ൌ 	
డிሺ௧ሻ
డ௧ ൌ 	
డௌሺ௧ሻ
డ௧        (4.7) 
where ∆t denotes a small interval of time.  
The hazard function or rate can then be expressed as:  
݄ሺݐሻ ൌ 	 lim∆௧→଴ ௉ሺ௧ஸ்ஸ௧ା∆௧|்ஹ௧ሻ∆௧ ൌ
௙ሺ௧ሻ
ௌሺ௧ሻ		       (4.8) 
The hazard rate evaluates the risk of a completed interval (at T=t) conditional 
probability density on survival at, or further than, time t, that is in a continuous-time 
model, while in a discrete-time model it measures the probability of an occurred event 
during the observed period, not conditional on an occurring event in previous time 
(Alt et al., 1997: 6).      
Essentially, to adjust survivor and hazard functions for the influence of covariates in 
survival analysis, there are two key models: accelerated failure time (AFT) and 
proportional hazards (PH) or multiplicative effects on the hazard rate models. The 
form used in this study is the PH model, and it is given by: 
݄൫ݐ, ݔ௜,௧൯ ൌ 	݄଴ሺݐሻ݁ݔ݌ఉ௫೔,೟        (4.9) 
ݔ௜,௧ represents the independent variables (covariates); ߚ stands for coefficients that 
have been obtained through some estimated regression at time ݐ, all of which is a non-
negative function (݃൫ݔ௜,௧൯ ൌ ݁ݔ݌௫೔,೟ఉሻ	 of the explanatory variables; ݄଴ሺݐሻ is the 
baseline of the hazard function of a bank under certain conditions of explanatory 
variables. As stated previously, the discrete-time model, derived from the continuous-
95 
time-related model (Beck et al., 1998), is more precisely derived from the semi-
parametric Cox PH approach (1975). In such a model the baseline of hazard is 
unspecified or it has no restrictions.10  
The Weibull model further corresponds to a parametric continuous-time model, but 
with the specified assumption of distribution for the baseline hazard, which is also 
examined in this current study. The baseline hazard function of this model can be 
written as:  
݄଴ሺݐሻ ൌ ݌ߣݐ௣ିଵ          (4.10a) 
 ݄൫ݐ, ݔ௜,௧൯ ൌ ݌ݐ௣ିଵ݁ݔ݌ఉ௫೔,೟       (4.10b) 
where ߣ is a multiplicative scale that measures the baseline hazard at every value of 
(t); an increase in this factor leads to a larger hazard rate. The processes of 
continuous-time and discrete-time models are, however, similar; as noted previously, 
they differ in terms of measuring the survival times, in that the latter model is 
measured as grouped duration (interval censoring) data, when deriving the discrete-
time model from the Cox model (4.9) by considering the process of hazard form in 
continuous-time function yet with the data grouped into intervals. In the case of this 
study, it would be easy to apply a discrete hazard since it utilises annual data (which is 
time-series cross-sectional) (Jenkins, 1995). Assuming that this data consists of years 
(t) and banks (i), each bank may experience a crisis during the year and that could 
be	ݕ௜,௧, w, which is a binary measure of any banks that are facing crisis. Hence, the 
probability of a discrete hazard can be estimated as	ܲ൫ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 1൯ (Beck et al., 1998: 
1267). The obtained function of a discrete-time hazard rate can then be expressed as:  
ܲ൫ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 1, ݔ௜,௧൯ ൌ ݄൫ݐ, ݔ௜,௧൯ ൌ 1 െ exp	ሺെ݁௫೔,೟ఉା௝೟ష೟బሻ	    (4.11)11 
Here, as equation (4.9) ݔ௜,௧ also denotes the covariates, the difference does, however, 
appear in the ݆௧ି௧଴ component of the interval, which indicates the length of the spell 
by utilising dummy variables, where t0 = 0 specifies the first crisis and the length of 
prior spells for multiple failure events, and t0 – t evaluates the spell length from t0 
                                                            
10 The continuous- and discrete-time models are derived from the maximum likelihood form, with the 
exception of Cox’s model, which is derived from partial likelihood.   
11 For the mathematical processes of the discrete hazard equation that is derived from Cox’s PH model, 
see Beck et al. (1998: 1284-1285). 
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until t (the current year). Accordingly, to fit the discrete-time PH model or to solve the 
equation (4.11) into a distribution function, the complementary log-log or cloglog 
model is utilised (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978): 
݈ܿ݋݈݃݋݃ሺܲሻ ൌ ݈ܿ݋݈݃݋݃൫݄௜,௧൯ ൌ logൣെ log൫1 െ ݄௜,௧൯൧ ൌ 	ܽ௧ ൅ ߚ′ݔ௜,௧  (4.12) 
Here, ܽ௧, the log of integrated hazard over interval	ሺ݆௧ି௧଴, ݆௧ሻ, and the other 
components of the equation ሺߚ′ݔ௜,௧ሻ are similar to equations (4.9), (4.10b) and (4.11). 
Thus, the cloglog model can be defined as a linear formula of duration-intervals added 
to the covariates that are related to bank characteristics, macroeconomic factors and 
the political economy. All these aspects are described in the next section. To make a 
clear statement based on the findings of this study, the estimated models of cloglog 
are further explored in terms of unobserved heterogeneity or frailty; such an 
examination is required to check the error term (u). To examine this term in the 
cloglog PH model, the model itself is generalised through the equation below: 
 ݈ܿ݋݈݃݋݃ሾ݌ሺݐ, ݔ|ߚ, ݒሻሿ ൌ ܦሺݐሻ ൅ ߚᇱܺ ൅ ݑ     (4.13) 
Here, v is equivalent to u, which is a random variable with zero mean, and ܦሺݐሻ 
specifies the baseline hazard function. To estimate the aforementioned formula, the 
cloglog model needs to be transformed from pooled to random-effect panel data. In 
addition, distinctive values are used to identify the observations for the heterogeneity 
term (u) so that the processes of distribution are required to integrate error terms out 
of the likelihood estimation (Jenkins, 1995).  
4.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND COVARIATES  
The annual reports of the financial statements of all the GCC countries over the period 
from 1995 to 2011 (with the exception of Oman due to the absence of Islamic bank 
applications in the country) are acquired from Bankscope; other foreign banks which 
have branches operating in the GCC region are excluded from the sample. The 
empirical sample is therefore limited to domestic banks that provide commercial, 
finance and trade services, which are comprised of three IB and nine CB in Saudi 
Arabia, four IB and fourteen CB in the UAE, six IB and five CB in Bahrain, two IB 
and five CB in Qatar, and three IB and six CB in Kuwait, totalling to 18 IB and 39 
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CB12. In addition, all of the annual financial information that is employed in this study 
is reported under the International Accounting Standard (IAS) in US dollars. Other 
macroeconomic variables are similarly drawn from the world data bank through the 
website of the World Bank Organization. There is also a selective variable 
corresponding to the quality of regulation for each GCC country that has been 
obtained from the Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (PRS).  
To observe the influence of the financial crisis in 2008 on the banks’ failure or 
survival (both Islamic and conventional) in the GCC countries, a bank is valued as 1 
when the country has experienced a financial crisis and 0 (zero) if it has not 
experienced such an event. Furthermore, a bank is measured as failed if it has 
witnessed at least one of the following circumstances: substantially negative net 
income; a ratio of non-performing assets to total assets that extends to more than 10%; 
and the bank being forced to merge. For this reason, the failure variable is accounted 
for the crisis year (2008) and for any of the previous events if they occurred 
(Evrensel, 2008).  
To examine the effect on the failures of GCC banks, a set of covariates are utilised 
that reflect micro- and macro-level factors, summary statistics for which are presented 
in Table 4.1. These covariates can be sub-classified as follows:   
(i) Micro- or bank-level covariates that are comprised of bank type, income statement, 
balance sheet variables and other financial ratios which are based on CAMEL types, 
namely: 
IB = an Islamic bank dummy takes 1 if the bank operates under IB specialisation and 
0 if it operates under CB specialisation;  
GNIR = the growth of net interest revenue (%); 
OEA = other earning assets (in millions US$);   
ROA = the return on average assets, an earnings indicator (%); 
NIM = the net interest margin, an earnings indicator (%); 
LLR/L = loan loss reserves / gross loans, an asset quality indicator (%);  
                                                            
12All listed banks in the sample are classified to IB and CB except Al-Jazeera bank, which was 
accounted to be CB providing an Islamic window from 1995 to 2004 and then in 2005 it was 
transformed into a fully-fledged IB.   
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NL/A = net loans / total assets, a liquidity indicator (%).  
(ii) Macro-level covariates that involve sector concentration, government ownership, 
and macroeconomic and regulation quality variables, namely:  
BC = bank concentration, or the total assets of the three largest banks to the total 
assets of all the banks in a sector; 
Real GDP = growth of the real gross domestic product (%); 
Inf. = the annual inflation rate, which is calculated by the consumer price index;  
GOV = the government ownership dummy, which takes 1 if it has been involved in 
bank ownership and 0 if it has not been involved in such ownership;  
RQ = the regulatory quality of the investment profile in a country.  
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Table 4.1- Summary Statistics 
All Banks 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
IB 0.246719 0.431385 0 1 
GNIR 17.93 41.019 -329.78 647.22 
OEA 3590.63 4685.035 17.9 37545.7 
ROA 1.95122 2.902902 -44.35 15.29 
NIM 3.511869 2.493332 -4.12 31 
LLR/L 6.367087 8.495842 0 100* 
NL/A 54.70189 14.60471 1.41 90.4 
BC 50.96621 15.10172 27.49 80.95 
Real GDP 5.369685 4.713747 -5.2 20.8 
Inf. 3.722572 4.112171 -4.9 15.1 
GOV 0.433071 0.495826 0 1 
RQ 0.798451 0.184626 0.27 0.95 
CB 
GNIR 15.0726 20.66 -45.161 187.515 
OEA 4141.59 5029.85 53.2 37545.7 
ROA 1.997962 1.381324 -12.63 10.48 
NIM 3.198688 1.037546 1.13 10.03 
BC 48.8161 14.26448 27.49 80.95 
LLR/L 6.680819 7.539471 0 55.69 
NL/A 54.14777 13.12959 19.18 82.01 
Real GDP 5.170906 4.740116 -5.2 20.8 
Inf. 3.715331 4.110741 -4.9 15.1 
GOV 0.437282 0.496484 0 1 
RQ 0.77845 0.193591 0.27 0.95 
IB 
GNIR 26.655 73.741 -329.78 647.218 
OEA 1908.442 2832.981 17.9 14646.1 
ROA 1.808511 5.330985 -44.35 15.29 
NIM 4.468069 4.558523 -4.12 31 
LLR/L 5.409202 10.87805 0 100 
NL/A 56.39372 18.3297 1.41 90.4 
BC 57.5309 15.7195 27.49 80.95 
Real GDP 5.976596 4.591597 -5.2 20.8 
Inf. 3.744681 4.127438 -4.9 15.1 
GOV 0.420213 0.494911 0 1 
RQ 0.859521 0.137484 0.36 0.95 
Note: (*) In 2011, the LLR appeared in Gulf Finance House with the same amount of gross loans.     
 
4.4.1 Micro-Level Variables 
It is essential for the current study to examine whether the distinction of being an IB 
or CB has any significant impact on survival time and on a bank’s hazard rate. Before 
establishing further expectations with regard to the IB dummy, it is important to 
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highlight that the financing operations of most IB consist of the venture capital type 
and therefore they seem to be more at risk than CB (Hussein, 2004). In addition, most 
large banks in the GCC region are CB and, as is stated in the relevant banking 
literature, large banks are also more likely to take advantage of economies of scale 
(Leung et al., 2003). Furthermore, these banks indicate a healthier position in risk 
management than smaller banks (Fama, 1985). Thus, the estimated relationship 
between the conditional probability of bank failure hazard and IB is thus likely to be 
positive.  
The other two covariates from the income statement and balance sheet (GNIR and 
OEA) are anticipated to reduce the risk of bank failure. There is, generally, no doubt 
that increasing net interest revenue results in a decrease of the risk of bank failure. 
Most IB in the GCC region obtain their NIR from two sources: murabahah (mark-up) 
contracts or sales instruments to create debt, which are deemed to be one of the asset 
side components and a substitute for interest-based loans. The observations from the 
data obtained through annual reports indicate that in addition to a large share of 
murabahah, there are still some mudarabah and musharakah, or PLS (profit loss 
sharing) financing, as investment or savings accounts, as an alternative to the deposit 
element on the liability side (Nagaoka, 2007).  
While PLS contracts are preferred by Islamic economists due to being the essential 
representative of Islamic moral economy principles of an embedded economy, 
murabahah or ‘cost-plus sale’ models are not considered as desirable, due to being 
debt based contracts. However, since PLS contracts involve more risk than debt based 
contracts; IB have been heavily indulging in expanding their financing through 
murabahah. For this reason, most IB use murabahah as a substitute for credit in CB 
(Ayub, 2007). Furthermore, large IB may be more likely to utilise PLS contracts; 
these contracts are implemented to invest in infrastructure projects that belong to a 
government and as a means to develop substantial real estate projects. Small IB 
conversely have a tendency to employ contracts with a short duration, low 
administration costs and minimum risk (Khalil et al., 2002). In terms of other earning 
assets, Pappas et al. (2012) found that increases in this particular variable will 
diminish the failure hazard of both IB and CB.    
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In relation to earnings ratios, it is believed that an increase in the ROA, which can be 
defined as the total of net income divided by the total assets, leads to a decreased 
hazard rate in both bank groups. IB are more involved with murabahah contracts, 
which provide more secure revenue than that which is offered by PLS instruments. 
Accordingly, it can be expected that the ROA has a specifically negative impact on the 
risk of bank failure for IB. Net interest margin represents the annual profit margin that 
banks can obtain – after excluding the cost of interest expenses from various activities 
and services (for example, loans, investment securities, short-term investments and 
brokerage) – divided by the average of earning assets (Golin and Delhaise, 2013: 77). 
Pappas et al. (2012) devised a positive link between the NIM and bank failure hazard 
in CB; they also suggested that if the NIM is high, a bank may lose its market share in 
a very competitive commercial sector. Thus, the NIM could have a positive influence 
on the risk of bank failure. This direction, however, cannot be predicted in this current 
study for each bank type; further, the mean and maximum of the NIM values for each 
bank group in Table 4.1 reveals that IB have a higher NIM when compared with CB. 
This finding poses a question as to the extent that the NIM ratio in IB could affect 
bank failure hazard and whether this influence is likely to be positive. 
In reference to the asset quality ratio, LLR/L reflects the loans quality of the bank and 
measures the potential risk that could be associated with bank activities, such as 
lending and investing. A higher ratio means lower loans quality, thereby indicating a 
problematic situation for the bank that may necessitate the advancement of credit and 
risk management practices. Berger and Mester (2000) illustrated that this ratio may be 
affected by external conditions such as an economic crisis or by central bank 
regulations. It could, however, also be influenced by internal factors like incorrect 
decisions in portfolio management, which would result in a higher credit risk. In 
addition, the mean value of the LLR/L ratio (in Table 4.1) for both bank groups is 
notably similar at 6.68% for CB and 5.41% for IB. Consequently, the prior expected 
sign for LLR/L for all bank types with failure hazard is positive. The effect of this 
ratio for each bank group is not expected to be directed towards the risk of failure.   
The final financial ratio reflects liquidity management, which is NL/A; this ratio 
depicts the banks’ ability to meet any unanticipated changes in the market conditions, 
whether these are related to an excess or shortage in liquidity events. A capable 
102 
bank’s management should thus have contingency plans to arrange such changes in 
liquidity. Likewise, the previous ratio (LLR/L) and the mean rate of NL/A for both 
bank types are relatively similar at 54% for CB and 56.4% for IB. An increase in the 
NL/A ratio therefore signifies a critical bank position, which is expected to have a 
positive impact on bank failure risk. For an individual bank group, there is, however, 
no prior expectation.             
4.4.2 Macro-Level Variables 
The macro-level variables represent the level of institutional development in GCC 
countries; it is therefore essential to explore the impact of such variables on survival 
times and bank failure in this sector. BC variable effect on banks’ failure cannot be 
expected due to the mixed findings in literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Pappas, 
2012), where it is highlighted that a more concentrated banking sector is likely to 
reduce failure risk. In addition, Evrensel (2008) demonstrates that BC decreases the 
bank hazard rate in developed countries, since they have an unrestricted banking 
system and the ability to gain greater profit at less expense in banks’ administration 
and supervision. This situation is, however, different in developing countries, where 
BC is correlated positively with the hazard of bank failure.           
The economic growth and stability of the country should absorb financial shocks that 
it may experience, which in turn decreases the risk of a bank’s failure. A negative real 
GDP growth rate does, however, increase the probability of bank failure. It can 
therefore be predicted that increasing the rate of real GDP minimises the probability 
of a crisis affecting the banking system (for example, see: Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998; Evrensel, 2008; Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011).  
The Inf. rate variable shows the average level of prices in a country, and indicates that 
a higher Inf. rate is linked with a higher interest rate, which then affects a bank’s 
performance when creating loans. This situation could result in a credit bubble, 
increasing the probability of bank failure risk (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998). Since IB work in a dual economy under a single conventional monetary policy, 
they will be affected by the change in the interest rates in terms of determining their 
internal rate of return and financing rate.       
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The dummy variable of GOV represents an indication of liquidity pumping, especially 
with regard to the oil revenue in the Gulf region, which is expected to have an adverse 
influence on bank failure risk. Finally, focusing on the legal framework, the 
regulatory quality indicator is utilised to capture the ability of the government and its 
restrictions on formulating policies and regulations that boost private sector 
development. This variable also helps to assess the business environment facing the 
banks that operate in the GCC countries; a higher level of RQ thus denotes a 
motivated environment and a strong banking sector, which in turn reduces the failure 
risk of the banks.   
4.5 DETERMINING THE SURVIVAL OF THE GCC BANKS: FINDINGS 
After presenting the model and the econometric strategy and data sources, this section 
of the study presents the findings in a tripartite structure: unconditional findings, 
conditional results that are related to hazard rate, and the hazard ratio findings, which 
are obtained by employing the previously described methods in survival-time 
analysis.   
4.5.1 Unconditional Findings 
The unconditional results are based on the life-table non-parametric method, where 
the survival-time data is assumed to be continuous but has been observed in grouped 
form; the baseline of hazard rate and survivor function depends on the previous time 
that has passed for each bank in the GCC region and the failure events. This method is 
applied to examine the hypothesis on whether the risk of failure is higher for IB than it 
is for CB, without controlling the differences for the covariates. Indeed, this method is 
also employed to verify that there are adequate events in each interval to derive the 
hazard rate for each bank’s group. It is important to note that such a method implies 
that the longer the bank has operated in the country the less likely it is to fail (Zorn, 
2000). Figure 4.1 shows the unconditional estimated survivor rates for each bank 
group.  
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Figure 4.1- Survivor Function by Bank Types 
 
Note: Derived Using the Life-Table Method. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the survival rate of CB is higher than that of IB; the line 
of proportion surviving rate in IB declines sharply with the lower duration of survival 
time when compared to the results for CB, indicating that IB are more likely to fail 
than CB. Statistically, the likelihood-ratio and log-rank tests for the homogeneity of 
bank groups are applied to further examine the data. The Chi-squared and p-values for 
these tests are presented as follows: 9.467 (0.002) and 23.18 (0.000) (the figures in 
parentheses are p-values). Thus, the null hypothesis of the equality of bank types is 
rejected; this finding boosts the motivation behind the employment of IB as a dummy 
variable to investigate its impact on the failure hazard rate.    
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Figure 4.2- Survivor Function by GCC Country (Derived Using the Life-Table 
Method) 
 
Note: Derived Using the Life-Table Method. 
 
In addition to the focus on bank groups, this study also intends to explore the survival 
rate of each GCC country that has been covered by the observation windows. As 
depicted in Figure 4.2, the Saudi banking sector has the longest survival time (above 
seventy years with a survival rate of approximately 0.5); Kuwait and Bahrain follow 
this statistic. Indeed, the oldest Saudi bank is NCB and its Kuwaiti counterpart is 
NBK. Conversely, the UAE and Qatar represent the shortest survival times at 
approximately forty-five years, but the latter country shows the highest proportion 
surviving at almost 0.6. Furthermore, the drawn line of survivor rate decreased 
gradually in KSA and Kuwait, whereas it dropped dramatically in the UAE.   
In order to examine the significance of country-level differences, the findings of 
homogeneity tests show that the chi-squared and p-values for the likelihood-ratio and 
log-rank are 18.22 (0.001) and 33.39 (0.000) (the figures in parentheses are p-values). 
Consequently, the null hypothesis of country-level equality is rejected. Finally, given 
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the obtained unconditional results, it can be noted that the longevity does matter in the 
analysis of the survival time of the GCC banking sector.  
4.5.2 Conditional Findings 
The empirical findings based on conditionality are derived from two estimated 
equations through three models; these are the Cox PH, Weibull, and cloglog models. 
The first equation is comprised of the income statement and balance sheet covariates 
in order to estimate failure hazard; the second equation includes the financial ratios 
covariates of failure hazard; both equations are associated with macro-level 
covariates. As is shown in tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, the three models present very 
similar results for the estimated coefficients of each variable; this is especially true of 
the Weibull and cloglog findings, because these two models are fully parametric.  
As stated previously, the aim of applying the continuous-time models is, however, to 
assess the validity of the cloglog estimation, and this model is preferred as long as the 
annual variables are pooled from unbalanced, time-series cross-sectional data. Further 
echoing the unobserved heterogeneity problem, another cloglog related model is 
estimated and the findings for both models (shown by the last four columns in tables 
4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) are analogous, thereby emphasising that heterogeneity, or the frailty 
problem, is negligible.  
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Table 4.2- Covariates of the Income Statement and Balance Sheet in Failure 
Hazard 
Model PH Cox Weibull Cloglog 
Cloglog with 
Unobserved Het. 
Variables  Micro Micro+ Macro+  Micro 
Micro+ 
Macro Micro 
Micro+ 
Macro Micro 
Micro+ 
Macro 
Log t     1.39*** 1.393*** 1.397*** 1.393*** 
    (0.190) (0.193) (0.190) (0.193) 
IB 0.714*** 0.645*** 0.718*** 0.647*** 0.709*** 0.636*** 0.709*** 0.636*** 
(0.215) (0.224) (0.212) (0.221) (0.212) (0.221) (0.212) (0.221) 
GNIR -0.003 -0.007*** -0.0036 -0.082*** -0.0036*** -0.00830*** -0.00367 -0.00830***
(0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.003) (0.0034) (0.00276) (0.00344) (0.00276) 
OEA -0.0001*** -0.00019*** -0.0001*** -0.00013*** -0.0001*** -0.00013*** -0.0001*** -0.00013***
(3.6 e-05) (3.9e-05) (2.9 e-05) (3.19e-05) (2.94e-05) (3.18e-05) (2.94e-05) (3.18e-05) 
BC  0.0275***  0.029***  0.0292***  0.0292*** 
 (0.0081)  (0.008)  (0.00805)  (0.00805) 
Real GDP  -0.07244***  -0.079***  -0.0810***  -0.0810*** 
 (0.022)  (0.0217)  (0.0218)  (0.0218) 
Inf.   0.191***  0.191***  0.193***  0.193*** 
 (0.025)  (0.0253)  (0.0254)  (0.0254) 
GOV  -0.659***  -0.568***  -0.569***  -0.569*** 
 (0.213)  (0.208)  (0.209)  (0.209) 
RQ  -1.11*  -1.002*  -0.984  -0.984 
 (0.621)  (0.615)  (0.615)  (0.615) 
Constant   -9.86*** -10.79*** -8.860*** -9.838*** -8.861*** -9.838*** 
  (0.67600) (0.845) (0.593) (0.785) (0.593) (0.785) 
Ln_p   0.89*** 0.944***     
  (0.079) (0.0803)     
P   2.44 2.43     
Lnsig2u       -12.23 -12.29 
      (21.09) (25.55) 
Log L -629.75 -594.47 -303.85 -268.17 -658.069 -621.78 -658.069 -621.785 
LR chi2 59.88 130.43 50.88 122.24 101.66 174.23   
Wald chi2       17.51 135.19 
Obs. 762 762 762 762 21106 21106 21106 21106 
Id.       762 762 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; (***) denotes p<0.01, (**) p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Figure 4.3- The Conditional Probability of Hazard Rate by Bank Types and the 
Income Statement and Balance Sheet Specification 
Weibull Regression 
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Starting with the income statement and balance sheet specification in Table 4.2, the 
baseline of the hazard rate is obtained from the shape of parameter P in the Weibull 
model at 2.4. In cloglog this baseline is instead computed through log (t) by assuming 
that it is similar to the Weibull model, which is approximately equal to 2.4, thereby 
indicating that the baseline hazard increases with elapsed survival time. As expected, 
the reported coefficient estimate of the IB dummy variable is significant and positive 
with bank failure hazard, which is in line with the life-table result, thus signifying that 
IB increase the failure risk by about 0.64 more than CB. In addition, Figure 4.3 reveals 
the line shape of the hazard rate for IB and CB from the regression of the Weibull 
micro- and macro-level estimate equation with regard to the other covariates; 
noticeably, the hazard line of CB rises steadily over the analysis time; the hazard line 
of IB conversely rises rapidly, increasing the gap between these lines over the analysis 
time.    
  
Table 4.3- Covariates of the Balance Sheet and Income Statement for Bank 
Groups 
Cloglog with Unobserved Heterogeneity  
 CB IB 
Variables  Micro  Micro+ Macro Micro  Micro+ Macro 
Log t 1.710*** 1.713*** 0.929*** 0.873*** 
(0.251) (0.261) (0.290) (0.287) 
GNIR 0.00556 -0.00636 -0.00668** -0.00788*** 
(0.00548) (0.00629) (0.00329) (0.00295) 
OEA -0.000148*** -0.000151*** -7.02e-05 -0.000102 
(3.34e-05) (3.69e-05) (6.72e-05) (7.32e-05) 
BC  0.0280***  0.0317** 
 (0.00955)  (0.0156) 
Real GDP  -0.0618**  -0.129*** 
 (0.0251)  (0.0439) 
Inf.   0.189***  0.197*** 
 (0.0314)  (0.0488) 
GOV  -0.744***  -0.310 
 (0.256)  (0.393) 
RQ  -1.100  -1.022 
 (0.672)  (1.609) 
Constant -9.922*** -10.68*** -6.885*** -7.765*** 
(0.797) (0.963) (0.820) (1.634) 
Lnsig2u -8.989 -12.52 -12.65 -13.92 
(17.74) (32.45) (47.24) (338.2) 
Wald chi2 52.67 98.42 13.63 32.15 
Obs. 17159 17159 3947 3947 
Id. 574 574 188 188 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; (***) denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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In terms of the other covariates of the cloglog estimated model with micro- and 
macro-level variables, the coefficients of GNIR and OEA variables are statistically 
significant and meet the study’s expectation in reducing the failure risk. There is, 
however, a small magnitude influence at approximately -.01, and -.0001, illustrating 
that a rise in these covariates decreases bank failure hazard albeit by a very small 
degree. By further examining Table 4.3, which reveals the influence of the same 
covariates for bank groups separately, the growth of net interest revenue appears to be 
significant only for IB, that also with minor negative impact on the hazard rate.  
Further, Table 4.4, which illustrates the financial ratios specification, displays the 
coefficients of selected financial ratios alongside the macro-level variables. The 
baseline hazard here (at approximately 2.6) is again computed through the Weibull 
and cloglog models, confirming that even given the presence of financial ratios 
variables, the baseline hazard rises with elapsed survival time. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficient of IB also emphasises the positive link with the risk of bank 
failure, indicating that IB have a 0.77 risk of failure greater than CB.  
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Table 4.4- Covariates of Financial Ratios in Failure Hazard 
Model Cox PH Weibull Cloglog 
Cloglog with 
Unobserved Het. 
Variables  Micro Micro+ Macro+  Micro 
Micro+ 
Macro Micro 
Micro+ 
Macro Micro 
Micro+ 
Macro 
Log t     1.553*** 1.649*** 1.553*** 1.649*** 
    (0.190) (0.204) (0.190) (0.204) 
IB 0.740*** 0.774*** 0.818*** 0.804*** 0.786*** 0.774*** 0.786*** 0.774*** 
(0.229) (0.235) (0.227) (0.232) (0.227) (0.233) (0.227) (0.233) 
ROA -0.0524*** -0.0465*** -0.0599*** -0.0529*** -0.0614*** -0.0545*** -0.0614*** -0.0545*** 
(0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0148) 
NIM  0.185*** 0.183*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 
(0.0348) (0.0350) (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0374) (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0373) 
LLR/L 0.0839*** 0.0850*** 0.0811*** 0.0820*** 0.0801*** 0.0811*** 0.0801*** 0.0811*** 
(0.00858) (0.00902) (0.00838) (0.00870) (0.00833) (0.00865) (0.00833) (0.00865) 
NL/A 0.0380*** 0.0368*** 0.0369*** 0.0337*** 0.0366*** 0.0336*** 0.0366*** 0.0336*** 
(0.00831) (0.00973) (0.00801) (0.00930) (0.00801) (0.00929) (0.00801) (0.00929) 
BC  0.0262***  0.0273***  0.0275***  0.0275*** 
 (0.00878)  (0.00868)  (0.00866)  (0.00866) 
Real GDP  -0.0448**  -0.0530**  -0.0545**  -0.0545** 
 (0.0225)  (0.0224)  (0.0224)  (0.0224) 
Inf.  0.182***  0.185***  0.187***  0.187*** 
 (0.0263)  (0.0262)  (0.0263)  (0.0263) 
GOV  -0.658***  -0.633***  -0.631***  -0.631*** 
 (0.221)  (0.215)  (0.216)  (0.216) 
RQ  -1.681**  -1.452**  -1.452**  -1.452** 
 (0.670)  (0.668)  (0.667)  (0.667) 
Constant   -14.27*** -15.12*** -13.18*** -14.01*** -13.19*** -14.01*** 
  (0.978) (1.136) (0.910) (1.074) (0.911) (1.074) 
Ln_p   0.952*** 0.989***     
  (0.0736) (0.0763)     
P   2.69 2.69     
Lnsig2u       -10.55 -12.56 
      (13.68) (24.47) 
Log L -598.472 -566.0263 -267.279 -233.0862 -621.284 -586.697 -621.284 -586.697 
LR chi2 122.44 187.33 124.03 192.42 175.23 244.40   
Wald chi2       186.11 232.23 
Obs. 762 762 762 762 21106 21106 21106 21106 
Id.       762 762 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 4.4- The Conditional Probability of Hazard Rate by Bank Types and the 
Financial Ratios Specification 
Weibull Regression 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the line shape of the hazard rate for IB and CB from the regression 
of the Weibull financial ratios and the macro-level estimate equation in relation to the 
other covariates; the hazard line of CB also increases steadily, whereas that of the IB 
rises sharply over the course of the analysis time.  
With regard to the financial ratios covariates of the cloglog estimated model with 
macro-level variables in Table 4.4 (commencing with the earnings ratios), the 
coefficient of ROA has a significant negative impact on hazard ratio at -0.05. It also 
has a similar effect for IB, in that it reduces the potential bank failure hazard by -0.3 
(as is seen in Table 4.5), whereas it is not significant with the grouping for CB. This is 
a striking result for ROA with IB, given that the majority of the transactions of IB 
depend on asset-based contracts such as murabaha. Thus, it seems that an increase in 
ROA has decreasing impact on the failure risk in IB. In other words, reliance on the 
non-PLS or fixed-income creating debt contracts have lesser propensity for failure due 
to the contained risks associated with debt-based instruments as opposed to PLS type 
Islamic financial products. The NIM covariate (as was predicted) has a positive impact 
on hazard ratio by 0.2. In terms of bank type, Table 4.5 reveals that increasing the net 
interest margin tends to increase failure risk significantly, by about 0.23 (although this 
is only true for IB); such an obstacle appears in IB for a reason: some IB may have 
relatively more weight in their portfolios for PLS contracts, including mudarabah and 
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musharakah, which account for more than 10% of total Islamic financing. Due to the 
nature of these instruments, the credit risk of IB increases, which in turn increases the 
risk that is expressed by the NIM ratio. As evidence for this situation, Nagaoka (2007) 
reports that the averages of PLS and debt-based contracts in the Dubai Islamic Bank 
over the period from 2001 to 2005 are 17% and 48.6% respectively.  
To illustrate the distribution pattern of Islamic financing, Asutay (2012) demonstrates 
that the average of PLS contracts from 2006 to 2010 in the Bahrain Islamic Bank was 
approximately 17.5%; the average in the Dubai Islamic Bank was 21.7%, yet this 
figure is shown at less than 4% for the Qatar Islamic Bank. It is then difficult to 
establish a general pattern, as in the case of the Qatar Islamic Bank, because it is less 
associated with PLS contracts when compared with other Islamic banks. IB may also 
suffer in terms of managing credit risk, whereas opting to expand the PLS contracts 
implies greater risk and less profit than with debt-based contracts. 
The other two estimated coefficients related to asset quality and liquidity ratios in 
Table 4.4 (LLR/L and NL/A) are significant and agree with this study’s expectation 
that they would have a positive influence on the hazard rate (with statistics of .08 and 
.034). From the same covariates in Table 4.5, it can be further noticed that in CB a 
higher rate of LLR/L and NL/A increased the hazard ratio by .15 and .066; in contrast, 
for the IB an increase in LLR/L ratio decreased bank failure risk by 0.14. Such a 
finding implies that IB have some internal difficulties in asset quality management 
that could be ascribed to their practices in making new loan programs or in their 
evaluation of the potential risk factors in an investment portfolio, which, by extension, 
may have an effect on the adequacy level of allowances for loan and lease losses. IB 
may thus need to improve their management structure in order to make more efficient 
decisions related to credit risk.  
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Table 4.5- Covariates of the Financial Ratios for Bank Groups 
Cloglog with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 CB IB 
Variables  Micro Micro+ Macro Micro Micro+ Macro 
Log t 1.833*** 1.988*** 1.272*** 1.211*** 
 (0.247) (0.276) (0.337) (0.333) 
ROA -0.0468 -0.0241 -0.248*** -0.277*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0510) (0.0605) (0.0720) 
NIM -0.237* -0.120 0.222*** 0.227*** 
 (0.127) (0.130) (0.0502) (0.0551) 
LLR/L 0.148*** 0.152*** -0.114** -0.144*** 
(0.0131) (0.0149) (0.0455) (0.0555) 
NL/A 0.0880*** 0.0664*** -0.0226 -0.0320 
 (0.0127) (0.0145) (0.0148) (0.0200) 
BC  0.0172*  0.0136 
  (0.0101)  (0.0174) 
Real GDP  -0.0220  -0.0923* 
  (0.0275)  (0.0486) 
Inf.  0.225***  0.177*** 
  (0.0355)  (0.0525) 
GOV  -0.379  -0.642 
  (0.282)  (0.421) 
RQ  -1.080  -1.715 
  (0.814)  (1.729) 
Constant -16.34*** -17.02*** -6.892*** -5.483** 
 (1.306) (1.475) (1.449) (2.543) 
Lnsig2u -10.55 -11.63 -12.26 -13.08 
 (14.53) (29.60) (25.14) (47.37) 
Wald chi2 178.23 196.77 52.29 57.08 
Obs. 17159 17159 3947 3947 
Id. 574 574 188 188 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; (***) denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In terms of macro-level variables which are involved in the two equations, as was 
described initially in this study, the coefficients of these covariates, shown in tables 
4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, are significant and align with the expectations of this study. For the 
BC variable, a more concentrated banking sector leads to a rise in the hazard rate by 
approximately 0.03; as this study is based on developing countries, such a result is 
consistent with Evrensel’s findings (2008). Even with the subgroups for CB and IB in 
Table 4.3, the influence of BC does not differ from both bank groups together in the 
first estimate equation (as is seen in Table 4.2), whereas in Table 4.5 it has a positive 
impact on hazard rate, but it is only significant with CB at 10%.  
The estimated coefficient of real GDP growth signifies that increasing this variable 
will result in a decline of the hazard rate by approximately -0.06 for both equations. 
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For the bank groups in the first equation (and in relation to the covariates of the 
balance sheet and income statement), the reported effect of increasing real GDP 
growth is more significant and valuable in the IB group than it is for that of the CB, 
where it decreases the hazard rate by 0.12 and 0.04. In the second equation, this 
estimate is, however, only significant with IB, reducing the failure hazard ratio by 0.1. 
This finding indicates that although the size of IB is less than that of CB, they are 
instead more engaged with the real economy.  
As regards the Inf. variable, it has a positive influence on hazard rate in all cases, 
including the models for both CB and IB; this rate increases failure hazard 
approximately by 0.2. The GOV covariate has a negative impact on hazard rate with a 
reading of -0.63; in terms of the bank groups, it is only significant in relation to the 
model for CB, which is related to the first equation with a value of -0.73, indicating 
that GOV is more associated with CB than IB, which, by extension, decreases the 
probability of failure hazard in these banks.  
Lastly, as the results indicate, improving the RQ has an adverse impact on the hazard 
rate in both estimate equations, yet there are different values; it thus decreases the 
hazard rate by 1.1 and 1.5. For the bank groups, it is only significant in Table 4.3 with 
CB at approximately -1.2.                                  
4.5.3 The Hazard Ratio Findings 
It is, moreover, important to analyse the hazard ratio findings, as this sections aims to 
do. This ratio can be described as follows: a hazard ratio less than one implies a 
negative influence of the variable on failure hazard; other variables remain constant 
or, in other words, ceteris paribus. By looking at the reported findings in Table 4.6, 
the hazard ratio estimate of the IB dummy signifies that at each survival time the 
conditional probability of failure rates in those banks is almost twice as high as it is in 
CB, thus resulting in shorter survival time for IB. Tables 4.2 to 4.4 better emphasise 
the depiction of the estimate coefficient and the hazard ratio of the IB variable, which 
can be expressed as 1.9= exp(0.64) and 2.2= exp(0.77).  
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Table 4.6- Hazard Form Results of the Cloglog Model 
Covariates of the Balance Sheet and Income Statement 
Varia
bles  
Log t IB GNIR OEA BC Real 
GDP 
Inf.  GOV RQ 
Hzd. 
Ratio  
4.03 1.88 0.992 0.9998 1.029 0.922 1.21 0.566 0.373 
Std. 
Err. 
0.78 0.42 0.003 0.0000 0.008 0.020 0.03 0.118 0.229 
Covariates of the Financial Ratios 
Varia
bles  
Log t IB ROA NIM  LLR/
L 
NL/A BC Real 
GDP 
Inf.  GOV RQ 
Hzd. 
Ratio  
5.2 2.169 0.947 1.222 1.084 1.034 1.028 0.947 1.21 0.532 0.234 
Std. 
Err. 
1.06 0.504 0.014 0.045 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.021 0.032 0.115 0.156 
Note: All covariates are significant at %99, %95 and %90.  
In terms of micro-level variables, the hazard ratios of GNIR and OEA, which are 
related to the balance sheet and income statement, indicate a negative impact on 
hazard rate for banks. The hazard ratios for those variables are, however, almost equal 
to one, suggesting that the impact of these variables on hazard rate is slight. Similarly, 
the hazard ratio of ROA is presented as less than one (0.95= exp(-0.054)), but there is 
a minor negative effect. Conversely, the hazard ratio for NIM is shown as 1.22, 
thereby demonstrating that an increase in NIM by 1% is associated with a 22% higher 
hazard rate. Finally, the most notable macro-level output is that of a 1% rise in BC 
and Inf., which causes an increase in the hazard rate by 3% and 20%. The hazard ratio 
for banks that are involved with GOV is only 40% of the hazard rate when compared 
with those banks that are not involved with the aforementioned variable at each 
survival time. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Previous studies in IB have rarely produced empirical evidence on failure risk analysis 
or on the exploration of the factors that could affect a bank’s failure. Thus, such a gap 
in the literature has inspired this study to examine the failure of IB and CB in the GCC 
region by employing the survival-analysis models. Initially, the unconditional model 
was employed by applying the life-table non-parametric method to address the trend 
of survival rates, both in IB and CB and within each country. Further, through the use 
of the discrete-time model, this study investigated the influences of some selected 
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variables from micro- and macro-level data on the banks’ failure, presenting a 
comprehensive comparative analysis between IB and CB.  
The unconditional analysis supports the hypothesis that IB are more likely to fail than 
CB, without controlling the differences for the covariates; in terms of an individual 
country, Saudi banks have the longest survival time followed by those in Kuwait and 
Bahrain, whereas the UAE and Qatar represent the shortest survival times. From these 
results, it can be concluded that longevity is important in a survival-time analysis of 
the GCC banking sector.  
Ultimately, the conditional findings reveal that, in terms of micro-level variables, the 
IB coefficient confirms the unconditional findings, suggesting that IB are 
approximately twice as hazardous as CB. Such a finding is obtained for the banks 
sampled from five GCC countries covered by this study; however, Beck et al. (2013) 
indicated that during the financial crisis IB have performed better then CB, in 
particular, in terms of asset quality and capitalisation, which means that IB were at 
less risk than CB. In addition, the study by Beck et al. comprised twenty-two 
countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan, and it took into account the 
local and global financial crisis.  It should also be pointed that the business cycles of 
the countries in which Islamic banking has a reasonable position has not been effected 
by the financial crisis; which should be considered in interpreting Beck et al.’s (2013) 
results. 
The link between the GNIR, OEA and failure hazard rate is negative; nonetheless they 
still have small magnitude influences. The financial earnings ratios show that a rise in 
ROA causes the hazard rate to decline, yet an increase in NIM leads to a similar 
increase in the hazard ratio. The asset quality and liquidity ratios, LLR/L and NL/A, 
are associated positively with failure hazard risk. Moreover, the findings depict that 
increasing GNIR decreases the failure risk for CB and IB, but it is significant only for 
IB. Similarly, with the ratios for ROA, which has a negative influence on hazard rate, 
and NIM, which has a positive influence on hazard rate, they are significant for IB. 
This outcome emphasises that the financing of most IB depends on non-PLS or asset-
based contracts, in that they offer less risk and more profit than PLS contracts. For the 
group associated with CB, a higher ratio of LLR/L and NL/A increases the hazard rate, 
yet with IB an increase in LLR/L decreases bank failure risk. Such a finding implies 
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that IB may need to improve their management structure, so as to make more efficient 
decisions related to liquidity and credit risk, especially when opting to expand their 
PLS contracts.  
As the findings indicate, the failure risk is, however, more affected by macro-level 
variables; a more concentrated banking sector leads to an elevated hazard rate, since it 
has the same positive influence on both subgroups (IB and CB). Growth of the real 
GDP rate causes the failure risk to decline, and, more importantly, the effect of real 
GDP growth is of greater value for IB than it is for CB, suggesting that despite the 
smaller size of IB (in comparison to CB), they are better engaged with the real 
economy. Furthermore, for all scenarios, higher inflation considerably increases 
failure hazard. The involvement of the government in bank ownership reduces the 
probability of failure risk; in addition, CB are more associated with GOV than IB, 
which protects these banks against failure hazard. Finally, improving the regulatory 
quality has a pronounced and adverse impact on hazard rate.  
The most striking finding regarding IB is that the higher probability of failure risk in 
this group does not necessarily signify weak performance. It is instead linked with the 
real economy growth indicator; it can thus be recommended that to enhance the role 
of Islamic finance, especially in the GCC, the financing models as well as the 
regulation should be improved in conjunction by policy makers.  
Lastly, it is also important to note that the history of GCC banking in general and 
Islamic banking in particular is rather short; as these countries were founded mostly in 
the post-war period and their banks are even younger. Thus, having a longer time 
period would have enhanced the quality of the findings established in this study.  
However, this study is designed to take into account the realities of the region with the 
aim of shedding some light on this particular aspect, which has not previously been 
studied for the GCC’s Islamic and conventional banking.   
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CHAPTER 5 
NPL WITHIN THE GCC ISLAMIC BANKING AND ISLAMIC 
FINANCING CONTRIBUTING TO THE NPL IN THE GCC’S 
BANKING SYSTEM 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Financial stability is essential for the sustainable growth and enhanced performance of 
banks in general and for IB in particular. Although there are a number of determining 
factors for financial stability, problem loans can be considered as a source of worry in 
the banking system, whether that be in developed countries or in developing 
countries. Thus, the determinants of credit risk and NPL will be explored, especially 
within advanced countries.  
In recent years, the expansion of the economies of the GCC countries has resulted in 
the expansion and development of the financial sector. This has been further enhanced 
by the development and expansion of IB in the region, which has contributed to the 
further growth of the bank credit system. Although akin to any banking system, these 
credit systems have been influenced by the microeconomic dynamics of the 
institutions concerned, by the macroeconomic environment and by their financial 
surroundings, which can, for example, be seen in the form of business cycles. This 
situation consequently implies that the financial market downturn in 2006 and the 
financial crisis in 2009 have had an effect on the performance of IB as well as on the 
general financial system (Khamis et al., 2010).  
This paper aims to investigate the macro-level and micro-level factors that determine 
NPL in the GCC banks. In the process of completing this investigation the following 
objectives will be developed: 
(i) To explore the impact of some selected sectors from Islamic financing and Islamic 
finance contracts on the NPL of both the Islamic banking and commercial banking 
systems of the GCC countries as a whole.  
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(ii) To identify the macro-level and bank-level factors that contribute to NPL in the 
GCC’s Islamic banking system via means of the panel data econometrics model. 
(iii) To examine the dynamic impact of those factors which determine the NPL of the 
GCC’s banking sector by utilising dynamic panel data (GMM) models.  
This paper therefore aims to identify the macro-level and bank-level factors 
contributing to NPL in the GCC’s Islamic banking sector through the use of the panel 
data econometrics model for the period of 2005 to 2011. Further, and in order to 
circumvent the observed shortcomings in the size and nature of the issues and to 
substantiate the analysis, this paper simultaneously aims to examine the impact of 
these factors on the NPL of the GCC’s banking system in general by utilising dynamic 
panel data (GMM) models. In addition, from among these factors this study will 
examine the impact of the sectoral distribution of Islamic financing and the 
distribution of Islamic financial methods on the observed trends of NPL, which 
enables the contribution of Islamic finance to the NPL of the Islamic banking sector 
and the GCC’s commercial banking sector as a whole to be identified.  
This paper is organised as follows: an overview of studies related to NPL in banking 
sectors is provided, followed by a description of the determinant factors of NPL, 
including macroeconomic, structural, organisational, product development and bank-
level factors. The research methodology is displayed based on panel data, dynamic 
panel data (GMM) models and estimator and econometric specification; it is followed 
by the empirical findings for each stated method. Finally, the discussion and 
conclusion of the study is presented.    
5.2 NPL: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUBJECT LITERATURE 
A bank, as an intermediation firm, is likely to face loan delays or default problems; 
after a specific period of time these defaulted loans thus become NPL. Therefore, 
increasing NPL in credit portfolios indicates inefficient behaviour or management 
within a bank. To avoid such a dilemma, authorities require banks to increase loan-
loss provisions. Consequently, managing and determining factors that have an impact 
on NPL is a vital aspect of an individual bank’s performance and the financial 
economy of a country (Li et al., 2009).   
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The available body of knowledge on banking indicates that NPL or issues regarding 
problem loans have been examined from several perspectives. Initially, NPL were 
utilised as an indicator of asset quality within the relevant literature (see: Meeker and 
Gray, 1987). Some studies focused on investigating the causes that precipitate a 
bank’s failure, including NPL and efficiency levels, where NPL are considered to be 
one of the key factors (for example, Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; Whalen, 1991; Barr and 
Siems, 1994; and Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). The second trend in the literature 
focused on examining the link between bank performance and efficiency, such as 
productive and cost efficiency and NPL, by using strategies that included the Granger-
causality method to explore the directions of the intertemporal relationship between 
these elements (see: Berger and DeYoung, 1997). The final and recent trends in the 
literature that are related to NPL seem to focus on investigating the determinants of 
NPL within banking sectors in the form of macroeconomic and microeconomic 
factors (see: Salas and Saurina, 2002; Lu et al., 2005; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; and 
Louzis et al., 2012). Furthermore, some recent studies have investigated the 
relationship between NPL, macroeconomic factors and the business cycle (see: 
Nkusu, 2011 and Beck et al., 2013). Despite the existence of such a rich array of 
literature on the subject, it should be noted that there is scarcely any research with 
regard to NPL in IB.  
From among the literature relating to banking studies and on the subject of NPL, 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) reported four significant hypotheses when examining the 
relationship between NPL, cost efficiency and equity capital in US commercial banks 
from 1985 to 1994, which were ‘bad management’, ‘bad luck’, ‘skimping’ and ‘moral 
hazard’. It was found that increasing NPL can decrease the measured cost efficiency. 
This result implies that reducing NPL by increasing administration expenses can lead 
to a decrease in the cost efficiency. On the contrary, NPL are considered to be 
increasing due to the lower cost effacing, indicating a low level of management. 
The available empirical literature indicates that a number of papers investigated the 
determinants of NPL by utilising dynamic panel GMM methods. For instance, Salas 
and Saurina (2002) examined the determinants of credit risk within commercial and 
savings banks in Spain from 1985 to 1997, including factors related to both macro-
level and bank-level variables by using GMM-difference. They concluded that there 
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was a significant variance between commercial and savings banks in terms of 
financial risk management. For both bank types, they stated that bank-specific 
variables are, however, useful when utilised as timely warning pointers, such as when 
approaching NIM and bank size portfolio diversifications. Another empirical study 
which employed the GMM-system is that by Espinoza and Prasad (2010), who 
investigated the relationship between NPL, macroeconomic factors and some selected 
bank-level factors of the GCC’s banking sector by focusing on non-oil GDP for the 
period of 1995 to 2008. Their findings also indicated that bank-level variables can be 
used as an early warning indicator for future problem loans, and they found that non-
oil GDP is adversely related to NPL. Another of their findings suggested that the 
global financial surroundings have an impact on NPL. A more recent empirical study 
is that by Louzis et al. (2012) of the case of Greek banks over the period from 2003 to 
2009; this study concluded that the problem loans in the banking sector are related to 
macro-level factors, including interest rate and unemployment, and subsequently by 
micro-level factors, especially those that reflect the quality of management, such as 
the ratio for the return on equity.  
Some studies have focused on examining the impact of macroeconomic and business 
cycles on NPL. For instance, Nkusu (2011) investigated the relationship between NPL 
and macroeconomic factors by using two approaches. The first approach is that of 
signal-equation panel regressions, which is utilised to prove that a decrease in the 
development of macroeconomic factors are linked to increasing NPL. The second 
approach is that of a penal vector autoregressive, which is used to investigate the 
dynamic interaction of variables determining NPL towards a shock in the system, with 
particular focus on the global financial crisis in 2008. The sample consists of twenty-
six advanced countries from the period from 1998 to 2009. It is found that regardless 
of the causes which are behind problem loans, a significant increase in NPL leads to a 
rise in the NPL themselves through a linear response that may continue from the first 
shock up until the fourth year. A recent empirical study by Beck et al. (2013) 
investigated the link between macroeconomic factors and NPL in 75 countries from 
2002 to 2010 by utilising the dynamic panel data model. It concluded that the key 
factor affecting NPL is GDP growth, meaning that the impact of the global financial 
crisis, which affects the economic activity of each country, is the most risky factor for 
bank asset quality. Meanwhile, the concept of NPL or asset quality in those countries 
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is influenced by additional factors, such as exchange rate, share prices and the lending 
interest rate.                       
In terms of developing countries, Farhan et al. (2012) investigated the macro-level 
factors, including GDP growth, interest rate, exchange rate, energy crisis, 
unemployment and inflation, on the determinant of the NPL of ten Pakistani banks 
through the use of a questionnaire survey that mainly targeted credit risk managers. 
They concluded that all of the noted variables have a positive impact on NPL, with the 
exception of GDP growth, which has a negative effect on NPL. In addition, this study 
indicated that the loan quality was significantly affected by the idea of an energy 
crisis.  
There has been little effort made to investigate the determinants of NPL. Among the 
available studies, some investigations have explored the efficacy and financial 
stability of IB and the CB sector by using NPL as a proxy reflecting asset quality or 
financial stability. For example, Rahim et al. (2012) compared the CB and IB in 
relation to financial stability by employing z-score and NPL as indicators reflecting 
financial stability in Malaysia over the period from 2005 to 2010 through the use of 
the panel data FE model. Their analysis included some independent variables that 
related to bank-level, such as asset quality and cost-income ratio, which indicates 
efficiency, and macro-level variables, including market share, Herfindahl Index, 
inflation and real GDP. Rahim et al. found that the financial stability in IB was 
somehow more constant than in the case of CB, which were affected significantly by 
efficiency, the Herfindahl Index, inflation and real GDP. Nevertheless, they noted that 
those variables were not particularly significant with financial stability indicators in 
CB. In another study, Beck et al. (2013) examined the business orientation, bank 
efficiency and stability of IB and CB from 22 countries over the period from 1995 to 
2009, utilising NPL as a proxy for asset quality. It was concluded that in general NPL 
are affected adversely by IB (as a dummy variable). Beck et al. noted, however, that 
during the global financial crisis the performance of IB was higher than that of CB in 
terms of asset quality and capitalisation.  
In examining the link between a bank’s efficiency and NPL in order to investigate the 
management quality through a comparative study of CB and IB in the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries from 1993 to 2007, by applying the hypotheses 
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that are suggested by Berger and DeYoung (1997), Setiwan et al., (2013) found that 
an increase in NPL is largely determined by external factors. This notion supports the 
‘bad luck’ hypothesis, and internal effects related to efficiency level, which is 
associated with the ‘bad management’ and ‘skimping’ hypotheses, specifically in the 
IB of the Middle East region, including Turkey.  
Thus, it should be noted that the present study is distinct from other empirical studies 
which explored the NPL of the GCC’s commercial banking sector by examining the 
link between bank efficiency and NPL but also, and most importantly, by 
investigating NPL in IB and CB with Islamic windows. In addition, among the macro-
level and micro-level factors, this study also includes the effect of the financing for IB 
and Islamic financial methods on NPL or loan quality13. Furthermore, some studies 
have employed Z-score to investigate the impact of NPL on the financial stability of 
IB (e.g. Rahim et al., 2012), however, the research aim of this study will be achieved 
by the use of sophisticated econometric tools so as to observe the dynamic impacts or 
time condition impacts on NPL via dynamic panel data (GMM) models.   
5.3 DETERMINANTS OF NPL AND DESCRIBING THE VARIABLES FOR 
FORMING THE MODELS 
After an extensive review of the available literature, the variables used in this study 
are defined when forming the empirical models to be tested. In doing so, the variables 
are classified as: macroeconomics variables, organisational- and structure-oriented 
variables, product-development-related variables and bank-level variables. 
The relationship between the macroeconomic environment and NPL is investigated by 
a number of studies in banking literature (see: Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al., 
2012), which include factors such as the real GDP growth, non-oil GDP growth, 
sectoral financing, organisational structure and product-development factors. When 
reflecting on these factors, this study considers the following variables: 
(i) Growth of financing by the banking sector for the real estate and construction 
sectors.  
(ii) Growth of financing for the manufacturing and industry sectors.  
(iii) Fully-fledged IB financing growth for the real estate and construction sectors.  
                                                            
13 Some studies utilised NPL as an indicator for loan quality, such as those by Hughes and Mester 
(1993); see Berger and DeYoung (1997: 853).    
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(iv) Growth in the assets size of fully-fledged IB and Islamic windows (IW). 
(v) The growth of sharia-compliant assets in IB and IW.  
(vi) Asset growth of CB.  
(vii) The growth of profit-loss-sharing (PLS) contracts.  
(viii) The growth of fixed-income creating debt (FID) contracts.  
The next factor, which is considered to have a determining impact on NPL, is that of 
bank structure and organisational development, which is in turn related to the bank 
type. Table 5.1 presents the definition of those variables, which include the growth 
rate of assets size of: fully-fledged IB, IW and CB. The link between the ratio of NPL 
and each of these variables is unclear in terms of its direction. Salas and Saurina 
(2002) and Louzis et al. (2012) stated, however, that bank size itself, without the 
growth rate, indicates a risk of diversification, implying that bigger banks have 
significant potential for additional opportunities in diversification, which is associated 
negatively with NPL . Such variables can therefore be utilised as a proxy to assess the 
link between the growth rates for each bank type. This notion is particularly true if 
they differ in risk-taking behaviour to diversify their portfolios between high-risk 
projects and low-risk projects with more conditions and restrictions, where a negative 
link with NPL signifies a lower risk of diversification in contrast to a positive 
relationship with NPL, which indicates a higher risk of diversification. 
The last factor is product development, which is associated with the allocation of 
Islamic finance (IF) contracts according to its categories, which are PLS and FID 
contracts. As is recognised in IF literature, PLS modes of financing include 
mudarabah and musharakah; FID contracts are comprised of murabahah (mark-up 
pricing), and deferred sales, such as ijarah or leasing and hire purchase, salam and 
istisna. 14  It is essential for this study to investigate the influence of the financing of 
IB through both PLS and FID instruments on NPL. The growth rate of each category 
in each country will be calculated in order to examine the effect of these variables.  
                                                            
14 In the current study sample, Kuwait’s IB, including the Kuwait Finance House, the Kuwait 
International Bank and the Boubyan Bank KSC, have not provided any PLS contracts.  
Again, in this study sample and over the observed period, none of the IB have utilised a salam contract 
except the Dubai Islamic Bank, which has applied this instrument for the period of 2010 to 2011 with 
2.45% and 6.15% of total Islamic financing modes.     
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After discussing the potential macro-level, organisational, structural and product-
development-related determining factors of NPL as envisaged by the theory, this 
section focuses on micro-level or bank-specific factors, which include RWA, two 
selected financial ratios (ROE and NIM) to reflect upon the indicators of a bank’s 
profitability, and efficiency scores.  
 
Table 5.1- Definition of Variables and Hypotheses Test   
Variable   Definition  Hypothesis Tested 
ܰܲܮ NPL to gross loans (dependent variable NPL) 
The prior NPL put more 
load on the current NPL 
(+)  
ܴܹܣ Risk-weighted assets to assets Credit risk capture (+) 
ܴܱܧ Return on equity =  ୔୰୭୤୧୲ୱ౟౪୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୣ୯୳୧୲୷ ౟౪  
Bad management and bad 
luck (-) 
ܰܫܯ Net interest margin = ୔୰୭୤୧୲	୫ୟ୰୥୧୬	ሺୟ୤୲ୣ୰ ୣ୶ୡ୪୳ୢ୧୬୥ ୧୬୲ୣ୰ୣୱ୲ ୣ୶୮ୣ୬ୱୣୱሻ౟౪
୅୴ୣ୰ୟ୥ୣ ୭୤ ୣୟ୰୬୧୬୥ ୟୱୱୣ୲ୱ౟౪  
Risky loan portfolio (-)  
ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ Efficiency scores obtained from DEA    Bad management, bad luck (-) and skimping (+)  
ܧܨܨௌி஺ Efficiency scores obtained from SFA Bad management, bad luck (-) and skimping (+) 
∆ܩܦܲ Real growth of Gross Domestic Product  Prosperity (-) 
∆	݊݋݊ െ ݋݈݅	ܩܦܲ Non-oil GDP growth   Prosperity (-) 
∆ܫܯ Manufacturing and industry financing growth   Interaction with business cycle and real GDP (-) 
∆ܴܧܥ Real estate and construction of GCC banks financing growth  
Interaction with business 
cycle and real GDP (-) 
∆ܴܧܥܫܤ real estate, and construction financing growth of IB 
Interaction with business 
cycle and real GDP (-) 
∆ܫܤܣ Fully-fledged assets of IB to total assets growth  
Less risk in 
diversification (-), high 
risk in diversification (+)  
∆ܫܹܣ Islamic window assets to total assets growth 
Less risk in 
diversification (-), high 
risk in diversification (+) 
∆ܫܤܫܹܣ IB and Islamic window assets to total assets growth 
Less risk in 
diversification (-), high 
risk in diversification (+) 
∆ܥܤܣ CB assets to total assets growth    
Less risk in 
diversification (-), high 
risk in diversification (+) 
∆ܲܮܵ PLS contracts financing to total Islamic financing growth  
Less concentrated in 
transactions of IB 
(Unknown) 
∆ܨܫܦ FID contracts financing to total Islamic financing growth 
More concentrated in 
transactions of IB (+) 
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With regard to RWA to gross total assets ratio, the RWA is measured according to the 
Basel II Accord, which reflects definite requirements, including lending policies from 
bank regulators. It thus captures the credit risk of bank portfolios when considering 
some aspects such as the sort of debtor and the actual collateral and guarantees. 
Repullo and Suarez (2013) suggest, however, that the capital buffers under Basel II 
are not sufficient to counteract any recession on the supply of credit to bank debtors. 
In addition, De Lis et al. (2001) highlight that credit is likely to rise faster during 
expansion and slower during recession than GDP. Such arguments demonstrate key 
evidence as to the effects of financial crises and downturn on the business cycle, 
wherein the RWA increases because it utilises the capital buffers as one of the 
requirements in Basel II; a rise in this ratio leads to an increase in the present or future 
value of NPL. The link between RWA ratio and NPL is shown by Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) to be positive, given that increasing the credit risk in bank portfolios 
leads to an increase in NPL. Therefore, the relationship between RWA and NPL is 
predicted to be positive.      
Turning to performance and profitability ratios (including ROE and NIM), the ROE 
ratio is found to be negatively related to NPL in the study made by Louzis et al. 
(2012), which pointed out that due to the previous performance of bank management 
a negative link between ROE and NPL could be seen. This link reflects the 
management quality and the external effects of financial stability in the country which 
could have an influence on the bank performance, which is indicative of the ‘bad 
management’ and ‘bad luck’ hypotheses. In the short term, the ROE ratio may, 
however, have a positive relationship with NPL; for example, the bank may elevate 
the existing earnings at the cost of upcoming defaulted loans to enhance the 
profitability aspect in a market by utilising loan-loss provisions; such a credit policy is 
named a liberal policy or ‘pro-cyclical or lending policy’ (see: Gordy and Howells, 
2004; Louzis et al., 2012; Repullo and Suarez, 2013; and Adrian and Song Shin, 
2014). It should be noted that in this study the ROE ratio is examined in non-dynamic 
panel static models and in a dynamic model reflecting the effect of the previous year; 
this ratio is expected to have a negative sign with NPL.  
The term of NIM ratio is based on the annual margin profits, which are attained from 
the difference between interest income and expenses subjugated by earning assets 
127 
(Golin and Delhaise, 2013). Salas and Saurina (2002) stated that if NIM has declined 
then the credit diversification policy could be modified, and these changes can make 
loan portfolios more risky, which in turn increases the probability of defaulted loans. 
The sign of this variable with no lag is unpredictable, yet with one lag the NIM ratio is 
anticipated to be negative with NPL.   
As discussed in chapters three and four, the bank is considered to be an intermediary 
between investors and borrowers that transforms the input monetary sources to output 
quantities or products. The selected input-output variables to estimate efficiency 
scores are total deposits, short-term funding (DSF) and operating expenses (OE), 
including non-interest and personal expenses; the output variable is that of net loans 
(NL). In addition, bank efficiency is evaluated to detect how efficient the bank is at 
producing loans and, most importantly, to examine the relationship between 
efficiency and NPL. This in turn is instigated so as to investigate management 
behaviours when directing NPL, which can be explained by the terminology of Berger 
and DeYoung (1997): the ‘bad management’, ‘bad luck’, and ‘skimping’ hypotheses.  
In the case of the ‘bad management’ and ‘bad luck’ hypotheses, the relationship 
between bank efficiency and NPL is negative for several reasons. For instance, with 
the former hypothesis as an internal cause, the absence of management quality in 
monitoring loans expenses and collateral results in decreasing the efficiency and 
increasing loan problems. The state of the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis is held to be due to 
external factors, such as a downturn in the macroeconomic aspects which may create 
additional costs in administrating NPL, which instils an adverse effect on bank 
efficiency. On the other hand, the ‘skimping’ hypothesis indicates a positive 
relationship between efficiency and NPL. In the skimping policy position the bank 
tends to reduce the administrative expenses that are related to monitoring and 
controlling the borrowers; such a procedure thus makes the bank efficient and the 
NPL appear to be not affected, especially in the short term. Over time the loan 
performance problem does, however, appear because of defaulted loans as a large 
number of debtors become negligent.  
In the present study the influence of a bank’s efficiency on NPL is investigated in the 
present and on previous occasions. The present (or not lagged variables) is conducted 
to examine the relationship between Islamic banking efficiency and NPL, through 
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panel data models, whereas the dynamic panel (the effect of the previous year) is 
applied to examine the link between efficiency and NPL in the Gulf’s commercial 
bank sectors as a whole. As noted by Berger and DeYoung (1997), a bank may be 
affected by all of these three hypotheses. For instance, bad luck could occur as a result 
of economic crisis; at the same time bank management may make bad decisions by 
adopting a skimping policy to reduce costs; all of these procedures could result in an 
increase to NPL.             
5.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL PROCESS 
This section describes the factors that are utilised in this study for GCC Islamic 
banking with panel data econometric specifications as the first stage. Given that the 
nature of the data does not allow sophisticated analysis to be conducted, the impact of 
Islamic financing on NPL in GCC commercial banking as a whole is investigated by 
utilising dynamic panel (GMM) models. The empirical modelling is detailed in the 
research methodology section. 
After presenting the literature review of the available empirical studies and identifying 
the potential variables used in exploring and examining NPL, this section focuses on 
the research methodology of the study by detailing the empirical process, including 
the model selection. 
5.4.1 Panel Data Estimator  
The first aim of this study is to estimate the determinants of NPL for the IB and CB 
providing IW in the GCC region. In order to respond to this research question, the 
panel data method is considered to be the most efficient empirical econometrics 
model. The basic formula for the panel data method is shown in the following model 
as expressed in equation 5.1:  
ݕ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ 	ߚݔ௜௧ ൅ η௜ ൅ ߥ௜௧         (5.1) 
݅	denotes the number of banks		ሺ݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊ሻ, and ݐ represents the time-series ሺݐ ൌ
1,… , ݏሻ of the panel data sample; the dependent variable is	ݕ௜௧, which represents the  
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ratio of NPL to gross loans; this is suggested by Louzis et al. (2012). 15 In the 
modelling, a non-performing loan has occurred if it has been delayed up to ninety 
days by borrowers (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). The explanatory variables ݇	 ൈ 1 are 
symbolised by	ݔ௜௧ and	η௜, indicating the unobserved individual effects; ߥ௜௧ is the error 
term.  
During the empirical process in this study, both types of panel static models are 
applied: “fixed effects” (FE) models and “random effects” (RE) models. The 
difference between these two models is that in the FE model, the η௜ component is 
estimated under fixed parameter assumption, a matrix of individual dummies, and the 
remaining variance effects are random with	ߥ௜௧, which is distributed independently. In 
the RE model, the η௜ is, however, presumed to be a random component and 
independent of	ߥ௜௧ (Greene, 2007; Baltagi, 2008). As an initial estimate, the 
econometric specification OLS model is also applied. Among the FE and RE models, 
the Hausman test is utilised to distinguish the favourable model (Hausman, 1978).     
5.4.2 Dynamic Panel Data (GMM) Estimator  
The dynamic panel approach or GMM model is utilised to estimate the micro and 
macro factors that may determine NPL over time, which is proposed as in the 
following studies:  
(i) The GMM difference (GMM-DF) model developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), 
and by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
(ii) The GMM system (GMM-SYS) model developed by Arellano and Bover (1995).  
(iii) Estimating efficient dynamic panel data models for a small number of time-series 
observations (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
The general description of the dynamic panel model is defined in the following 
equation:  
                                                            
15 Many studies employed the transformed variable through truncated or logit transformation of NPL 
ratio as dependent variable (for example, Salas and Saurina, 2002 and Espinoza and Prasad, 2010). The 
present study does, however, utilise the numeral of NPL ratio without transformation because it shows 
more significant and precise results. Furthermore, Salas and Saurina (2002) pointed out that the 
transformation of dependent variable would not be suitable for the GMM process.           
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ݕ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚሺ݈ሻݔ௜௧ 	൅	η௜ ൅	ߥ௜௧, |α| ൏ 1    (5.2) 
ߚሺ݈ሻ symbolises the lag of estimate parameters; α represents the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable;	ݔ௜௧,	η௜, and ߥ௜௧ are described in the previous part related to 
panel data.    
The GMM model is based on the first difference transformation of equation 5.2, 
which can be rewritten as:  
∆ݕ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙ∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚሺ݈ሻ∆ݔ௜௧ 	൅ ∆ߥ௜௧       (5.3) 
∆ signifies that the first difference operator component and ߥ௜௧ component are not 
correlated over time ሾ(ܧ൫ߥ௜௧	ߥ௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൌ 0]. The dependent variable with one 
lag,	∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ, is correlated with error term ∆ߥ௜௧, leading to a biased estimation of the 
model. The dependent variable with two lags or more,	∆ݕ௜,௧ିଶ, is, however, correlated 
with ∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ and not with ∆ߥ௜௧, which can be used as an instrument variable of 
equation three. This then proceeds to the orthogonality restrictions description, 
starting with the following equation of moment conditions: 
ܧ൫ݕ௜,௧ି௦∆ߥ௜௧൯ ൌ 0	݂݋ݎ	ݐ ൌ 3,… . , ܶ	ܽ݊݀	ݏ ൒ 2     (5.4) 
The second case of moment conditions is when exploratory variables are strictly 
exogenous, which implies that over all time those variables are not correlated with the 
error term, as in the following formula:  
ܧ൫ݔ௜,௧ି௦∆ߥ௜௧൯ ൌ 0	݂݋ݎ	ݐ ൌ 3,… . , ܶ	       (5.5) 
For the case when explanatory variables are weakly exogenous or predetermined, 
such as ܧሺݔ௜௧ߥ௜௧ሻ ് 0	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ݐ ൏ ݏ, then the	ݔ௜௧ can be a valid instrument only with the 
specified lagged values, which involves the moment conditions as follows:  
ܧ൫ݔ௜,௧ି௦∆ߥ௜௧൯ ൌ 0	݂݋ݎ	ݐ ൌ 3,… . , ܶ	ܽ݊݀	ݏ ൒ 2     (5.6) 
If ܼ௜ is the matrix element of instrumental variables then according to Bond (2002) 
the equation (5.6) can be rewritten as:  
ܧሺܼ′௜∆ߥ௜௧ሻ ൌ 0    (5.7) 
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The GMM model built on moment conditions that diminish the criterion as expressed 
in the following equation: 
ܬ௡ ൌ 	 ቀଵ௡	∑ ∆ߥ′௜ݖ௜௡௜ୀଵ ቁ	 ௡ܹ 	ቀ
ଵ
௡	∑ ݖ′௜∆ߥ௜௡௜ୀଵ ቁ																																																							 (5.8)  
By utilising the weight matrix: 
௡ܹ ൌ 	 ቂଵ௡	∑ ሺݖ′௜ܪݖ௜ሻ௡௜ୀଵ ቃ
ିଵ																																																																																		  (5.9) 
ܪ is an individual specific matrix. The previous equations (5.4 and 5.9) form the basis 
of the GMM one-step estimator, which is efficient if the error terms are 
homoscedastic. Indeed, there are two types of GMM estimators: one-step and two-
step estimates. In addition, Windmeijer (2005) pointed out that the GMM two-step 
estimate with corrected errors asymptotically could achieve better results than the 
one-step estimator. The data sample of this study is, however, relatively small; the 
one-step GMM model is therefore preferred in the present study. Thus, in such a 
sample, the standard errors do not allow for additional variations to construct the 
weight matrix (Bond, 2002; Bond and Windmeijer, 2005; Windmeijer, 2005).  
In order to examine the autocorrelation, the Arellano-Bond approach is utilised with 
first-order (AR1) and second-order (AR2) serial correlation; the former is applied to 
detect the serial correlation in differenced error terms when given the following: 
∆ߥ௜௧ ൌ 	 ߥ௜௧ െ ߥ௜,௧ିଵ	, and      (5.10a)   
∆ߥ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ 	 ߥ௜,௧ିଵ െ ߥ௜,௧ିଶ      (5.10b)   
Both previous equations, (10a) and (10b), share the  ߥ௜,௧ିଵ term. The later test is used 
to check the serial correlation in levels for first-order. Further, Sargan/Hansen joint 
tests are applied and reported after the GMM estimation to indicate the validity of 
instrumental variables with the objective of making sure that they are not endogenous 
to the differences of the error term.16 
In addition to applying the difference GMM estimator, this study applies the GMM 
system estimator; the latter differs from the former by exploiting additional moment 
                                                            
16 Some lags are invalid as instruments; for example, if ݕ௜,௧ିଶ as an instrument is endogenous to the 
differences in the error term that leads to an invalid instrument (Roodman, 2009).   
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conditions, ܶ െ 2, to the moment conditions in the first differences model. Blundell 
and Bond (1998) stated that the performance of the GMM system estimator could be 
less biased and more accurate, especially if	ߙ is large. The form of this estimator can 
be written in the following equation:  
ܧ൫ݑ௜௧	∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൌ ܧ ቀሺߟ௜ ൅	ݒ௜௧ሻ∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵቁ        
ൌ ܧ ቀ൫ݕ௜௧ െ	ݕ௜,௧ିଵ൯∆ݕ௜,௧ିଵቁ ൌ 0        (5.11) 
5.4.3 Econometric Specification  
Table 5.1 describes the utilised variables that may affect and determine the NPL of the 
GCC banks, starting with the basic estimate model:    
ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅	∑ ߚଵ௞ܴܹܣ௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ௞∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅	η௜ ൅	ߥ௜௧,											and 
 |α| ൏ 1, ݅ ൌ 1,… . ,51, ݐ ൌ 1,… . ,7	             (5.12) 
ܰܲܮ௜௧ denotes the average of impaired or default loans to gross loans per year, and 
the estimated α of ܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ should be positive; ܴܹܣ measures the ratio of RWA to 
total assets. This variable is utilised under the assumption of weak exogeneity with 
bank-level factors, which indicates that endogeneity and potential correlation matter 
with error term over time (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al., 2012). To avoid the 
correlation problem, such a variable is therefore computed with two lags or more for 
the first difference transformed form in equation 5.3. The last variable in the basic 
estimate model is that of the real GDP growth rate, and although	∆ܩܦܲ is assumed to 
be strictly exogenous, the GDP growth and the other additional variables (treated as 
predetermined) in the following models are instrumented by themselves “IV-style” 
(Roodman, 2009).     
A selection of variables was added to the basic model to account for the micro- and 
macro-level factors; initially, this is to investigate the relationship between bank 
efficiency and NPL in the effects on the present and previous year. The following 
equation is estimated: 
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ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൌ
ߙܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௞ܴܹܣ௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ௞∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ߚଷ௞ܧܨܨ஽ா஺,ௌி஺௜௧ ൅
∑ ߚସ௞ܧܨܨ஽ா஺,ௌி஺௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅η௜ ൅ 	ߥ௜௧																																				    (5.13) 
ܧܨܨ஽ா஺,ௌி஺	separately	represents the efficiency scores that are computed by utilising 
the output distance function via the DEA under the variable return to scale 
assumption. In addition, to justify the efficiency scores that are obtained through the 
DEA method and to conduct the robustness check, the stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA) is utilised by applying Cob-Douglas production function (see chapters two and 
three). After that and to examine the non-oil GDP growth impacts on NPL, the 
following formula is estimated:  
ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൌ ߙܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௞ܴܹܣ௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଷ௞∆ܩܦܲ௡௢௡௢௜௟௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ η௜ ൅	ߥ௜௧			      (5.14)  
In order to test the hypothesis of a bank’s profitability effect on NPL, bank-level 
variables are included with the basic model as follows:  
ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൌ ߙܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௞ܴܹܣ௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ௞∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଷ௞ݔ௛௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅η௜ ൅ 	ߥ௜௧		 (5.15)  
ݔ௛ represents bank-level variables, which are ROE and NIM. Accordingly and 
corresponding to the impact of bank-type and assets-size on NPL, other variables 
related to banking-sector development are tested in the econometric specification, 
which is written as:  
ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൌ ߙܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௞ܴܹܣ௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ௞∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚଷ௞∆ݔ௭௜௧ି௞ଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅η௜ ൅ 	ߥ௜௧				(5.16)  
∆ݔ௭ denotes the asset growth of IB, IW and CB.  
The equation 5.17 captures the dynamic effect of construction and real-estate sector 
financing on NPL: 
ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൌ ߙܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅෍ߚଵ௞ܴܹܣ௜௧ି௞
ଵ
௞ୀ଴
൅෍ߚଶ௞∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ି௞
ଵ
௞ୀ଴
൅෍ߚଷ௞∆ݔோா஼,ோா஼ூ஻௜௧ି௞
ଵ
௞ୀ଴
൅η௜ ൅ 	ߥ௜௧		 
        (5.17)  
∆ݔܴܧܥ,ܴܧܥܫܤ symbolises the growth of the real estate and construction aspects of the 
banking sector financing and IB financing for real estate and constructions.  
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Finally, in terms of Islamic finance modes, it is essential for this study to examine the 
relationship between NPL and Islamic finance contracts, such as PLS contracts and 
FID contracts. Thus, the following equation aims to investigate such a dynamic 
relationship between those variables: 
ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൌ ߙܰܲܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅෍ߚଵ௞ܴܹܣ௜௧ି௞
ଵ
௞ୀ଴
൅෍ߚଶ௞∆ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ି௞
ଵ
௞ୀ଴
൅෍ߚଷ௞∆ܫܨܯ௉௅ௌ,ிூ஽௜௧ି௞
ଶ
௞ୀଵ
൅η௜ ൅ 	ߥ௜௧	 
(5.18)  
ܫܨܯ௉௅ௌ,ிூ஽ denotes the individual change in PLS and FID contracts.  
 
5.4.4 Data Sample 
The annual financial statements of all of the GCC countries for seven years from 2005 
to 2011 (with the exception of Oman due to the absence of Islamic banking in the 
country for the period in question) were acquired from Bankscope under the 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) in US dollars. Other foreign banks that have 
branches which operate in the GCC region are excluded from the sample.  
Table 5.2 displays the summary descriptive statistics of the variables utilised for the 
panel data and dynamic panel data (GMM) estimators.  
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Table 5.2- Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.  Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.  
Panel data sample of IB and CB with IW  Dynamic panel data (GMM) of all banks 
NPL 3.51    3.83      0 23.72 NPL 4.90 7.60 0       56.86 
RWA 72.76     23.40     0 110.04 RWA 72.27 24.99 0 133.37 
ROE 14.76  11.51     -58.36    52.77 ROE 12.03 55.94 -946.11   52.77 
NIM 3.41 1.4       1.2      13.53 NIM 3.49 1.37 1.2       13.53 
DSF 20419.2   21482.2   98.4000   103478 DSF 17048.6 19062.6 98.40     103478 
OE 360.076   359.622   4.50000   1914.47 OE 1069.52 4524.00 4.50      39960.1 
NL 15250.3   16749.4   50.6800   89608.5 NL 13284.2 15251.5 50.68     89608.5   
lnDSF 9.242     1.366     4.589     11.547 lnDSF 9.051 1.332 4.589     11.55 
lnOE 5.355     1.141     1.504     7.557 lnOE 5.258 1.45 1.504     10.60 
lnNL 8.952     1.364     3.925     11.403 lnNL 8.84 1.312 3.997     11.46 
ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ 0.646    0.176 0.054  1 ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ 62.17 17.08 5.38 100 
ܧܨܨௌி஺ 0.787 0.085    0.357   0.965 ܧܨܨௌி஺ 81.98 6.79 38.24 96.80 
∆RECIB 30.374   26.97 -9.637  98.262 ∆IBA 5.19 16.33 -17.43    70.83 
∆PLS 286.356   1188.94   -46.345  5415.92 ∆IWA 71.92 147.40 -14.25    709.70 
∆FID -0.523     2.845  -8.653  5.191 ∆IBIWA 13.46 27.49 -10.74    143.13 
∆GDP 6.38    5.53     -5.2     18.8 ∆CBA -0.50 2.30 -6.68    9.25 
     ∆RECIB 47.52 39.82 -26.23    135.60 
     ∆REC 31.21 28.15 -9.64    98.25 
     ∆IM 23.45 25.77 -16.11    134.80 
     ∆PLS 174.10 936.62 -46.34    5415.93 
     ∆FID -0.318 2.231 -8.653    5.191 
     ∆GDP 5.52 5.16 -5.2      18.6 
     ∆Non-oil 
GDP 
6.37 8.60 -7.2 36.1 
Notes: DSF, OE, NL and the natural logarithm of their number (ln) are utilised to compute efficiency 
scores; they are presented in USD million. The minimum ratio of ROE is shown by the Gulf Bank 
(KSC) in Kuwait during 2008.    
 
The empirical sample is therefore limited to fourteen domestic IB and thirty-eight 
domestic CB, which are comprised of: 
(i) Three IB and nine CB that provide sharia-compliant windows in Saudi Arabia. 
(ii) Four IB, three CB that provide sharia-compliant windows and eleven CB in the 
UAE; 
(iii) Two IB, two CB that provide sharia-compliant windows and three CB in Bahrain. 
(iv) Two IB, four CB that provide sharia-compliant windows and one conventional 
bank in Qatar.  
(v) Three IB and five CB in Kuwait.  
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In addition, all of the annual variables utilised to compute efficiency scores are 
converted to suitable real prices according to the GDP deflator in 2005. Other micro- 
and macro-economic variables are drawn from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the 
Islamic Research and Training Institute (as a member of the Islamic Development 
Bank through its website), the world databank through the website of the World Bank 
Organization, and The Banker (various issues).  
5.5 THE TRENDS OF NPL IN THE GCC COUNTRIES: DESCRIPTIVE 
INFERENCES  
When understanding and contextualising the concept of problem loans, it is important 
to observe the magnitude of the problem. Thus, this section aims to determine the 
trends of NPL in the GCC countries covered by this study. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the NPL, as a ratio of GDP in each country, increased 
sharply, with the exception of Qatar, and it reached its peak in 2009. In particular, in 
the case of the UAE it reached its peak in 2009, which can be explained by the impact 
of the global financial crises. As indicated in the figures, NPL rose significantly in 
Kuwait during 2009 because of real estate financing and equities. In addition, from 
the perspective of an individual bank, the Gulf Bank in 2008 had higher losses due to 
derivatives transactions linked to clients. In the UAE, during 2009, the NPL increased, 
one of the main reason for this increase is that the Central Bank authorised 
instructions to classify loans to the Saudi Arabian conglomerates, namely the 
Algosaibi and Al-Saad groups, as bad loans (Khamis et al., 2010: 5). However, the 
impact of the global financial crisis should also be considered on the increase in the 
NPL, as Dubai, one of the Emirates, went through financial difficulties and was bailed 
out by Abu Dhabi. With regard to the GDP trends, the real GDP growth declined 
dramatically in 2009 without exception, especially in Kuwait and the UAE. The initial 
observations from the figures indicate that GDP growth comparatively diminishes 
NPL.         
When reflecting on the economic realities of the region, it should be noted that the 
non-oil GDP growth could have a significant impact on NPL in the GCC banks, for 
oil prices in the Gulf countries have remained constantly high over the period from 
2005 to 2010 and have steadily increased the revenues (Khamis et al., 2010: 6). In 
support of the previous statement, Espinoza and Prasad (2010) argued that non-oil 
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GDP would be a better selection criterion for NPL, given that the oil companies are 
owned by the government and loans are therefore not defaulted by them. In addition, 
the oil revenues spread to the non-oil channels in the economy, such as through public 
spending and household expenditures; they thus claimed that it would be better to 
investigate this impact through the real non-oil GDP growth. Consequently, the 
increase in non-oil real GDP is expected to result in a decline in NPL, meaning that 
the relationship between these two variables is expected to be negative.17  
 
                                                            
17 The non-oil real GDP growth variable is taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit reports, 
through the real change in origin of GDP (%) in all sectors with the exception of industry, because this 
sector is heavily dependent on oil and petrochemical companies.      
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Figure 5.1- The Ratio of NPL and Real GDP Growth in the GCC 
 
Saudi Arabia    The UAE 
 
Bahrain       Qatar  
 
Kuwait 
 
Data Source: Bankscope and the World Bank Group. 
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In general, NPL are systematically affected by macroeconomic performance and 
business cycles (Nkusu, 2011). For both Domowitz and Sartain (1999) and Salas and 
Saurina (2002), the risk level can be structured according to the type of loan, with the 
highest risk-level loans being for real estate and construction, followed by those for 
trade and industrial sectors, credit card debt and household loans and mortgages. 
When reflecting on a financing breakdown and its impact on NPL within the GCC, 
Figure 5.2 depicts the sectoral financing growth rates for the real estate and 
construction financing growth (RECFG), the IB’ real estate and construction financing 
growth (RECFGIB), and the manufacturing investment financing growth (MIFG) for 
each country. Over the study period, the patterns for RECFG, RECFGIB and MIFG in 
each country indicate that they were influenced by the financial crisis in 2009. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the observed trends in these sectors virtually 
correspond with the trends for the real GDP growth in Figure 5.1. Thus, the trend 
movements in these sectors show that they were affected by economic downturn and 
financial crisis, especially the RECFGIB. Indeed, in Saudi Arabia the RECFGIB was 
relatively higher than the RECFG and the MIFG, whereas in the UAE it was higher 
than other financial sectors over the period from 2005 to 2007, yet it has fluctuated 
more than the RECFG in Bahrain and Qatar.18 Thus, the business cycle is an 
important determining factor of NPL. Despite the differences in the risk-taking level 
in each sector, increasing the bank financing for such sectors, which potentially is 
more related to the real GDP growth, is expected to have a negative relationship with 
NPL. 
  
                                                            
18 The rationale for including Islamic financing in the real estate and construction industries can be 
attributed to the majority of the financing in the Islamic banking sector being allocated to this particular 
sector; for instance, the average percentage of this financing sector to the total financing of IB reached 
approximately 35% from 2008 to 2010.  (See Figure 5 in the appendix).  
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Figure 5.2- Sectoral Financing Growth in the GCC’s Banking Sector 
Saudi Arabia    The UAE 
 
Bahrain        Qatar 
 
Kuwait 
 
Data Source: The Central Bank of Saudi Arabia (SAMA), the Central Bank of the 
UAE, the Central Bank of Bahrain, the Central Bank of Qatar, the Central Bank of 
Kuwait and the Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
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It should be noted that the aggregate of PLS contracts which are operated by IB in the 
GCC is relatively small when compared with FID instruments, as there is a strong 
preference for FID due to their less risky nature. For instance, in 2011 the PLS 
contracts as a proportion of total Islamic financing contracts accounted for 0.6%, 
9.9%, 6.2% and 2.3% in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar respectively. 
Thus, IB prefer to operate through cost-plus sale or FID instruments as a substitute for 
credit and loans in CB (Hassan and Lewis, 2007; Ayub, 2007; Ahmed, 2011). This 
trend can easily be observed in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3- The PLS Contracts to Total Islamic Financing Contracts 
 
Data Source: Islamic Research and Training Institute Database. 
 
As displayed in Figure 5.3, the ratio of PLS financing to total financing for IB has not 
even reached 18% in the UAE; the lowest percentage appears in the (Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia) KSA IB and it is only around 1%. In comparison, Figure 5.4 depicts the 
share of FID transactions in the total financing for each country. The share of FID 
generally fluctuated between 85% and above, which implies that IB in GCC countries 
have relied heavily on FID type financing instruments, particularly murabahah 
financing. From the financing portfolios in IB, it can be noted that the managers in IB 
do avoid higher levels of risk. Even in the presence of well-monitored credit policy, 
these IB may control the default loans by increasing the admission fees in such 
transactions. This action ultimately could have a negative impact on the business 
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cycle and real GDP growth, which may then increase the NPL. Although FID 
contracts are more favoured in the operations of IB than PLS modes due to the less 
risky nature of these instruments, the impact of the former group could be positive 
with NPL, whereas the directional nature of PLS contracts on NPL cannot be 
predicted.  
 
Figure 5.4- The Rate of FID Contracts to Total Islamic Financing Contracts   
 
 
Note: At some points the rate of FID instruments has been over 100% because the total of IF 
modes is calculated after deducting the provisions, where most of those provisions are 
concentrated in murabahah transactions.    
Data Source: Islamic Research and Training Institute Database. 
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5.6.1 Panel Data Findings  
This section presents the results to describe the relationship between NPL and 
explanatory variables in the sampled IB and CB that provide IW in the GCC countries 
via OLS (with cluster robust), FE models and RE models.19  
Table 5.3 shows that the Hausman specification test clearly rejects the null hypothesis 
for Model 1, implying that the RE estimate significantly differs from the FE estimate. 
Therefore, the FE specification is preferred, yet in Model 2 the null hypothesis is 
accepted, meaning that both estimators, FE and RE, are consistent and that 
systematically there is no difference. Thus, in this case the RE estimator is preferred. 
Model 2 is, however, conducted to check the robustness of the Model 1 estimation, 
especially with regard to the direction of the obtained efficiency scores from the DEA 
and SFA methods. The coefficient of the RWA variable is statistically significant in all 
panel data estimators and positively related to NPL, which is in line with the study 
made by Berger and DeYoung (1997), which specifies that a rise in RWA, indicating a 
higher credit risk portfolio, leads to an increase in NPL of around 3%.     
With regard to the estimated coefficients of performance and profitability ratios, ROE 
and NIM, the relationship between ROE and NPL is negative and significant in all of 
the estimated models. This result indicates that a decrease in ROE leads to an increase 
in the NPL by about 12%, suggesting that the short-term effect of the management of 
IB and IW may be not efficient enough when controlling the credit risk portfolios. 
This could verify the ‘bad management’ hypothesis, which is consistent with the study 
made by Louzis et al. (2012). Furthermore, in the contrary positions bank 
management seems to be efficient; this indicates that another potential case may occur 
which is illustrated by figures 5.3 and 5.4. Essentially, the financing portfolios of the 
GCC banks depend on FID contracts which account for more than 80% of total 
financing; in the short term the profits could thus increase dramatically due to the 
heavy reliance on these contracts, which could in turn lead to a rise in the ROE.  
In the case of the NIM variable, the estimated coefficient shows a positive impact on 
NPL, implying that increasing the NIM boosts NPL by about 42%. Thus, the findings 
                                                            
19 To detect for a  multicollinearity problem, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is utilised in all of the 
panel data estimate models; according to this test it is found that in each of the explanatory variables 
the value of VIF is less than 1.30, which signifies that there is no multicollinearity (Greene, 2007: E5-
18). This test is presented in the appendix section.    
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provide evidence that the transactions of IB and IF tend to be riskier than other 
counterparties, specifically when PLS contracts are involved, wherein these 
transactions could produce a significant profit, but they are riskier than FID and other 
financial contracts that lead to higher defaulted loans.     
As can be seen in Table 5.3, the efficiency coefficient is significant in all of the panel 
data estimators and associated negatively with NPL, proving, in the short term, the 
‘bad management’ hypothesis in IB and CB with IW. It should be noted that the 
observed negative relationship supports the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis resulting from the 
stock market downturn in 2006 within most of the GCC countries, in addition to the 
global financial crisis over the period from 2008 to 2009 (Khamis et al., 2010). All of 
these external factors might have contributed to creating higher costs in administering 
bank solvency and problem loans, which have an adverse effect on efficiency.  
 
Table 5.3- Panel Data Estimate Results for Models 1 and 2 (with Bank-level and 
Macroeconomic Variables) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 OLS robust FE RE OLS robust FE RE 
Variables  NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
RWA 0.0165 0.0368*** 0.0319** 0.0146 0.0269* 0.0258** 
 (0.0151) (0.0140) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0130) 
ROE -0.114* -0.145*** -0.123*** -0.128** -0.146*** -0.131*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0251) (0.0230) (0.0605) (0.0254) (0.0228) 
NIM 0.185 0.792*** 0.429* 0.199 0.775*** 0.423* 
 (0.221) (0.282) (0.227) (0.231) (0.286) (0.226) 
ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ -4.341 -10.65*** -7.140***    
 (3.092) (2.557) (2.150)    
ܧܨܨௌி஺    -10.19** -18.71*** -14.76*** 
    (4.686) (5.118) (4.498) 
∆GDP -0.0599* -0.0213 -0.0541 -0.0473 -0.0387 -0.0550 
 (0.0302) (0.0655) (0.0558) (0.0310) (0.0659) (0.0557) 
Constant 6.605** 7.473*** 6.429*** 12.04** 16.17*** 14.02*** 
 (2.958) (2.071) (1.867) (4.388) (4.275) (3.813) 
       
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 
R-squared 0.214 0.310  0.216 0.294  
Number of banks  31 31  31 31 
Chi2(3) 
Hausman  Prob>chi2 
 10.53 
0.06 
 6.5 
0.26 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The findings of Model 3 are depicted in Table 5.4. The Hausman test results indicate 
the acceptance of the null hypothesis, thereby illustrating that both estimators are 
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consistent and that the RE estimator is favourable. By looking at the variables related 
to Islamic financing contracts and despite the coefficient of PLS growth rate being 
relatively small, it is statistically significant and it has a negative relationship with 
NPL. This finding demonstrates that the nature of PLS contracts is riskier than other 
Islamic financing contracts, and increasing transactions with such instruments in the 
short term may lead to a decline in NPL, given that a higher risk financing portfolio, 
namely PLS-oriented contracts, could bring higher revenue.  
As the results in Table 5.4 show, the FID variable represents a significant and positive 
relationship with NPL, which corresponds to the expectations of this study, implying 
that due to risk-level-related reasons the financing portfolios of most of the IB in the 
GCC countries concentrate on FID-oriented contracts due to the high risk associated 
with PLS contracts.  
In relation to macro-level factors, the results in Table 5.4 show that the real GDP 
growth coefficient illustrates a negative link with NPL (from 5% to 10%), supporting 
the ‘prosperity’ hypothesis and implying that the growth in real macroeconomic terms 
has a direct but adverse impact on NPL. In addition, the growth rate of RECIB 
financing has a significant and negative impact on NPL, signifying that an increase in 
financing such sectors by 1% led to a decline in NPL by about 3%. Such findings 
suggest the interaction between real GDP and the business cycle related to RECIB is 
high and that the growth of both variables decreases the NPL. This can be explained 
by the fact that IB in the GCC countries are more exposed to real estate market risk 
because they have heavily directed their financing to this particular sector20.   
  
                                                            
20 See Appendix Chapter 5 Figure 5, which illustrates the average of financing percentage for each 
sector to total financing in IB in GCC countries, where the proportion of the real estate and construction 
sector has increased gradually since 2005 and has remained at the highest level among other sectors in 
2009 and 2010.    
146 
Table 5.4- Panel Data Estimate Results for the Model 3 (with Organisational, 
Product-Development and Macroeconomic Variables) 
 Model 3 
 OLS robust FE RE 
Variables NPL NPL NPL 
RWA 0.0086 0.0248* 0.0201 
 (0.011) (0.0140) (0.0131) 
∆PLS -0.00069*** -0.00043** -0.0005*** 
 (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) 
∆FID 0.210*** 0.174** 0.187** 
 (0.065) (0.0752) (0.0737) 
∆RECIB -0.033*** -0.0250*** -0.0272*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0054) (0.0052) 
∆GDP -0.111*** -0.105 -0.108** 
 (0.0377) (0.066) (0.054) 
Constant 5.361*** 3.625*** 4.112*** 
 (1.462) (1.259) (1.202) 
    
Observations 198 198 198 
R-squared 0.240 0.236  
Number of banks  31 31 
Chi2(3) 
Hausman  Prob>chi2 
 3.12 
0.68 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
5.6.2 Dynamic Panel Data (GMM) Findings  
The GMM analysis is conducted to analyse the obtained findings that describe the 
relationship between NPL and the independent variables, which are bank-level and 
macro-level variables, including the impact of Islamic financing on NPL in the GCC 
banks, by estimating five dynamic econometric models. These models include OLS, 
two-stage least squares (2SLS), FE panel data, GMM-difference and GMM-system. 
All of these econometrics specifications are utilised in order to check the robustness 
test for each of the estimated coefficients in terms of direction and statistical 
significance.21 In addition, the Arellano-Bond p-values test of autocorrelation, namely 
AR(1) for first-order, is conducted to detect the correlation of residuals through the 
differences in error terms, which must be less than 1% (0.1) to reject the hypothesis 
that the random error process is correlated through individual, and AR(2) for second 
                                                            
21 2SLS is preferred in order to maximise the sample size, especially in the case of short panel, with 
levels estimator through the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator, because the instrumental variable is 
instrumented with lags rather than differences (Roodman, 2009: 105-106).Again as reported for panel 
data estimates, a multicollinearity problem is detected through VIF in all dynamic estimators and it is 
found that for each explanatory variable the value of VIF is less than 1.30, with the exception of 
efficiency scores as the values of VIF are about 4.50 for DEA estimate and around 2.80 for SFA 
estimate; this indicates that there is no multicollinearity (Greene, 2007: E5-18). The test is shown in the 
appendix. 
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order is estimated to test the autocorrelation in first-order levels. The p-value here 
must be more than 10% (1.0), thus, to accept the hypothesis that error terms are 
autocorrelated as a full disturbance but not through levels.22 All of these p-values are 
reported in all of the estimated models, along with the p-value of the Hansen test, 
which is estimated for the validity of instrumental variables. 
It should be noted that in this model, NPL and RWA are utilised as endogenous bank-
level variables via 2SLS and GMM estimates with two and three lags. Thus, in the 
2SLS estimate, the NPL-dependent variable with one lag is instrumented. Although in 
the GMM estimates (as described in section 5.4.3), RWA is assumed to be a weak 
exogenous bank-level variable, meaning that the decision-makers of a bank’s 
management take into consideration the future expected amount of NPL; the other 
independent variables that relate to macro-level are treated as being under 
predetermined assumption. Variables associated with bank-specific or micro-level 
factors are therefore predetermined (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al., 2012). In 
other words, they are instrumented by themselves “IV-style” (Roodman, 2009).         
In all estimated models from four to twenty, the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and statistically significant in most of these models; it has a 
coefficient of less than one, which is in line with the study made by Salas and Saurina 
(2002). Such findings imply that NPL are likely to be increased due to previous NPL.     
In Table 5.5, Model 4 and Model 5 represent the baseline specification and the 
estimator model, including non-oil GPD growth as an independent variable. The 
baseline estimate shows a significant p-value of first-order autocorrelation and no 
serial correlation in the second-order, implying that the estimators are consistent; the 
Hansen test confirms the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are valid. The 
coefficients of explanatory variables have the anticipated sign, and they are significant 
in all estimators with the exception of the coefficient of GDP growth in the GMM-
system estimator. The p-value of second-order serial correlation suggests, however, 
that the GMM estimators of Model 5 are not consistent; the findings of this model 
therefore cannot be relied on.         
                                                            
22 See Roodman (2009:119-121).  
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By looking at all of the estimators of variables for RWA and GDP in Table 5.5, it can 
be seen that the coefficient of RWA is positive with not more than 0.18 and that is 
significant in most specifications. The implication of this variable is that NPL are 
likely to increase due to increasing the previous credit risk of banks’ portfolios. In 
terms of macroeconomic variables and as can be seen from the results, the GDP 
coefficient is negative and significant in several models, suggesting that a rise in the 
real GDP growth in the previous year leads to a decrease in the NPL from 10% to 
20%. In addition, the relationship between the lagged variable of non-oil GDP growth 
and NPL is negative; it is also in line with the expectations of this study, yet this result 
could be biased and misleading.   
In terms of bank-specific variables, Table 5.6 shows the results of models 6 and 7. As 
the results indicate, according to the p-values of AR(1) and AR(2) and the Hansen 
test, it is presumed that both models are consistent (at 10% for AR(1) in GMM-system 
model); the instrumental variables are also valid. The coefficient of the performance 
variable, namely ROE, is negative and significant with NPL at about 2%, which is in 
line with the expectations of this study. This result implies the presence of previous 
bad decisions on the part of bank management, which prompts a decrease in bank 
performance and thus results in an increase of NPL. Likewise, the profitability ratio 
NIM has a negative and significant impact of approximately 2% on NPL, suggesting 
that the modification in credit policy due to the previous decline in NIM could raise 
the risk-level in the loans portfolio, which in turn increases NPL.    
With regard to the link between bank performance and NPL, the findings through 
banks’ efficiency scores as modelled by Model 8 and Model 9 are presented in Table 
5.7. AR(1) and AR(2) results guarantee the consistency of estimators; the Hansen test 
also asserts the validity of the utilised instrumental variables. The not-lagged 
coefficient of efficiency is negatively related with NPL and statistically significant in 
all of the estimated models, with the exception of the GMM-DF estimate, suggesting 
that a decline in a bank’s efficiency contributes to an increase of around 10% in NPL. 
This finding indicates the ‘bad management’ hypothesis in the GCC’s banks, which 
could reflect the management quality; this result in turn corresponds with the panel 
data findings in the earlier section. This adverse impact could point to the ‘bad luck’ 
hypothesis in the sense of external factors relating to macroeconomics affecting the 
149 
GCC’s bank performance.23 The one year lagged coefficient of efficiency is, however, 
linked to NPL with positive sign, which should be considered as an indication of the 
‘skimping’ hypothesis, signifying bank policy in reducing credit administration 
expenses to increase the level of efficiency. The results do, however, indicate that a 
failure to monitor debtors in the previous year led to an increase in NPL. In addition, 
Model 9 is conducted to ensure the validity and direction of efficiency scores that 
were obtained via the DEA approach and utilised in Model 8.  The coefficients of the 
SFA efficiency scores are not significant and slightly higher than the DEA 
coefficients; however, they are in the same directions. 
 
                                                            
23 In 2006 the stock markets of Gulf countries dropped; they then recovered from 22% to 60% in 2007. 
As a result of the financial global crisis in 2008, the market declined by 29% to 73%. Furthermore, in 
2008 the central banks pressed liquidity to the financial system directly through long-term government 
deposits and indirectly through repos (see: Khamis et al., 2010: 10-29). 
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Table 5.5- Baseline Model (Model 4) and Estimated Model (Model 5) (including Non-Oil GDP) 
 Model 4 (Baseline estimate) Model 5 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF 
GMM-
SYS OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.934*** 0.948*** 0.509*** 0.427** 0.925*** 0.946*** 0.954*** 0.946*** 0.521*** 0.933***
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.124) (0.197) (0.0501) (0.0225) (0.0529) (0.0225) (0.188) (0.0468) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0179** 0.0174* 0.034*** 0.0652** 0.084*** 0.0182** 0.0156* 0.0182** 0.083*** 0.084***
 (0.008) (0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0328) (0.0241) (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0309) (0.0238) 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.08*** -0.065** -0.16*** -0.16** -0.0494      
 (0.025) (0.0277) (0.0484) (0.0671) (0.0379)      
∆݊݋݊ െ ݋݈݅	ܩܦܲି ଵ      -0.060** -0.068** -0.060** -0.064** -0.047* 
      (0.0245) (0.0303) (0.0245) (0.0266) (0.0245) 
Constant -0.134 -0.0936 1.049  -5.15*** -0.274 0.118 -0.274  -5.23***
 (0.69) (0.821) (0.814)  (1.997) (0.702) (0.886) (0.702)  (2.000) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.825 0.805 0.346   0.826 0.808    
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    31 42    31 42 
Hansen test p-value    0.29 0.41    0.13 0.29 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.00 0.07    0.01 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.17 0.17    0.08 0.12 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ 
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆݊݋݊ െ ݋݈݅ ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.6- Bank-Level (Financial Ratio) Model 6 and Model 7 
 Model 6 Model 7 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.913*** 0.945*** 0.473*** 0.454*** 0.907*** 0.934*** 0.949*** 0.508*** 0.420** 0.917*** 
 (0.038) (0.0517) (0.122) (0.171) (0.059) (0.028) (0.056) (0.13) (0.199) (0.052) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0167** 0.0174** 0.028*** 0.0590** 0.079*** 0.0190** 0.0196** 0.034*** 0.0647* 0.076*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.0282) (0.023) (0.0084) (0.009) (0.008) (0.034) (0.022) 
ܴܱܧିଵ -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.017***      
 (0.0011) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.001)      
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.072*** -0.0562** -0.161*** -0.153** -0.0424 -0.082*** -0.0694** -0.160*** -0.157** -0.0521 
 (0.0246) (0.0277) (0.0486) (0.067) (0.038) (0.024) (0.0273) (0.049) (0.066) (0.036) 
ܰܫܯିଵ      -0.161** -0.235** -0.193 -1.145*** -0.329** 
      (0.0791) (0.0947) (0.262) (0.343) (0.144) 
Constant 0.242 0.0615 1.867**  -4.555** 0.342 0.543 1.709  -3.431* 
 (0.693) (0.789) (0.778)  (1.955) (0.721) (0.884) (1.345)  (1.75) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.847 0.830 0.462   0.825 0.806 0.346   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 42    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.30 0.50    0.31 0.56 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.02 0.10    0.00 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.31 0.19    0.14 0.16 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ܴܱܧିଵ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ܰܫܯିଵ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.7- NPL and Bank Efficiency (DEA and SFA) – Model 8 and Model 9 
 Model 8 Model 9 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.923*** 0.944*** 0.503*** 0.409** 0.908*** 0.929*** 0.949*** 0.517*** 0.387* 0.909*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0554) (0.113) (0.195) (0.0391) (0.0258) (0.0597) (0.120) (0.198) (0.0387) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0156* 0.0140 0.032*** 0.0362 0.075*** 0.0171** 0.0151* 0.030*** 0.0343 0.081*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0321) (0.0236) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0074) (0.0345) (0.0254) 
ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ -0.100** -0.102* -0.098* -0.0629 -0.089**      
 (0.0407) (0.0515) (0.0512) (0.0534) (0.0450)      
ܧܨିܨ ଵ஽ா஺ 0.0908** 0.0930* 0.0738* 0.107** 0.0657      
 (0.0366) (0.0508) (0.0399) (0.0455) (0.0406)      
ܧܨܨௌி஺      -0.198* -0.192 -0.172 -0.164 -0.219 
      (0.114) (0.167) (0.132) (0.139) (0.138) 
ܧܨିܨ ଵௌி஺      0.185* 0.183 0.222* 0.284* 0.136 
      (0.106) (0.168) (0.132) (0.168) (0.108) 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.078*** -0.0597** -0.164*** -0.159** -0.0539 -0.085*** -0.0687** -0.155*** -0.173** -0.0629* 
 (0.0268) (0.0291) (0.0497) (0.0693) (0.0376) (0.0247) (0.0268) (0.0492) (0.0682) (0.0372) 
Constant 0.785 0.862 2.898  -2.743* 1.071 0.854 -2.857  1.999 
 (0.940) (1.302) (3.305)  (1.552) (2.274) (2.951) (5.453)  (3.009) 
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.834 0.814 0.379   0.832 0.811 0.382   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    33 44    33 44 
Hansen test p-value    0.30 0.23    0.38 0.26 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.00 0.06    0.00 0.05 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.25 0.19    0.22 0.13 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ 
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ ܧܨିܨ ଵ஽ா஺ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ 
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ܧܨܨௌி஺ ܧܨିܨ ଵௌி஺ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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With regard to the macro-level sectoral financing variables, tables 5.8 and 5.9 present 
the estimated coefficients for growth rates of MI and the growth rates of REC and the 
REC of IB. These stated variables are utilised without lag, whereas Table 5.10 shows 
the estimation for a model with one-year lag variables. For GMM estimate models, 
the p-value of AR(1) is significant, indicating that there is no serial correlation in 
AR(2), except the GMM-difference estimated in Model 11. This lack of correlation 
demonstrates the consistency of the estimators, as given by the result of the Hansen 
test, which shows that the instrument variables are valid. It should be noted that the 
sign of all of the sectoral financing variables meets the expectations of the study, 
excluding the REC variable with one year lag in Model 14 in which coefficient 
direction varies over the five estimations. Thus, such a result could not be relied on. 
When comparing the coefficients of MI and REC in models 10 and 11, the results 
show that they are relatively similar, implying that increasing the MI and REC 
financing growth of GCC banks by 1% leads to a decrease of the NPL by about 2%. 
Similarly, in the GMM-DF estimate the coefficient of RECIB is statistically 
significant and has a negative impact on NPL. 
These findings demonstrate that in the GCC countries there is a substantial interaction 
between real GDP growth and the business cycle in the economy, especially with the 
real estate and construction sectors. For instance, in 2008 the financing share of these 
sectors to total financing in the banking sector and in IB was as follows: 7.3% and 
5.6% in the KSA; 12.9% and 25.7% in the UAE; 26.2% and 11.3% in Bahrain; 18.4% 
and 38.3% in Qatar; and 31.4% and 22.1% in Kuwait. Noticeably, the risk exposure 
level of REC in IB is higher in the UAE and Qatar than within the other countries 
(Khamis et al., 2010: 69).24  
With regard to the RECIB variable with one year lag in Model 13, the coefficient of 
RECIB has remained negative and significant in the GMM-DF estimate with 
approximately a 10% level of significance. The results of this variable, without lag 
and with one year lag, is in line with the earlier panel data findings, supporting the 
fact that the financing for IB is more related to the REC sector, which increases the 
                                                            
24 Large banks in most of the GCC countries are more exposed to real estate and construction 
financing; further, there is a large concentration of real estate projects in investment funds (see: Khamis 
et al., 2010: 10 and 57).  
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risk-exposure level. Furthermore, Khamis et al. (2010) stated that in 2009 the 
performance of IB had been affected by the crisis in the real economy in relation to 
the real estate market; deterioration in this market thus increases NPL. It is therefore 
suggested that diversification is a crucial step for IB, due to the objective of reducing 
their risk exposure, by focusing more on increasing the financing to other sectors that 
are more engaged with the real economy, such as the manufacturing and industry 
sectors, which relate to the real economy by creating added value through jobs and 
wealth. Hence, value-added-oriented sectors, including manufacturing industries, 
should remain an important financing area for IB, as expected from the aspirational 
view put forward by the Islamic moral economy. Given that such sectors relate to 
generating wealth via the embedding of financing in the real economy, it is believed 
that the propensity for failure is less than that of the real estate sector25. 
 
Table 5.8- Macro-Level Model 10 (Including Manufacturing and Industry 
Financing Variable of GCC Banks) 
 Model 10 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.929*** 0.945*** 0.501*** 0.369* 0.920*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0538) (0.127) (0.189) (0.0503) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0153* 0.0119 0.030*** 0.051 0.078*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0336) (0.0236) 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.059** -0.0327 -0.096** -0.0999* -0.0390 
 (0.0232) (0.0267) (0.0444) (0.0534) (0.0378) 
∆ܯܫ -0.0176* -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.0121 
 (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0076) (0.0080) (0.0081) 
Constant 0.318 0.713 1.392  -4.553** 
 (0.677) (0.786) (0.874)  (1.930) 
      
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.827 0.810 0.360   
Number of banks   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.26 0.32 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.01 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.24 0.23 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܯܫ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
                                                            
25 Indeed, over the current study period the financing average to total financing of the manufacturing 
sector has presented the lowest level among other financing sectors, barely reaching 12% in 2008 (see: 
Figure 5 in the appendix of Chapter 5).  
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Table 5.9- Macro-Level Model 11 and Model 12 
(Including the Real Estate and Construction Financing Variable of CB and IB) 
 Model 11 Model 12 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.930*** 0.948*** 0.452*** 0.105 0.921*** 0.928*** 0.942*** 0.478*** 0.290 0.922*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0575) (0.116) (0.240) (0.0512) (0.0273) (0.0567) (0.118) (0.234) (0.0492) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0140* 0.0137 0.024*** -0.016 0.074*** 0.014* 0.014 0.026*** 0.029 0.078*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0091) (0.008) (0.054) (0.022) (0.0075) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0518) (0.0232) 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.0366 -0.0284 -0.105** -0.156*** -0.0164 -0.0625** -0.0453 -0.119*** -0.156*** -0.0428 
 (0.0304) (0.0367) (0.0426) (0.0529) (0.0409) (0.0243) (0.0298) (0.0411) (0.0582) (0.0368) 
∆ܴܧܥ -0.021*** -0.017** -0.035*** -0.048*** -0.016**      
 (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0096) (0.0181) (0.0068)      
∆ܴܧܥܫܤ      -0.0089** -0.009* -0.013** -0.0153* -0.0042 
      (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0092) (0.0039) 
Constant 0.515 0.453 2.670***  -4.177** 0.422 0.426 2.053**  -4.638** 
 (0.671) (0.818) (0.967)  (1.826) (0.645) (0.812) (0.961)  (1.933) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.830 0.809 0.411   0.827 0.807 0.369   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 43    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.09 0.22    0.19 0.41 
A-B AR(1) test p-
value  
 
 0.11 0.08  
 
 0.00 0.07 
A-B AR(2) test p-
value  
 
 0.17 0.20  
 
 0.17 0.16 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܴܧܥ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܴܧܥܫܤ   ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.10- Macro-Level Model 13 and Model 14 
(Including the Real Estate and Construction Financing Variable of CB and IB with Lagged Variables) 
 Model 13 Model 14 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.932*** 0.948*** 0.496*** 0.382* 0.925*** 0.935*** 0.948*** 0.508*** 0.386** 0.924*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0561) (0.122) (0.203) (0.0520) (0.0248) (0.0488) (0.124) (0.195) (0.0476) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0175** 0.0170* 0.032*** 0.0604* 0.084*** 0.0165** 0.0131* 0.034*** 0.0594* 0.077*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0332) (0.0249) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0309) (0.0241) 
∆ܴܧܥܫܤିଵ -0.00310 -0.00141 -0.0065* -0.0077* -0.00071      
 (0.0044) (0.005) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0046)      
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.075*** -0.063** -0.14*** -0.147** -0.0489 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.15** -0.083** 
 (0.0252) (0.0289) (0.0474) (0.0623) (0.0382) (0.0251) (0.0271) (0.0500) (0.0630) (0.0323) 
∆ܴܧܥିଵ      0.016*** 0.024*** -0.000664 -0.0054 0.0107 
      (0.00598) (0.00684) (0.00721) (0.00602) (0.00679) 
Constant 0.0293 -0.0101 1.435*  -5.120** -0.388 -0.244 1.063  -4.822** 
 (0.811) (0.985) (0.785)  (2.171) (0.708) (0.758) (0.822)  (1.985) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.825 0.805 0.351   0.828 0.812 0.346   
Number of Bank   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 43    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.19 0.50    0.29 0.24 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.01 0.08    0.00 0.07 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.19 0.18    0.18 0.18 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܴܧܥܫܤିଵ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܴܧܥିଵ  ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Turning to the macro-level factors of a bank’s structural and organisational 
development, tables 5.11 and 5.12 represent the estimated results for the assets growth 
according to bank types as seen in models 15, 16, 17 and 18. As the results show, the 
p-values of first-order and second-order autocorrelations prove the consistency of 
these estimators. In addition, the Hansen test values illustrate the validity of 
instrumental variables. Starting with the asset growth of IB, the coefficient shows a 
positive and significant relationship between IBA and NPL, demonstrating that an 
increase in IBA produces a rise in NPL of about 3%. This implies that the IB may 
have less ability to diversify in financing portfolios, which results in an increased 
vulnerability to risk. The coefficient of the IWA (asset growth of CB with IW) is also 
positive but with a small coefficient and is not a statistically significant result. With 
regard to the IBIWA variable (sharia-compliant assets growth), this again shows a 
positive link with NPL; nonetheless, it is not significant in all of the estimators. In 
contrast to the adverse impacts, the relationship between CBA growth and NPL is 
negative and significant in terms of all of the estimators, which specifies that an 
increase in the growth of CB assets leads to a decline in NPL of around 30%. This 
result then implies that these CB have more capacity when it comes to diversification 
in financing projects, which in turn decreases the level of risk-taking.  
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Table 5.11- Model 15 and Model 16 
Assets Growth for IB and IW Banks 
 Model 15 Model 16 
 OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.943*** 0.935*** 0.451*** 0.323* 0.918*** 0.947*** 0.937*** 0.492*** 0.341* 0.920***
 (0.0351) (0.0528) (0.147) (0.195) (0.0500) (0.0278) (0.0446) (0.131) (0.187) (0.0381) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0219** 0.0205** 0.0390** 0.0872** 0.095*** 0.0202** 0.0192** 0.039*** 0.0782** 0.0812**
 (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0158) (0.0429) (0.0358) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0145) (0.0367) (0.0320) 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.085** -0.07*** -0.067** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.0653*
 (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0744) (0.0777) (0.0399) (0.024) (0.0260) (0.0513) (0.0633) (0.0361) 
∆ܫܤܣିଵ 0.0252** 0.0289** 0.0171 0.0208 0.0346**      
 (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0196) (0.0150) (0.0147)      
∆ܫܹܣିଵ      0.00274 0.00328 0.00217 0.00236 0.00298 
      (0.003) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0034) 
Constant -0.441 -0.325 1.241  -6.025** -0.458 -0.395 0.816  -5.07* 
 (0.812) (0.882) (1.208)  (2.929) (0.802) (0.945) (1.103)  (2.735) 
           
Observations 239 232 239 188 239 246 232 246 195 246 
R-squared 0.806 0.808 0.308   0.808 0.809 0.336   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    30 41    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.19 0.27    0.33 0.49 
A-B AR(1) test p-
value  
 
 0.00 0.06 
   0.00 0.05 
A-B AR(2) test p-
value  
 
 0.84 0.90 
   0.82 0.49 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ 
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܫܤܣିଵ  ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܫܹܣିଵ  ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.12- Model 17 and Model 18 
Sharia-Compliant Assets to Total Assets Growth and Assets of CB to Total Assets Growth Models 
 
 Model 17 Model 18 
 OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.935*** 0.927*** 0.421*** 0.271 0.905*** 0.943*** 0.940*** 0.399** 0.151 0.915***
 (0.0294) (0.0423) (0.134) (0.196) (0.0365) (0.0424) (0.0608) (0.160) (0.192) (0.0594) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0223** 0.0208* 0.0384** 0.0796* 0.0951** 0.0223** 0.0207** 0.036*** 0.0413 0.096***
 (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0158) (0.0413) (0.0389) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0135) (0.0430) (0.0341) 
ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.23*** -0.29** -0.093** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.27*** -0.36*** -0.077* 
 (0.0314) (0.0293) (0.0887) (0.116) (0.0450) (0.0259) (0.0272) (0.0774) (0.102) (0.0407) 
∆ܫܤܫܹܣିଵ 0.0185 0.0199 0.0351 0.0358 0.0246      
 (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.026) (0.0268) (0.0237)      
∆ܥܤܣିଵ      -0.195* -0.199* -0.38*** -0.49*** -0.279**
      (0.106) (0.116) (0.139) (0.160) (0.126) 
Constant -0.511 -0.39 1.24  -6.09* -0.504 -0.395 1.784  -6.147**
 (0.93) (1.01) (1.191)  (3.242) (0.831) (0.896) (1.120)  (2.823) 
           
Observations 239 232 239 188 239 239 232 239 188 239 
R-squared 0.807 0.809 0.337   0.807 0.807 0.349   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    30 41    30 41 
Hansen test p-value    0.15 0.30    0.19 0.27 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.00 0.04    0.05 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.82 0.62    0.79 0.91 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ 
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܫܤܫܹܣିଵ  ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܥܤܣିଵ  ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The product-development factor findings are presented as formulated in models 19 
and 20, which can be seen in Table 5.13. In both models the p-value of AR(1) is 
significant and there is no serial correlation in AR(2), which shows the consistency of 
the estimated models. In addition, the Hansen test shows that the instrumental 
variables are valid.  
By looking at Model 19, the PLS variables with one and two lag have a negative 
impact on NPL; the coefficient of PLS with two lag is significant in all of the 
estimators, but there is minor influence for both lagged variables (at about 0.02%), 
which is attributed to the very low level of financing with PLS contracts. These 
findings indicate that with two years lagged variable and despite the high risk-level 
involved with PLS instruments, increasing the PLS financing seems to decrease NPL. 
The other variable related to product-development is FID; the two coefficients, with 
one and two lag, are positively associated with NPL and they are significant with the 
GMM-difference model, which is in line with the expectations of this study. 
Consequently, it can be suggested that in the long term, increasing FID financing 
increases NPL by around 10%. This result thus indicates that although FID contracts 
are favourable and heavily utilised by GCC IB due to their low risk-level, the growth 
influence of FID contracts leads to more NPL than PLS instruments.  In other words, 
it can be concluded that the propensity of credit risk or of generating NPL is higher in 
FID financing than it is for PLS financing. 
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Table 5.13- Macro-Level Model 19 and Model 20 (Including Product-Development Variables) 
 Model 19 Model 20 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
ܰܲܮିଵ 0.945*** 0.942*** 0.437*** 0.339* 0.910*** 0.950*** 0.946*** 0.433*** 0.375* 0.912***
 (0.0387) (0.0583) (0.150) (0.198) (0.0694) (0.0372) (0.0562) (0.148) (0.200) (0.0657) 
ܴܹܣିଵ 0.0176** 0.0158* 0.0358** 0.136** 0.132** 0.0203** 0.0185** 0.0438** 0.184** 0.132***
 (0.00858) (0.00869) (0.0160) (0.0680) (0.0537) (0.00866) (0.0086) (0.0173) (0.0743) (0.0504) 
ܩܦܲି ଵ -0.079*** -0.0753** -0.215*** -0.174* -0.0545 -0.0640** -0.059** -0.175** -0.109 -0.0386 
 (0.0272) (0.0287) (0.0703) (0.0951) (0.0577) (0.0268) (0.0280) (0.0719) (0.110) (0.0571) 
∆ܲܮܵିଵ -0.0002*** -0.00017** -0.000115 -0.000178 -4.77e-06      
 (5.69e-05) (6.50e-05) (8.58e-05) (0.00018) (0.0001)      
∆ܲܮܵିଶ -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.00038** -0.0002*      
 (4.89e-05) (5.78e-05) (6.96e-05) (0.00015) (9.42e-05)      
∆ܨܫܦିଵ      0.0994 0.0922 0.124* 0.195** 0.107 
      (0.0729) (0.0651) (0.0618) (0.0893) (0.0657) 
∆ܨܫܦିଶ      0.00572 0.0358 0.108** 0.157* 0.0633 
      (0.0372) (0.0500) (0.0432) (0.0822) (0.0578) 
Constant 0.0970 0.226 1.691  -8.799** -0.310 -0.158 0.880  -8.872**
 (0.769) (0.871) (1.270)  (4.439) (0.740) (0.823) (1.295)  (4.100) 
           
Observations 239 232 239 188 239 239 232 239 188 239 
R-squared 0.806 0.807 0.309   0.805 0.806 0.314   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    23 32    23 32 
Hansen test p-value    0.24 0.22    0.12 0.18 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.02 0.09    0.00 0.07 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.98 0.72    0.92 0.80 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ Instrumented: ܰܲܮିଵ 
Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܲܮܵିଵ ∆ܲܮܵିଶ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ Instruments: ܴܹܣିଵ ∆ܦିଵ ∆ܦିଶ ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ ܰܲܮିଶ ܴܹܣିଶ
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the GMM style model with three lag.  
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5.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
This paper utilises the panel data model to examine the macro-level and bank-level factors 
that determine NPL in the Islamic banking sector within the GCC. In addition, this paper uses 
dynamic panel data via means of GMM models to examine the impact of the sectoral 
distribution of Islamic financing on NPL in the GCC’s banking system, which enables the 
contribution of Islamic financing and Islamic financial modes in the NPL of the GCC’s 
commercial banking sector as a whole to be identified.  
With regard to the results, the real GDP growth generally shows negative association with 
NPL in all of the estimators, which supports the ‘prosperity’ hypothesis and implies that the 
growth in real macroeconomic terms has a negative impact on NPL.   
In terms of bank-specific factors, RWA play a vital role as an early warning indicator for 
increasing NPL for both Islamic banking, including IW, and the GCC’s commercial banking 
sector as a whole, as it reflects the high-level risk of loans portfolio combination. In addition, 
the performance and profitability ratios show that the ROE has a negative impact on NPL in 
the IB and IW, and in the whole commercial banking sector for both the short term and long 
term, which indicates a low quality of management. In the case of short-term impact, IB may, 
however, seem to be efficient as the GCC banks appear to prefer FID contracts, which lead to 
high profits and an upsurge for the ROE. On the other hand, the NIM ratio presents the 
different impacts on NPL in both of the samples used. For the Islamic financing panel model 
it shows a positive impact on NPL, meaning that Islamic financial transactions tend to be 
riskier than conventional financial transactions, specifically the PLS contracts because PLS 
modes of Islamic financing could produce a significant profit, but these are riskier than FID 
contracts, which in turn increases NPL. For the GCC’s banking sector, the findings from the 
GMM models show that the NIM has a negative association with NPL. The different findings 
on the profitability ratio can be explained by the dissimilarity in the loan portfolios of IB and 
the transactions of CB.  
The association between non-lagged efficiency and NPL supports the ‘bad management’ 
hypothesis with the panel data and GMM models. This negative relationship could indicate 
the ‘bad luck’ case, which may be caused by external factors that create more costs in 
administering bank solvency and problem loans, such as the downturn in 2006 and the global 
financial crisis in the period from 2008 to 2009. The one year lag efficiency variable is, 
163 
however, positively associated with NPL, suggesting the presence of the ‘skimping’ policy in 
reducing credit administration expenses; in addition and due to the previous year, there could 
be a shortage of monitoring borrowers, which increases NPL. Moreover, to ensure the 
validity and direction of efficiency scores that were obtained through the DEA approach, the 
SFA efficiency score is applied and the coefficients of these variables are in the same 
directions with the efficiency variables of DEA. 
In terms of macro-level sectoral financing, the growth rates of MI and REC present a 
relatively similar adverse impact on NPL. For the panel data model the growth rate of RECIB 
financing is related negatively to NPL; the same is true for the dynamic panel models, and the 
RECIB financing shows a negative impact on NPL. These findings suggest that in the GCC 
countries there is a substantial interaction between the real GDP growth and the real estate 
and construction sectors. The RECIB variable with one year lag has a negative effect on NPL, 
supporting the notion that the financing of IB is more related to real estate and construction 
projects, which increases the risk exposure. Hence, it is suggested that diversification is a 
crucial step required for bank managers and policy makers in the GCC region. Indeed, they 
need to focus more on increasing the financing to other sectors that are embedded within the 
real economy such as manufacturing and other productive industries so that the risk of NPL 
can be reduced as the propensity of failure is less in these sectors than in the real estate 
sector.  
The findings related to the banks’ structural and organisational-development factors show 
that an increase in the assets growth for IB leads to an increase in NPL, indicating that IB 
could have less ability to diversify in financing portfolios. This would in turn mean that these 
banks are more at risk. On the other hand, the relationship between CBA growth and NPL is 
negative, suggesting that these CB are more capable of diversifying financing projects and 
hence decreasing risk taking.  
The product development of IF factor demonstrates that in all of the estimated models (with 
and without lags) that the PLS growth shows negative impact on NPL, but with minor 
influence, which is attributed to the very low level of financing with PLS contracts. Such 
findings suggest that despite the high risk-level in PLS instruments, increasing the PLS 
financing could lead to a decrease in NPL. The FID variable in all of the estimators did, 
however, present a positive relationship with NPL, indicating that although FID contracts are 
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favoured by IB within the GCC, the growth path of FID financings could harm the loan 
quality more than PLS instruments. 
It should be noted that the causes behind NPL can be attributed to macroeconomic, financial 
or institutional factors (Nkusu, 2011). This study investigates several economic causations 
between NPL and some selected macro-level and micro-level factors, which are classified 
into endogenous and exogenous factors, by utilising the dynamic panel data (GMM) models. 
Furthermore, in the present Islamic banking literature on the subject of loan quality issues, no 
study has yet attempted to examine the impact of Islamic financing and Islamic finance 
contracts on NPL; this absence thus points to the significance of this study, which examines 
the effects on the loan quality of the GCC’s commercial banking sector.  
Future research could utilise other empirical techniques such as Granger causality in addition 
to the dynamic panel data models so as to examine the intertemporal relationships. Further, 
the relationship between Islamic financing, Islamic contracts and NPL could be equally 
explored by taking into account a longer time period, to examine longer dynamic effects by 
increasing the lag numbers, which enables the application of different estimates such as the 
panel vector autoregressive (Nkusu, 2011). Finally, future research could consider the impact 
of financing other sectors on NPL, such as Islamic financing for the manufacturing and 
consumer sectors.               
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of the study in relation to its main objectives. Briefly, it 
summarises the aims and findings of the study with regard to each essay presented in the 
previous chapters. It is notable that discussing the study’s limitations helps to define its scope 
and offers some directions for future research. Section 6.2 provides a summary of the 
empirical findings; section 6.3 describes the implications of the findings for managers and 
policy makers. Section 6.4 presents some critical reflections on the theoretical and empirical 
models used to measure the efficiency and performance of IB. Section 6.5 discusses the 
limitations of the study and offers some recommendations for future research that are based 
on the current findings. Finally, section 6.6 brings the research to a conclusion.                      
6.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH AND FINDINGS  
The current study investigates the concepts of efficiency, performance, survivability and 
credit risk or issues relating to NPL for IB within the GCC through four empirical essays. In 
these four essays, the key investigation is into the impact of several environmental variables 
that are related to the financial and economic environment, in addition to macro-level and 
bank-level factors. In particular, the factors related to bank-level were included to 
differentiate and compare the performance between IB and IW. The macro-level factors and 
the variables associated with the financial environment were also used to distinguish the 
response of IB and IW towards these factors, such as the real GDP growth and the global 
financial crisis. Further, by providing a selection of political economy perspectives, this study 
took into account the effects of government and foreign ownership, the rule of law and 
regulatory quality. This study therefore investigated extensively the performance of Islamic 
banking in the GCC within the larger macro-level context. 
Examining the Efficiency of the Saudi Arabian Banking Sector 
The first essay provides a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the efficiency levels of 
IB and IW in the Saudi Arabian commercial banking sector, through the DEA approach from 
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2005 to 2010. It examines the effects of a number of variables related to bank characteristics 
on the efficiency of Saudi banks by utilising the second stage regression of the DEA model; 
the variables were bank type (as a dummy variable) in the form of IB or IW, the quality of 
loans and liquidity ratios. Moreover, SFA is applied to examine the robustness of the 
estimated model of DEA second stage regression.  
For the empirical analysis, the analysis of financial ratios concluded that the Saudi banking 
sector was affected by the development stages in the Saudi capital market, as well as the 
global financial crisis in 2008. In addition, the performance of IB was affected by such 
factors more than that of CB, which could be due to the number of IB and because the amount 
of their total assets was less than those of CB. Furthermore, the obtained TE scores from the 
DEA estimation are in line with the financial indicators, which suggested that the 
performance of IB reached its peak in 2005. These indicators decreased sharply until they 
reached their lowest level in 2008, which can be explained by the trading activities in the 
Saudi capital market during 2006. In addition, the Al-Jazira bank was greatly affected as it 
appears to be the most inefficient bank among the Saudi Arabian banks. In terms of the 
nature of the SE findings, small banks and the majority of banks with foreign partners 
unexpectedly seemed to operate under an increasing return to scale during the period in 
question, a result which can be attributed to good bank management (particularly in the area 
of loans management) so that they were able to avoid defaulted loans.   
With regard to the findings related to environmental variables, the results indicate that IB are 
more efficient than IW in terms of producing loans. The estimated coefficient of NPL 
indicates a negative association with a bank’s efficiency; in this case it would be suggested 
that more requirements are needed to monitor borrowers when controlling problem loans. 
Finally, the estimated coefficient of the liquidity ratio highlighted the negative impact on 
bank efficiency, as less liquidity in banks is more associated with funding high risk loans, 
which may cause an increase in NPL. Finally, the findings for Saudi banks’ ranking presented 
after adjusting the DEA efficiency levels; as the results indicate, the performance of IB was 
affected by the environmental variables more than that of the CB. Moreover, the performance 
of some IW with foreign partnerships was higher than that for other banks. 
Measuring Efficiency and its Determinants in the GCC Countries 
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The second essay measures the TE levels of IB and IW in the GCC countries through the 
meta-frontier analysis method so as to evaluate the gaps between efficiency levels from 2005 
to 2010, as all of the banks in these countries operate under different technologies and 
different bank groups. This essay presents a comparative study on two levels: between each 
country and between three bank groups, which are IB, IW, and CB. In addition, this essay 
examines the total factor productivity through MPI form to measure the catch-up rate, which 
locates how the country’s or group’s frontiers perform in terms of production points and 
productivity growth towards the meta-frontier from period t to period t+1. In addition, it 
examines the high potential influence of banks’ characteristics, financial structures and rule-
of-law variables on the efficiency scores that were obtained from the DEA meta-frontier 
method, via panel data with the random effects model and bootstrap technique, which is 
proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).     
For the DEA meta-frontier, the analysis of TGR of GCC countries revealed that the highest 
TGR appears in Qatar followed by the UAE, indicating that Qatari banks have been operating 
at the best level of available production technology. In addition, Qatar has recorded the 
highest catch-up rate, whereas the UAE and Saudi Arabia have not managed to record any 
high level of catch-up rate.  
The findings on the meta-frontier for bank groups illustrate that IW have dominated all bank 
groups; the TGR of these banks has also demonstrated the highest ratio since 2007. In 
addition, the average of TGR shows that IB could operate at the best level by producing at 
90%, rather than at 83%, and by utilising the same levels of input that are provided by the 
GCC countries. Despite the TGR results for IB, they have managed to catch-up and have 
been the most productive group for the majority of that period.  
The findings of the second stage regression model prove that GCC banks, as intermediation 
firms, have a good ability to transform deposits into loans; bank size is also considered to be 
an important factor in terms of enhancing efficiency. From the perspective of the type of 
bank, IB are less efficient at producing outputs than IW. In addition, the GCC’s banking 
efficiency is affected positively by the rule-of-law variable. The government ownership 
enhances the liquidity and causes an increase in the production of output level, which reflects 
the importance of oil revenue to the GCC countries.  
Measuring the Survival-Time Analysis of the IB and CB within the GCC  
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The third essay investigates the survival-time analysis and risk of failure for IB and CB by 
taking into account the impact of the global financial crisis and other circumstances; to this 
end, it employs duration models to investigate whether IB or CB are more susceptible to 
failure risk for the period of 1995 to 2011. This empirical analysis started with the life-table 
method, which is a non-parametric technique and unconditional analysis that depends on the 
observation of failure events. This stage of unconditional analysis was followed by the 
conditional analysis, which depends on the availability of data at a micro-level and at a 
macro-level. This essay pivots on the application of the cloglog model to estimate a bank’s 
failure and to present a comparative analysis between IB and CB.   
As the results in Chapter Four illustrate, the life-table findings or the unconditional analysis 
supported the hypothesis that IB are more likely to fail than CB, without controlling the 
differences for the macro-level and micro-level covariates. The conditional findings 
concluded that in terms of micro-level variables, the coefficient of the dummy variable for IB 
confirms the unconditional findings, which suggests that IB are approximately twice as 
hazardous as CB.  
The financial earnings ratios showed that a rise in ROA causes the hazard rate to decline, yet 
an increase in NIM led to a similar increase in the hazard ratio. The asset quality and liquidity 
ratios (LLR/L and NL/A) are associated positively with the failure of hazard risk. Moreover, 
the findings demonstrated that increasing GNIR decreases the failure risk for CB and IB, but 
it is only significant for IB. Similarly, with the ratios for ROA, which has a negative influence 
on hazard rate, and NIM, which has a positive influence on hazard rate, they are significant 
for IB. This outcome emphasised that the financing of most IB depends on non-PLS or asset-
based contracts, in that they offer less risk and more profit than PLS contracts.  
The macro-level findings concluded that a more concentrated banking sector leads to an 
elevated hazard rate, since it has the same positive influence on both subgroups (IB and CB). 
The growth of the real GDP rate causes the failure risk to decline; furthermore, the effect of 
real GDP growth is of greater value for IB than it is for CB, suggesting that despite the 
smaller size of IB (in comparison to CB), they are better engaged with the real economy. It 
was found that the inflation rate considerably increases hazard rate, whereas the involvement 
of the government in bank ownership reduces the probability of failure risk; in addition, CB 
are more associated with GOV than IB, which protects CB against failure hazard. Finally, the 
results show that improving the regulatory quality has an adverse effect on hazard rate.  
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Determining Factors of NPL in Islamic and Conventional Banking within the GCC  
The last essay examines the macro-level and micro-level factors determining NPL for IB and 
IW in the GCC countries via means of the panel data econometrics model. In addition, it 
investigates the factors contributing to NPL in the GCC’s commercial banking sector as a 
whole through the use of dynamic panel data (GMM) models to observe the time condition 
impacts on NPL for the period of 2005 to 2011. Furthermore, this essay identifies the impact 
of the sectoral financing (the real estate sector in particular) of IB as well as Islamic financial 
contracts, including PLS and FID contracts, on the NPL of the Islamic banking sector and the 
GCC’s commercial banking system as a whole. 
In terms of bank-specific factors, the findings concluded that RWA play a vital role as an 
early warning indicator for increasing NPL for both Islamic banking, including IW, and the 
GCC’s commercial banking sector as a whole, given that it reflects the high-level risk of loan 
portfolio diversification. The findings show that the ROE ratio has a negative impact on NPL 
in Islamic banking, including IW, and on the whole commercial banking sector, which is 
indicative of the low quality of management. IB could, however, seem efficient in the short-
term as GCC banks seem to prefer FID contracts, which lead to high profits; this in turn 
causes an upsurge in the ROE.  
The NIM ratio presented different influences on NPL in both the samples used; for the 
Islamic finance panel model, it showed a positive influence on NPL, suggesting that Islamic 
financial transactions tend to be riskier than transactions of CB, specifically the PLS 
contracts, because PLS modes of Islamic financing could produce a significant profit but they 
are riskier than FID and other financing contracts, which increases the NPL. For the GCC’s 
banks, the findings from the GMM models showed that the NIM has a negative impact on 
NPL. The different findings for the profitability ratio can be explained by the dissimilarity in 
the loan portfolios of IB and the transactions of CB.  
The findings in Chapter Five illustrate that the link between non-lagged efficiency and NPL 
support the ‘bad management’ hypothesis with the panel data and GMM models. This 
negative relationship could indicate the ‘bad luck’ case, which may be caused by external 
factors that create more costs in administering bank solvency and problem loans. The one 
year lag efficiency variable is associated with NPL positively, thereby suggesting the 
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’skimping’ policy in reducing credit administration expenses. Furthermore and due to the 
previous year, there could be a shortage in monitoring borrowers, which increases the NPL.  
In terms of the macro-level findings, the real GDP growth supported the ‘prosperity’ 
hypothesis, which implies that the growth in real macroeconomic terms has a negative impact 
on NPL. The sectoral financing findings emphasised that the growth rates of MI and REC 
relatively demonstrated similar negative impacts on NPL. In the panel data model the growth 
rate of RECIB financing was related negatively with NPL; likewise, in the dynamic panel 
models the RECIB financing showed a negative impact on NPL. These findings suggest that 
in the GCC countries there is a significant interaction between the real GDP growth and the 
real estate and construction sectors. In addition, the findings support the notion that the 
financing of IB is more related to real estate and construction projects, which increases the 
risk exposure.  
The findings related to the banks’ structure and organisational-development factors showed 
that an increase in the assets growth of IB leads to an upsurge in NPL, indicating that IB may 
have less opportunity to diversify their financing portfolios and that they are more at risk. On 
the other hand, the relationship between CBA growth and NPL is negative, suggesting that 
these CB are more capable of diversifying the financing portfolios and hence decreasing the 
risk taking.  
The product development of Islamic finance factors suggests that the PLS growth showed a 
negative impact on NPL, although minor influence was present, which was attributed to the 
very low level of financing with PLS contracts. Such findings suggest that despite the high 
risk-level in PLS instruments, increasing the PLS financing could lead to a decrease in NPL. 
The FID variable in all of the estimators did, however, present a positive relationship with 
NPL, indicating that although FID contracts are favoured by IB within the GCC, the growth 
path of FID financings could harm the loan quality more than PLS contracts.  
Overall summary 
Each essay in this study utilises a different sample and model; this study will therefore extend 
the existing knowledge and understanding of studies related to IBF in the following ways:  
(i) It closely examines the Saudi banks’ efficiency by comparing the TE levels and scale 
efficiency between IB and CB. 
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(ii) It investigates the efficiency of IB and CB in GCC countries through a comprehensive 
and comparative study. 
(iii) It applies a discrete-time model to investigate the risk of the bank in question; related 
covariates are also applied, which determine the hazard rate of IB and CB in the GCC 
countries. 
(iv) It examines the link between a bank’s efficiency and the NPL of IB and CB, and it is 
the first study to investigate the contributions of Islamic sectoral financing and 
Islamic finance contracts to the NPL of the GCC’s banking sector as a whole. 
6.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
The findings of this study provide some implications for managers, policy makers and 
researchers. In terms of a bank’s efficiency, the Saudi Arabian banks need to enhance their 
bank management to monitor borrowers and control default loans. In terms of the efficiency 
of the GCC banks and meta-frontier analysis, the technology gap ratio approaches seemed 
very significant in illustrating dissimilarities among the bank groups. The efficiency level of 
IB appeared to be lower than it is for IW. To promote the performance of IB, it is therefore 
recommended that IB should increase their size, either by merging or by expanding their 
market shares and clients so as to take advantage of scale economies. In addition, the findings 
provided evidence that supported the importance of the rule of law to improve a bank’s 
efficiency. It is thus recommended that policy makers, as one economic and political union, 
can develop the strategies and unite the regulations of IB within the GGC countries in order 
to utilise the best available technology.    
Previous studies on Islamic banking have rarely proposed empirical evidence exploring the 
factors that could affect a bank’s failure. Thus, in terms of bank-specific factors, which are 
related to asset quality and liquidity ratios, this study provided evidence for bank managers 
that IB need to improve their management structure so as to make more efficient decisions 
related to liquidity and credit risk, especially when opting to expand their PLS contracts. In 
addition, improving the regulatory quality enhances the role of Islamic finance, especially in 
the GCC. Therefore, the financing models as well as the regulations should be improved in 
conjunction by policy makers.  
The study suggests a clear indication to bank managers and policy makers that diversification 
is a crucial step necessary in the GCC region. This step could be achieved by focusing more 
on increasing the financing to other sectors that are embedded within the economy, such as 
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manufacturing and other productive industries, so that the risk of NPL can be reduced, as the 
propensity for failure is less in these sectors than it is in the real estate sector. Moreover, it 
suggests that despite the high risk-level in PLS instruments, increasing the PLS financing 
could lead to a decrease in NPL.  
6.4 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
MODELS 
With regard to measuring efficiency and performance issues, a critical position may suggest 
different methods than those commonly used in the literature as well as in this chapter. Such 
novel and Islamic moral economy oriented methods and approaches are rationalised through 
the moral claims of IBF, which suggests that IBF should be risk-sharing, asset based, or 
embedded in the real economy, participatory financing, and should be in line with the 
maqasid al-sharia (the objectives of sharia) or human wellbeing. Thus, critics such as Hasan 
(2004) and Asutay (2012) argue that the assessment of the performance of IBF should not be 
limited to efficiency and profitability, and should also measure the performance in the areas 
mentioned. It is therefore claimed that using the common methods and variables is an 
indication that IBF is in the same line of operations as CB. 
When reflecting on these issues, Hasan (2004) argues that those studies have presented 
unsatisfying information about the political economy and its impact on the financial sector. 
He also states that the nature of the inputs and outputs, and the limitations of data, have 
affected the findings of those studies, as they suffered from a lack of description and remain 
unclear. Finally, in terms of social accountabilities he states that IB ‘hardly have the structure, 
aptitude, environment, or personnel to do what we think they must to do. And discussion on 
the crucial structural issues is rare in the literature’ (Hasan, 2004: 23). To illustrate this point, 
Hasan (2004) argues that the objectives of cost minimisation and profit maximisation are not 
vital for IB, and that the performance of those banks should be evaluated with an indication 
of the level at which they help to build and develop society. In what manner IBF could be 
assessed when the majority of them are planned to be commercial banks in their operations 
and hence questioning their intentions, which are socially aspirational, remains an important 
question. In actuality, to fulfil such potential social objectives, IB should modify their 
structure and operational nature so that they not only incorporate the interests of the 
shareholders and the Board of Directors (BoD), but also the policy objectives of the countries 
in which they are operating. Thus, a nation’s banking regulations, political conditions and 
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social and developmental needs must be identified so that gauging the comprehensive  
performance in terms of the banks’ success at achieving social objectives can be assessed. 
Antonio (2013) therefore provides a fresh look into performance measurement by measuring 
the maqasid al-sharia outcomes of a number of IBF operations; Beduiddine (2012) also 
provides an alternative theoretical construct to measure maqasid al-sharia outcomes. It is 
hoped that such models, mainly located in social accounting, can be extended to research in 
IBF. 
6.5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
When addressing the study’s findings, some limitations were encountered. The first empirical 
essay only comprised one output variable; it is therefore suggested that future studies should 
include more input-output variables, such as other earning assets, and they should also apply 
different methods, such as SFA with Gamma model, to improve the assessment between the 
performances of IB and CB in Saudi Arabia. This recommendation does, however, require a 
larger sample; it is thus also recommended that future research expands the sample size and 
utilises panel data. In addition, more varieties of environmental variables need to be 
examined to study the variation in a bank’s efficiency; for instance, banks with foreign 
ownership and financial development factors, including market capitalisation and bank 
concentration. 
The second empirical essay applied meta-frontier and technology gap ratio approaches, which 
seemed to be very significant in illustrating dissimilarities among the Gulf countries or 
groups of banks. The other form of meta-frontier proposed by O’Donnell et al. (2008) is that 
of the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), one of the parametric methods. This method is 
recommended for future research and should be applied with different environmental 
variables to investigate the variances in production or cost technology among regional banks 
within the GCC.  
With regard to the particularities of survival analysis, the study was designed around the 
realities of the region with the aim of shedding some light on this particular aspect, which has 
not been studied for the subject of Islamic and conventional banking within the GCC. It is, 
however, important to note that the history of banking in the region in general and Islamic 
banking in particular is rather short, given that these countries were mostly founded in the 
post-war period and that their banks are even younger. Thus, it is recommended that any 
future studies encompass a longer period, utilising different explanatory variables such as 
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credit growth and capital regulation, which would enhance the quality of the findings 
established in this study (Evrensel, 2008).   
Further, this study investigated the factors that determine the NPL of the GCC’s banking 
sector through GMM models. Thus, it is recommended that future research should utilise 
other empirical techniques, such as Granger causality, to examine the intertemporal 
relationships. In addition, the relationship between Islamic financing, Islamic contracts and 
NPL could also be explored by taking into account the longer time period needed to increase 
the lag numbers so as to examine the dynamic impacts. Moreover, it is recommended that 
future research applies different estimates such as the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR), 
which is more applicable for a long-term period of panel data (Nkusu, 2011). Furthermore, 
future research could consider the impact of other financing sectors on NPL, such as Islamic 
financing for manufacturing and consumer sectors.                          
6.6 EPILOGUE 
The aim of this research was to investigate the efficiency, performance, survival analysis and 
NPL of the GCC’s banking sector in a comparative manner through four essays. 
Chapter Two presented evidence which suggested that the performance of IB is different 
from that of IW.  Chapter Three showed evidence that IW have dominated all of the bank 
groups; also the TGR of these banks has demonstrated the highest ratio. IB have managed to 
catch-up and become the most productive group for the majority of that period (2005-2010). 
In addition, improving the rule of law enhances the efficiency of the GCC’s banking sector. 
Chapter Four provided evidence which indicated that IB are more at risk than CB, yet IB are 
shown to be more engaged with the real economy than CB. Chapter Five presented evidence 
which suggested that the Islamic financing of the real estate sector and Islamic finance 
contracts, especially PLS instruments, have a significant impact on the NPL of the GCC’s 
banking sector.     
Finally and as evidenced by the contents of the empirical chapters (which include an 
extensive literature review of the relevant aspects of the research as well as econometric 
modelling relevant to each chapter), it can be concluded that this research has fulfilled the 
aims, objectives and research questions established at the beginning of the study. 
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APPENDIX - CHAPTER 2 
 
Table 1- DEA TE Results with Confidence Limits  
Bank Name Year   TE SE RTS  Bias  S.D  LL UL 
Al-Rajhi  2005 1 1 - 0 0 1 1 
Al-Jazira 2005 0.561 0.913 IRS 0.0419 0.022 0.560 0.642 
Albilad  2005 1 1 - 0 0 1 1 
Av. Islamic   2005 0.854       
NCB  2005 0.670 0.920 DRS 0.0204 0.013 0.674 0.719 
Riyad  2005 0.642 0.996 DRS 0.0448 0.024 0.650 0.739 
Samba 2005 0.800 0.986 IRS 0.0223 0.019 0.804 0.864 
SABB 2005 0.850 0.950 IRS 0.0114 0.01 0.851 0.881 
Saudi Fransi 2005 0.901 0.935 IRS 0.0526 0.034 0.908 1 
ANB 2005 0.783 0.916 IRS 0.0205 0.019 0.787 0.842 
Saudi Hollandi  2005 0.770 0.819 IRS 0.0154 0.012 0.770 0.810 
Saudi Investment 2005 0.745 0.744 IRS 0.0768 0.049 0.757 0.906 
Av. Conventional 2005 0.770       
Av. All Banks 2005 0.794       
AlRajhi  2006 0.820 0.934 DRS 0.0495 0.028 0.8283 0.917 
AlJazira 2006 0.491 0.997 IRS 0.0274 0.02 0.483 0.555 
Albilad  2006 1 1 - 0 0 1 1 
Av. Islamic   2006 0.770       
NCB  2006 0.650 0.883 DRS 0.0168 0.012 0.649 0.688 
Riyad  2006 0.633 0.961 DRS 0.0532 0.024 0.631 0.727 
Samba 2006 0.773 0.998 IRS 0.0248 0.022 0.773 0.846 
SABB 2006 0.774 0.970 IRS 0.0118 0.011 0.777 0.811 
Saudi Fransi 2006 0.920 0.973 IRS 0.0522 0.028 0.926 1 
ANB 2006 0.856 0.975 IRS 0.0131 0.012 0.857 0.892 
Saudi Hollandi  2006 0.750 0.865 IRS 0.0254 0.019 0.750 0.812 
Saudi Investment 2006 0.710 0.868 IRS 0.0325 0.021 0.715 0.785 
Av. Conventional 2006 0.758       
Av. All Banks 2006 0.760       
AlRajhi  2007 0.853 0.883 DRS 0.0516 0.031 0.849 0.950 
Al-Jazira 2007 0.552 0.965 IRS 0.0194 0.015 0.555 0.605 
Albilad  2007 0.923 0.994 DRS 0.0513 0.024 0.920 1 
Av. Islamic   2007 0.776       
NCB  2007 0.557 0.753 DRS 0.0176 0.011 0.550 0.597 
Riyad  2007 0.670 0.904 DRS 0.043 0.018 0.670 0.745 
Samba 2007 0.743 0.922 DRS 0.0386 0.031 0.745 0.848 
SABB 2007 0.904 0.988 IRS 0.0361 0.026 0.907 0.998 
Saudi Fransi 2007 0.882 0.987 IRS 0.0801 0.039 0.880 1 
ANB 2007 0.860 0.995 DRS 0.0146 0.012 0.861 0.896 
Saudi Hollandi  2007 0.730 0.895 IRS 0.0197 0.018 0.730 0.786 
Saudi Investment 2007 0.700 0.945 IRS 0.0297 0.022 0.703 0.775 
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Av. Conventional 2007 0.756       
Av. All Banks 2007 0.761       
AlRajhi  2008 0.860 0.860 DRS 0.0136 0.031 0.812 0.915 
AlJazira 2008 0.643 0.921 IRS 0.0294 0.019 0.647 0.705 
Albilad  2008 0.580 0.980 DRS 0.0314 0.022 0.580 0.651 
Av. Islamic   2008 0.693       
NCB  2008 0.624 0.649 DRS 0.0152 0.011 0.627 0.662 
Riyad  2008 0.823 0.830 DRS 0.0434 0.025 0.820 0.913 
Samba 2008 0.820 0.816 DRS 0.0628 0.043 0.826 0.963 
SABB 2008 1 1 - 0 0 1 1 
Saudi Fransi 2008 1 1 - 0 0 1 1 
ANB 2008 0.810 0.907 DRS 0.028 0.018 0.813 0.868 
Saudi Hollandi  2008 0.813 0.977 IRS 0.0291 0.019 0.818 0.879 
Saudi Investment 2008 0.810 0.898 IRS 0.0874 0.049 0.815 0.985 
Av. Conventional 2008 0.838       
Av. All Banks 2008 0.798       
AlRajhi  2009 0.847 0.872 DRS 0.0325 0.031 0.814 0.917 
AlJazira 2009 0.590 0.918 IRS 0.0276 0.019 0.591 0.649 
Albilad  2009 0.724 0.904 IRS 0.0245 0.021 0.726 0.792 
Av. Islamic   2009 0.723       
NCB  2009 0.564 0.683 DRS 0.0121 0.009 0.567 0.596 
Riyad  2009 0.835 0.885 DRS 0.0405 0.029 0.830 0.934 
Samba 2009 0.672 0.898 DRS 0.0548 0.038 0.670 0.804 
SABB 2009 0.921 0.985 IRS 0.0484 0.027 0.929 1 
Saudi Fransi 2009 0.992 0.991 IRS 0.0078 0.000 1 1 
ANB 2009 0.750 0.955 DRS 0.0292 0.017 0.754 0.811 
Saudi Hollandi  2009 0.783 0.953 IRS 0.0176 0.013 0.785 0.826 
Saudi Investment 2009 0.821 0.953 IRS 0.0329 0.029 0.825 0.919 
Av. Conventional 2009 0.792       
Av. All Banks 2009 0.773       
AlRajhi  2010 0.827 0.829 DRS 0.0141 0.027 0.782 0.873 
AlJazira 2010 0.654 0.918 IRS 0.0286 0.016 0.650 0.714 
Albilad  2010 0.670 0.861 IRS 0.0271 0.021 0.672 0.736 
Av. Islamic   2010 0.717       
NCB  2010 0.583 0.588 DRS 0.0129 0.011 0.584 0.619 
Riyad  2010 0.833 0.842 DRS 0.0408 0.027 0.830 0.927 
Samba 2010 0.620 0.815 DRS 0.0552 0.035 0.621 0.735 
SABB 2010 0.950 0.989 IRS 0.0369 0.017 0.956 1 
Saudi Fransi 2010 1 1 - 0 0 1 1 
ANB 2010 0.711 0.911 DRS 0.03 0.017 0.716 0.771 
Saudi Hollandi  2010 0.845 0.956 IRS 0.0225 0.016 0.849 0.898 
Saudi Investment 2010 0.815 0.965 IRS 0.0282 0.024 0.819 0.896 
Av. Conventional 2010 0.795       
Av. All Banks 2010 0.773       
Notes: RTS shows the returns to scale estimates, where IRS means increasing returns to scale; DRS illustrates decreasing 
returns to scale; the blank cell indicates CRS; LL and UL reflect the lower and upper limits of bootstrap replication at the 
ninety-fifth percentile confidence intervals.  
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Re-assessing the Second Stage Regression of the DEA Model  
1- Multicollinearity   
There are two types of tests to investigate the multicollinearity, which are the 
correlation matrix for the employed variables and the variance inflation factors.   
I. Correlation Matrix for Listed Variables 
 TE Scores      Z2 Z1 Z3 
TE Scores 1 -0.5458 -0.1037   -0.3788 
Z2 -0.5458   1 0.12169   0.3277 
Z1 -0.1037   0.1217   1 0.7195 
Z3 -0.3788    0.3277  0.7195  1 
Note: DEAEFF_O signifies the TE efficiency (Y); CLONQ2 indicates the quality of 
the loans (Z2); BANKT represents the dummy variable for IB (Z1); and CLQTUS 
shows the liquidity ratio (Z3). The dependent variable is included here as a result from 
the first stage of the DEA model to clarify the correlation degree with the employed 
variables in the second stage regression of the DEA.          
II. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Matrix VIF has five rows and one column. 
 Z2|    1.46441 
 Z1|    2.23476 
 Z3|    2.62921 
        TE Scores|    1.58949  
It can be noticed that none of these variables have a VIF value above ten, where if 
the VIF is more than ten then a multicollinearity problem exists. 
  
2- Heteroscedasticity 
To examine the non-constant variance the Breusch-Pagan chi-square test is used, 
which was produced by Cook and Weisberg (1983). 
Non-constant Variance Test:  
The hypotheses for this test are H0: constant variance, H1: non-constant variance 
Non-Constant Variance Score Test:  
Variance formula: ~ fitted.values  
Chi-square = 0.4856757    Df = 1     p = 0.4858626 
The null hypothesis is therefore accepted and the variance of this model is constant.
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3- Autocorrelation  
According to the Durbin-Watson test, the autocorrelation problem does exist, hence 
several regressions (Prais-Winsten or feasible GLS and ML) have been applied to 
avoid this problem, which are related to first order autocorrelation.  
 
+----------------------------------------------------+ | Ordinary    least squares regression               | | Model was estimated Jan 29, 2012 at 00:47:45AM     | | LHS=DEAEFF_O Mean                 =   .7773126     | |              Standard deviation   =   .1309184     | | WTS=none     Number of observs.   =         66     | | Model size   Parameters           =          4     | |              Degrees of freedom   =         62     | | Residuals    Sum of squares       =   .7009024     | |              Standard error of e  =   .1063244     | | Fit          R-squared            =   .3708667     | |              Adjusted R-squared   =   .3404248     | | Model test   F[  3,    62] (prob) =  12.18 (.0000) | | Diagnostic   Log likelihood       =   56.33642     | |              Restricted(b=0)      =   41.04382     | |              Chi-sq [  3]  (prob) =  30.59 (.0000) | | Info criter. LogAmemiya Prd. Crt. =  -4.423681     | |              Akaike Info. Criter. =  -4.423829     | | Autocorrel   Durbin-Watson Stat.  =   .5594047     | |              Rho = cor[e,e(-1)]   =   .7202977     | 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
 
 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ |Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
 Constant|     .97732579       .03588695    27.233   .0000 
      Z2 |    -.04170471       .01023908    -4.073   .0001   2.91775816 
      Z3 |    -.00497592       .00187390    -2.655   .0101   19.6684667 
      Z1 |     .07164587       .04297757     1.667   .1005    .27272727 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ | AR(1) Model:     e(t) = rho * e(t-1) + u(t) | | Initial value of rho       =         .72030 | | Maximum iterations         =            100 | | Method = Prais-Winsten                    | | Iter=  1, SS=       .332, Log-L=  80.617232 | | Iter=  2, SS=       .330, Log-L=  80.735786 | | Iter=  3, SS=       .330, Log-L=  80.739697 | | Final value of Rho    =             .760326 | | Iter=  3, SS=       .330, Log-L=  80.739697 | | Durbin-Watson:   e(t) =             .479348 | | Std. Deviation:  e(t) =             .112361 | | Std. Deviation:  u(t) =             .072983 | | Durbin-Watson:   u(t) =            2.060015 | | Autocorrelation: u(t) =            -.030007 | | N[0,1] used for significance levels         | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ |Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
 Constant|     .94222271       .04515804    20.865   .0000 
      Z2 |    -.03525603       .00738877    -4.772   .0000   2.91775816 
      Z3 |    -.00390087       .00108842    -3.584   .0003   19.6684667 
      Z1 |     .10447502       .06027298     1.733   .0830    .27272727 
     RHO |     .76032585       .08056575     9.437   .0000 
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+---------------------------------------------+ | AR(1) Model:     e(t) = rho * e(t-1) + u(t) | | Initial value of rho       =         .72030 | | Maximum iterations         =            100 | | Method = Maximum likelihood                 | | Iter=  1, SS=       .332, Log-L=  80.617232 | | Iter=  2, SS=       .330, Log-L=  80.739067 | | Iter=  3, SS=       .330, Log-L=  80.740791 | | Final value of Rho    =             .763668 | | Iter=  3, SS=       .330, Log-L=  80.740791 | | Durbin-Watson:   e(t) =             .478303 | | Std. Deviation:  e(t) =             .113033 | | Std. Deviation:  u(t) =             .072975 | | Durbin-Watson:   u(t) =            2.065883 | | Autocorrelation: u(t) =            -.032941 | | N[0,1] used for significance levels         | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ |Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
 Constant|     .94222183       .04556562    20.678   .0000 
      Z2 |    -.03526458       .00738033    -4.778   .0000   2.91775816 
      Z3 |    -.00389791       .00108671    -3.587   .0003   19.6684667 
      Z1 |     .10519075       .06059493     1.736   .0826    .27272727 
     RHO |     .76366828       .08007792     9.537   .0000 
Note: all of the tables showing findings have been attained by employing LIMDEP econometric 
software.   
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Table 1- Comparative statistical summary of the TE scores for adjusted and nominal data       
DEA   Real (Adjusted data)   Nominal data  
 Mean  SD Min. Max. Mean  SD Min. Max. 
Saudi Arabia         
2005 0.803 0.136 0.512 0.927 0.812 0.134 0.526 0.941 
2006 0.795 0.091 0.586 0.946 0.798 0.091 0.587 0.951 
2007 0.822 0.111 0.595 1 0.820 0.113 0.586 1 
2008 0.860 0.124 0.592 0.969 0.839 0.121 0.578 0.940 
2009 0.817 0.114 0.618 1 0.824 0.116 0.620 1 
2010 0.823 0.114 0.631 1 0.821 0.115 0.628 1 
The UAE          
2005 0.752 0.107 0.594 0.973 0.756 0.110 0.595 0.979 
2006 0.803 0.124 0.598 1 0.806 0.124 0.597 1 
2007 0.795 0.146 0.568 1 0.795 0.146 0.569 1 
2008 0.840 0.118 0.601 1 0.835 0.118 0.591 1 
2009 0.808 0.141 0.566 1 0.808 0.142 0.567 1 
2010 0.803 0.156 0.535 1 0.798 0.156 0.531 1 
Bahrain          
2005 0.862 0.156 0.528 1 0.863 0.156 0.530 1 
2006 0.794 0.200 0.370 1 0.808 0.197 0.397 1 
2007 0.755 0.174 0.486 1 0.771 0.180 0.495 1 
2008 0.735 0.147 0.561 1 0.733 0.150 0.560 1 
2009 0.695 0.141 0.491 0.895 0.694 0.140 0.493 0.893 
2010 0.727 0.184 0.463 1 0.730 0.182 0.462 1 
Qatar          
2005 0.741 0.131 0.601 1 0.748 0.127 0.599 1 
2006 0.762 0.120 0.615 1 0.764 0.119 0.617 1 
2007 0.824 0.120 0.603 0.964 0.825 0.122 0.600 0.976 
2008 0.885 0.101 0.736 1 0.880 0.109 0.709 1 
2009 0.863 0.130 0.710 1 0.869 0.128 0.715 1 
2010   0.837 0.168 0.608 1 0.839 0.168 0.608 1 
Kuwait           
2005 0.831 0.114 0.608 1 0.840 0.108 0.622 1 
2006 0.810 0.074 0.656 0.902 0.812 0.074 0.659 0.901 
2007 0.801 0.131 0.593 1 0.801 0.131 0.592 1 
2008 0.790 0.122 0.600 1 0.792 0.122 0.598 1 
2009 0.806 0.105 0.700 1 0.807 0.104 0.696 1 
2010 0.766 0.101 0.641 0.896 0.770 0.103 0.642 0.90 
IB Group           
2005 0.762 0.171 0.512 1 0.767 0.169 0.526 1 
2006 0.747 0.168 0.370 1 0.753 0.166 0.397 1 
2007 0.731 0.151 0.486 1 0.731 0.152 0.495 1 
2008 0.737 0.147 0.562 1 0.726 0.148 0.560 1 
2009 0.735 0.122 0.520 1 0.738 0.123 0.523 1 
2010 0.757 0.156 0.463 1 0.755 0.158 0.462 1 
CB-IW Group            
2005 0.818 0.111 0.594 1 0.829 0.110 0.595 1 
2006 0.828 0.091 0.643 1 0.831 0.091 0.644 1 
2007 0.877 0.096 0.695 1 0.880 0.098 0.696 1 
2008 0.903 0.081 0.666 1 0.891 0.082 0.652 1 
2009 0.874 0.108 0.629 1 0.878 0.109 0.627 1 
2010 0.857 0.141 0.527 1 0.855 0.141 0.525 1 
CB Group           
2005 0.792 0.105 0.609 1 0.795 0.106 0.611 1 
2006 0.805 0.097 0.598 1 0.810 0.098 0.597 1 
2007 0.781 0.122 0.569 1 0.785 0.123 0.569 1 
2008 0.821 0.103 0.651 1 0.824 0.098 0.657 1 
2009 0.779 0.136 0.491 1 0.779 0.136 0.493 1 
2010 0.764 0.128 0.573 1 0.766 0.127 0.579 1 
Table 2- Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Multicollinearity Test 
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(With Size 
Variable)  
Model 1 Model 2 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
NLD 1.09     0.916071 NLD 1.12 0.895883 
IB 1.35 0.740340 IB 1.35     0.740321 
IW 1.81     0.552223 ISW 1.81     0.551405 
FO 1.30     0.769843 FO 1.31     0.765692 
Size 1.77     0.565580 Size 1.87     0.535307 
   CON 1.15     0.866210 
Mean VIF 1.46     Mean VIF 1.43 
 
(With Size 
Variable)  
Model 3 Model 4 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
NLD 1.11 0.904102 NLD 1.12 0.895266 
IB 1.23 0.811789 IB 1.20     0.836756 
GOV 1.38 0.724582 GOV 1.09     0.913851 
Size 1.16 0.862938 Size 1.23     0.811725 
RL1 1.38 0.722530 RL2 1.19     0.839054 
Mean VIF 1.25     Mean VIF 1.17 
 
(Without Size 
Variable)  
Model 1 Model 2 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
NLD 1.09     0.919004 NLD 1.12 0.896242 
IB 1.33 0.750071 IB 1.33     0.749332 
IW 1.31 0.764376 ISW 1.32     0.756908 
FO 1.05     0.956822 FO 1.08     0.922159 
   CON 1.09     0.915196 
Mean VIF 1.19     Mean VIF 1.19 
 
(Without Size 
Variable)  
Model 3 Model 4 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
NLD 1.10 0.912820 NLD 1.11 0.899537 
IB 1.10 0.907527 IB 1.08     0.927266 
GOV 1.38 0.725803 GOV 1.09     0.918342 
RL1 1.37 0.727420 RL2 1.11     0.898029 
Mean VIF 1.24     Mean VIF 1.10 
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Table 1- Variance inflation factor (VIF) Multicollinearity test 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
RWA 1.04     0.9631 RWA 1.02 0.9778 RWA 1.02     0.9813 
ROE 1.27     0.7879 ROE 1.15 0.8717 ∆PLS 1.08     0.9288 
NIM 1.11     0.9045 NIM 1.09 0.9166 ∆FID 1.05     0.9506 
ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ 1.16     0.8608    ∆RECIB 1.12     0.8965 
   ܧܨܨௌி஺ 1.07 0.9343    
∆GDP 1.07     0.9331 ∆GDP 1.10 0.9125 ∆GDP 1.03     0.9667 
    Mean VIF 1.13     Mean VIF 1.09 Mean VIF 1.06 
 
Model 4 Model 5 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.03 0.9752 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.01 0.9872 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9804 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.01 0.9920 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.01 0.9900 ∆݊݋݊݋݈݅ ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.01 0.9929 
    Mean VIF 1.02     Mean VIF 1.01 
 
Model 6 Model 7 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.04 0.9587 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.03 0.9752 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.01 0.9895 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9763 
ܴܱܧିଵ 1.02 0.9805 ܰܫܯିଵ 1.02 0.9828 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.02 0.9794 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.02 0.9779 
    Mean VIF 1.02     Mean VIF 1.02 
 
  
183 
 
Model 8 Model 9 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.17 0.8565 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.14 0.8738 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.05 0.9541 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.08 0.9277 
ܧܨܨ஽ா஺ 4.50 0.2222 ܧܨܨௌி஺ 2.80 0.3572 
ܧܨିܨ ଵ஽ா஺ 4.51 0.2217 ܧܨିܨ ଵௌி஺ 2.79 0.3582 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.02 0.9792 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.03 0.9707 
    Mean VIF 2.45     Mean VIF 1.77 
 
Model 10 Model 11 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.06 0.9453 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.04 0.9596 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9835 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.01 0.9946 
∆ܫܤܣିଵ 1.08 0.9290 ∆ܫܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9809 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.07 0.9366 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.03 0.9732 
    Mean VIF 1.05     Mean VIF 1.02 
 
Model 12 Model 13 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.10 0.9130 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.05 0.9495 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9850 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9810 
∆ܫܤܫܹܣିଵ 1.13 0.8841 ∆ܥܤܣିଵ 1.05 0.9482 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.10 0.9116 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.04 0.9584 
    Mean VIF 1.08     Mean VIF 1.04 
 
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.04 0.9658 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.03 0.9732 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.04 0.9614 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.03 0.9671 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.03 0.9679 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.06 0.9450 
∆MI 1.13 0.8810 ∆REC 1.20 0.8299 ∆RECIB 1.13 0.8864 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.11 0.8994 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.19 0.8398 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.08 0.9276 
    Mean VIF 1.08     Mean VIF 1.11 Mean VIF 1.08 
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Model 17 Model 18 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.03 0.9750 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.04 0.9624 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9851 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.02 0.9851 
∆ܴܧܥିଵ 1.21 0.8243 ∆ܴܧܥܫܤିଵ 1.05 0.9486 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.23 0.8139 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.05 0.9519 
    Mean VIF 1.12     Mean VIF 1.04 
 
Model 19 Model 20 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
ܰܲܮିଵ 1.06 0.9460 ܰܲܮିଵ 1.04 0.9580 
ܴܹܣିଵ 1.01 0.9886 ܴܹܣିଵ 1.01 0.9904 
∆ܲܮܵିଵ 1.03 0.9693 ∆ܨܫܦିଵ 1.05 0.9547 
∆ܲܮܵିଶ 1.03 0.9702 ∆ܨܫܦିଶ 1.03 0.9722 
∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.06 0.9466 ∆ܩܦܲି ଵ 1.05 0.9538 
    Mean VIF 1.04     Mean VIF 1.04 
 
 
Figure 5- Sectoral Financing of IB in the GCC Countries (%)  
	
Data Source: Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
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